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L;lrYlUHT AND IIUDLNYIJNI  L'LllN'TCUb 
IN  this work tlie author does not aim  at originality, or lo 
a learned  dissertation on  tile mnultifor~n  lxinciples, or 
complex science, of  banking.  This has been done effectu- 
ally by more coinpetcnt I~ands. But his whole object is to 
give a plain business statement of  things as they havc bcen; 
ancl  are:  to trace the  rise and progress of  important mo- 
neyed  institutions, and  show what effects  they  have  pro- 
duced upon commerce, upon arts, upon agriculture, and upon 
society in general, and the beneficial results upon each, when 
properly  managed : and to  delineate the deleterious conse- 
quences  they  are  capable of,  and necessarily do  produce, 
when intrusted to unslcillful agents. 
The facts adduced have been  drawn from different ency- 
clopedias, and other authorities equally valuable;  and during 
the investigation, reference has been  made to  every source 
within liis reach, which could in any way elucidate tlie sub- 
ject.  The Bank  of  England, having  been  continued  by 
prudent  hands, standing alone, has  sustained itself, ancl al- 
most or quite sustained the government, for a period of  nearly 
a ccntury and a  Iialf, down  to  the prcsent day:  while that 
of  France, having been taken into tlie hancls of  goverinnenl,, 
mas nlinecl, mcl  alnlost prostrated the govcrninent itself. I1  1 he history of the institutions of olir own cor~ntry  will be 
found to contaiu  important, facts, hitherto locked up in pon- 
clcroos  folios, ancl  conscqucntly accessible to but few.  The 
lcarncd ancl able rcport of  the immortal Hamilton, presented 
to  congress  shortly after  the formation  of  the government, 
togethcr with the luminous report on currencies presented  to 
the  Inst congrcss by  Mr. McDufie, form an aggregate stnte- 
~ucnt  of  statislical  infor~nation  not to be found in any other 
11~0rli  &ant. 
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EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES  . 
Page 252. tenth  line  from  1.1le top. for  (( This stock  (six 
i~lillions),"  read "  This stock (eight millioas)." lN  collllllercial  language a bank is a repository, or  es 
tabliellnlel~t,  for  tile purpose of  receiving  thrrmoncy of idi- 
viductls ; either to keep it in security, or to improve-it by  lraf- 
fickillg in goods, bullion,  or  bills of  excllange ; and it lnay 
be either of  n public or of  a private nature.  A  public bnnk 
is generally regulated by certain I~LWS,  ellacfed by tl~c  govenl- 
ment of  the state, whic.11 consiit~~tc?  its  clin~.ler,  lilnil. ils capi- 
tal, alld establish the ruIes by which it is to concluct business. 
-4  pri~iate  bank, on the other  hand, is  me~cly  a  conlmcl. 
among  inclividuals, for  carrying  on a  tmdc  in money anti 
bills ; and the resyol~sibility  of  the part~lers  is the only secu- 
rity of  those ~11o  transact business with it. 
Banks  are properly coininercial institutions, which, by ail. 
fording  credils, or  ~~~~~~~~lg  notes,  as  the  representative  of 
money, enable merchants, with  greatcr facility, to  buy and 
sell commodities, at  home or abroad.  ?'he  prodiicc of  one 
country is tlli~s  exchanged with that of  anotller, by  nieaas oT 
a rnedium, to which an ideal  value  is  altnchecl ; hence  the 
great utility  of  bankii~g  establishments,  in all  commercial 
countries.  Among  the  ancients  the tcrnl  banlter  implicd 
solnetl~ing  different  from its modern  signlficatioi3, and con- 
veyed an idea corresponding with the profession of  an agent, 
brolrer, or  nioney lender.  Uanlters  were  called  Argcntarii 
alld Numulnrii, by the  Roinans ; and  they loaned  out  thc 
money of  private persons  on  interest ; ~vrotc  tlie  necessary 
deeds, allti  assisted  in l)l~ying  aricl scllil~g  all  Iii~lcl.;  of  ~wo- 
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perty.  The  first establishinent of  banking, in a regular and 
systematic form, took place at Venice about the middle of the 
twelfth  century ; and it arose  from  the  nccessities of  the 
state.  Dulie Vitale, Mitcllel II., I~cing  involved in expensive 
wars with the empire  of  the nrest, and thc Grecian Manuel, 
embarrassed the fiiianccs of  the  republic;  and to  relieve  it 
from  thc  prcssllre  of  its dihticulties,  lle  Iiail  recourse  to  a 
fat-ccd loccn, thc coiztributors to  which mcre  macle  creditors, 
ancl reccivecl intcrcst, at tl~c  ].ate of  four per ccnt. per aaniun. 
The Clianlber  of  Loails  was  established  for the manage- 
ment of  tl~is  f~~ncl,  ancl  regular  payment  of  the interest ; 
which, gradually improving its plan, at last formed itself into 
the more  pcrfect  institution  of  TIIE  BANI<  OF  VENICE. 
This celebrated bank has servecl as a modcl  to allnost every 
siinilar estnblidhlnellt in succcecling ages ; its 
capital mar  5,000,000 clucats, or $4,800,000, 
f~r  wl~ic-l~  the rcpnhlic i.:  secnrity.  Tt  is, properly, a  board of 
deposit,  credit, ancl  iutcrcst.  By an edict  of  the state,  all 
paynlents of  \vholcsale merchandise, and bills of  exchange, 
must bc inadc in l.inaco, or 1 ~anli  notes ; and all debtors must 
lodge tlleir lnoilcy in thc bank, that   heir  crcditors may re- 
ceive pnyuent iil 1,anco ; wl~icll  is done by transferring the 
amount from the one  to  that of  tllc other, or by  writing off 
the suin 11.0111  the accoullt of  tllc debtor, and placing it to that 
of  the creditor.  Payinents arc made in this illailner without 
the iilterve~~tion  ol gold  cr silvcr ; hut there  are exceptions 
to this rule in cases of  retail trade, or  when foreigners wish 
to carry on the precious inctals.  All the riches of  the state 
thus flowed into  tl~c  bank ; and, through various channels, 
were again diffused among trailers, to givc activity to the ex- 
tensive coininerce of  this  once  opulent, 2nd  powerful  city. 
From its  good  Bith, ancl  the regularity of  its  transactions, 
the bank of  Veilice llas always maintained a high cl~aracter 
in Europe, and on  some occasions, its  obligations have been 
inore esteenled than the bonds of  kings. 
During two centuries and a half the bank of  Venice wag 
unrivalled ; for so gradual is  the progress of  improvement, 
that human knowledge is only matured by the experience of 
ages-and  it was not  until the year  1401, that the magis- 
trates of Barcelona establislled  a bank  in that city.  It was 
called the Table of  Exchange, and mas properly a bank of 
exchallge  alld  deposit.  I?oreigl~  bills were negotiated with 
the same liberality as tllosc of  the citizens, and acc01n1noda- 
tions were extended  to stlange~s  as well  as to natives.  It 
was altogether  calculated  for the encourngel~lent  of  both ex- 
ternal and internal comn~ercc,  and the funds of  the city were 
pledged as security for the responsibility of the bank. 
In the year  1407, the bank  of  Genon  conlrnenced ; but 
previous to  this time,  the republic  borrowed  large  sums of 
money from  the citizens, assigilillg certain branches of  the 
revenue for the payment of  the interest, and a board of  ma- 
nagement,  composecl  of  the  most respect,aMe citizens, was 
appointed to conduct the loans, pay the interest, and account 
to government for the funcls intrusted to its care.  From this 
circumstance, the Genoese claim the inerit of  establishing a 
bank as early as the Venetians ; but  it  is  evident that the 
transactions  of  this  board  were  only  an approximation  to 
banking.  In process of time,  however, the lnultiplicity and 
extent of these funds induced disorder and confusioa, and it 
was deemed expedient to consolidate the whole into  one ca- 
pital stock, to  be managed by a bank called  the CHAMBER 
OF  ST.  GEORGE,  to be governed by eight protectors, annually 
chosen,  electecl by  the creditors  and stockholclers.  Under 
this form of government, the affairs of the bank were prospe- 
rously  conducted ; but  the  further  increase  of  the public 
debts, the accessions of  towns  and  territories, among which 
was the little ltingdom of  Corsica, inacle the business  of  the 
bank much  more  complex;  and  the inconvenience of  an- 
llual successions of  new protectors becoming apparent, deter- 
mined the  C4enoese, in  the year  1444. to  elect  eight  new governors tbr the nlanqement of  the banlt, of  whicli only 
two were to go out every year. 
I3efore tlle discovery  of  tlle passage  to the Indias, by the 
Cape of  Good  Ilope,  the Venetians enjoyed a  monopoly  of 
the 1uc;ratii-c trade of  the cast, by means of the Mamelukes of 
Egypt, wit11  rn1io1-u they  were  leagued by policy ancl inter- 
est, \vhicl~  cliffused opy)ulence  and wealth  throughout Italy. 
This  extensive coinnierce created and gave circulation to bills 
of exchange, the creclit aacl currency of  wbich  wele  univer- 
rally  acknoivleclged  \vl~en  they  bore  tlle  signature of  the 
banlia of  Icnl;.,  and fur scveral centuries there were no other 
cstal)lisl~irlcnts  of  the ltind in Europe. 
Tlle 13'1  XI^ OF  Anru~~:~n~nr  was ehtrtblisllect on the 31st of 
January, 1609.  Tl~e  ~nagi~t  rates of  the city, under autho- 
~ity  of  thc states,  dcclarecl tllemselves the perpetual cashiers 
of  the inhabitants, ancl that all payments above 600  gilders, 
1)ut afterwards reclucecl to  300, and bills  of  exchange, shall 
l)e made in the banlr ; which obliged inerchants to open ac- 
coants with il  for the  paynient of  their  foreign bills.  The 
csteiisive coinlnerce  of  Atn5tcrdanl involved such  a variety 
of  ttansnctions,  tht  the clpediency of  regulating them be- 
caine evident, and no measure  could more effectaally secure 
property, check In.cvsuits, ancl prevent  frauds, tl~an  the  esta- 
l~lishn~ent  of  a bank  office, in  1vhic11 all  receipts and pay- 
~nenls  were registcretl in books Itept open for the purpose. 
Dr.  ~mitl;  ascribes the origin of  this bank to the debasecl 
state  of  the  c~~rrent  coin  which  the trade  of  A~nsterdam 
brought from all quarters of Europe, nncl \\~\ihict~  was sulcl at a 
~ccluction  of  l~ine  per  cent.  below the money of  tl~e  mint. 
Jlerchants, in  such  cases, could  nut  always  fincl  standard 
nlolley to pily  I~ills  of  exchnnyc, the value  of' wltich  was  al- 
ways  uncc:tain;  and  accoiclingly  operated  against  the 
United l'iovinccs  ~vith  roreign i~nt~ons.  But as the bank re- 
( cived the debased, ligllt, or worn coin,  nt its i~ltrinsic  ~~alue, 
in the good lnoncy  of  the  country, and  gave credit  for the 
;jrnount in its booli~.  all  inva~.inhl~  stondarrl  wn? t1111s esta- 
blished, that tended greatly to simplify and facilitate the ope- 
rations of commerce.  The beneficial effects of  this establish- 
ment in Holland were soon perceived, and bank  money im- 
mediat,ely bore a premium, or agio, which is a term to denote 
the diftbrence of  price betnreeo the irlo~ley  of  the barllc and 
the coin of  tlle conntry.  Ivhen we consider that coin is only 
a represe~itative  of comi~~otlities,  and  th~t  its  iitility  arises 
only from its  being  a  generally  aclinowledged  standard of 
wlue, by which ln :~~I<ind  in t61c civilized state of  sr,ciety are 
enabled to calculnte the price of articles of excl~ange,  it is not 
surprising that bank receipts,  wliich repr .sent property also, 
ancl at ihe same time not  liable  to  rislr, danger, or  deteri- 
oration of any ltintl, should be held in highel eetilnatiorl than 
coin, mllich is exposed to robbery, and all sorts of  casualties. 
In all countries,  w iere baldis have Lee11  regu!ar in their 
transactions, and their  responsib.lit,y  undoubted, their paper 
has carried  a  premium, nlore  or  le,ss, according to  circurn- 
stances, and the agio of Amstercla,m was generally about five 
per cent. 
The  amount of  capital  of  tlle bank  of  Anlsterdam was 
never exactly ascertained.  It was originally  constituted by 
deposits of coin, and there mas fill1 value in its cofyers for  all 
the credits and receipts it issued.  'I'he bank, however, gave 
credit and receipts also  upon deposits of  g~ld  and silver bul- 
lion, at the rate  of  five  per cent. less than the mint  price of 
such bullion, which was restored to the owner if  he called for 
it within six months, upon paying one fourth per  cent. il the 
deposit was in silver, or  one half per  cent. if  in gold.  B~lt  if 
We term of six months was allowed  to expire, the bank  re- 
tained the bullion at the price stated in its books. 
The advantage of  alalting deposits in this bank is two- 
fold : first, the credit enal~les  the ~nercl~ant  to pay his bills of 
exchange ; second, the receipt  gives  him an opportunity  of 
selling his bullion at an advance price, if  the marltet s11T~uld 
fluctuate in  his  favor.  Although  none  can draw  out bul- 
lion without producing a receipt. and reassigning bank nioneF 14  BANK  OF  AMSTERDAM. 
eqnal to the price at which the bullion had been received, yet 
it  is not absolutely necessary  that  both  credit  and receipt 
should'always remain  in the  hands of  the  same person ; 
as he  who has the receipt will  find bank money to buy at 
the inarket price, to  enable him  to relieve the bullion, and 
the owner of the credit will at all times find receipts in abun- 
dance ; but to prevent any extraorclinary rise in tlie price of 
bank money, or  receipts, which  speculation or other causes 
might soinetimes induce, the bank adopted the resolution  of 
selling bank inoney for the current coin, at an agio of  five per 
cent., and buying it at the rate of  four. 
The  city is guaranty that there shall always be full value 
in the bank to answer all its deinands ; and as the directors, 
who are annually  changed, coinpare tlie  treasure with the 
books, under solemn oath ;  so that there can be no probability 
of fraud. 
The four reigning burgomasters are invested with the di- 
rection  of  the  bank,  and the  city of  Amsterdam derives a 
considerable revenue from it, which arises from the following 
sources : for all deposits, a fourth  or half  per  cent. must  be 
paid ; froin every person who opens an account, a  fee of ten 
gilders  is  exacted, and  for  every  additional  account, three 
gilders  three  stivers ; for  every transfer,  two stivers, or six 
stivers if  the transfer be less than three hundred gilders.  If 
any person shall overdraw his account, he is  fined three per 
cent. on the amount, and  his  order  is  set aside.  There is 
also a considerable profit on the sale of  foreign coin, or bul- 
lion,  which  is always kept till  it can he sold to advantage ; 
and like~vise  by selling bank money, at five  per  cent. agio, 
and buying it at  four.  Through these various resources, the 
bank of  Amsterdam became rich and prosperous, and it was 
supposed to retain in its repositories more gold and silver than 
any other establishment of the kind in Europe. 
BANK OF  ENGLAND, 
CHARTERED  IN THE  YEAR  1694. 
Previous to the year 1694 there were olily four  considera- 
ble banks in Europe ; but on the  27th July, of  that xear, a 
cllarter was granted by William aild Mary, for establishing the 
bank of  England ; which, for opulence, and extent of  circu- 
lation, is now thc greatest in the world.  The charter was 
granted for the tern1 of  twelve years, and the corporation was 
determinable on a, year's  notice.  The original capital, sub- 
scribed by the proprietors, 
was  &1,200,000 sterling, or  $5,333,3334, 
in consideration of  loaning to tlie government the same sum, 
&1,200,000 ; for  which  they  receivcd  an interest  of  eight 
per cent.  amounting to  $426,666:. 
By an act of parliament, in tl~e  8th and 9th of  William, 
they were allowed to enlarge tllcir 
capital stock to  &2,201,171.10, or $9,782,984.44. 
At this time the bank agreed  to  deliver up to the govern- 
ment, so inany exchequer bills as 
amounted to  s2,000,000 or $8,888,888.88. 
and to accept an annuity therefor, of  the 
sun1 of  $100,000,  or $444,444.44. 
The  bank then agreecl to leilcl to government, by contract, 
on demand,  ~1,000,000,  or  $4,444,444.44. 
In  order to enable them to  circulate  cschcc~uer  bills, they 
established what is now called  bank  circulation ; tlie nature 
of  which may be understood by what follows : The compa- 
ny of the bank are obliged to keep cash in hand, sufficient, not 
only to answer their common, hut also any extraordinary de- 
mand that  may be  made upon them ; and what  they have 
over they employ in the trade of  the company.  But when the 
bank  entered  into the above contract, as they did  not keep 
unemployed R larger sum of  lnoiiey than what thcp deemed necessary to answer thcir  ordinary demands, they  could 11uf 
conveniently take out of  tllcir current cash, so large  a  snln 
as a  million,  without  embarrassment ; they  therefore  in 
vented the followil~g,  which  answered all the purposes,  and 
shows the profound financial hliill with which they managed : 
They opened a  subscription  lor a niillion, I\  l~i,  h they re- 
new aniiually ; ~vlhe~eiu  tlie sl1l)scribers advance tell per cent. 
and enter into  a  contract to pay the  remainder, or any part, 
thereof, .cvhenever the  bank  shall call upon them, under  pe- 
nalty of  forfeiture of  the ten per  cent. so advanced.  In  con- 
sideration of  which, tlie bank pays the subscribers 4 per cent. 
interest, for the nlonc,v pnitl in; and ) per  cent. for the whole 
suin they agree to furnish ; and in case a call should be made 
upoil them for the whole, or  any parl thereof,  tbe bank fur- 
ther agrees to pay tham at the rate of  5 per cent. per annuin 
for such sum, until pnid ; ivhich they are under obligation to 
do, at the end of  the year.  By  this nleans, the bank obtains 
all the purposes  of  keeping  a  niilliori  of  nloney by  them ; 
and the subscribers, if  no call is  inade upoil them, (which is 
in general the case,) receive 6;  per  cent. for  the  inoney ad- 
vanced ; yet the company qains  $23,500  by  the contract; 
as will appear by the follo.cvin~  account, viz : 
The  hi~nlr  receives  froin tl~e  governme~~t,  for  the advance 
of a million, $30,000 ; and they pay the subscribers, who MI- 
vance  $100,000  and  agrce  to  pay,  when  called  upon, 
&900,000 more-SG,500  ; rnaking a clear gain to the bani; 
of  6;23,600, or  $104,444.44. 
Uanlr stock nlay not in~properly  be-called a trading stock, 
since with this  they  deal largely in foreign gold  and silver, 
and ill disco~nti~lg  bills  of  exchnnge ; besides which, they 
are allo~vcd  by  the governlnent large sums annually for tlze 
inatlagenlent of  the annuities paid  at their office. 
-, 
teiins of  thc  act of 7  An.ie, chapter  7;  the  bay~k  ad- 
.vanced on the original annuity, g100,000, the 
sum of  6;4(  10,000, or $1,777,777.7'7 
Ancl there had be& pnid into theexcl~equer,in  all, $,1,600,000. 
In pursuiince of  the saine act, the bank cancelled exct~equcr 
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bills to the amount of  $1,755,027.17.10+, or $9,800,123.96, 
at 6 per cent. interest, and was allowed to double its capital. 
In the year 1708, the advances to the government amount- 
ecl  to  %3,375,027.17.10+, or  $15,000,123.96, 
and the capital of  the bank now is  %4,402,343 00 00 
In 1709 there was paid in  656,204 01  9 
In 1710 there was paid in  501,448  12 11 
So that the capital is now  %5,559,995 14 08 
or $24,700,092.11. 
By  the  3d of  George  1, chapter  8, lhe baiili  cancelled 
;fi2,000,000 of  exchequer bills, which made the advances to 
government  ;fi5,375,027.17.10+, or $23,889,012.84. 
By the 8th of  George I, chapter  21, the bank purchased 
South Sea Company stock  %4,000,000, or $17,777,777.77. 
To  enable  the bank  to  effect this purchase, it increased 
its capital by  subscription, in the year 1722, f.3,400,000, and 
at this time the bank had  advanced to  the state, in various 
ways, in all  $9,375,027.17.109,  or $41,666,790.62 ; 
though its capital stocls was 
oilly $8,959,995.14.8,  or $39,822,203.22. 
Thus it appears by this statement, that the bank had ad- 
vanced a larger sun1 to the state than the whole arnount  of 
its capital, on which it paid a dividend to the proprietors, and 
this circumstance shows that the bank possessed an  undivided 
capital,  ~vhich  had  accumulated  from  its  establishment, 
which is the fact ; and it has continued to have an undivided 
capital ever since ; for in the year  1746, the bank had ad- 
vanced to governinent, on different occasions, 
the suin of  &11,686,800, or $51,941,333.33, 
and the capital on which it had divided had been raised  by 
several calls, to  &10,750,000, or  $47,911,111.11. 
Tn  pursuance of  the 4th George 3, chapter  25, the bank 
paid to government, for the renewal of  its charter, 
the sum of  g110,000, or $488,888.88. 
3 At the same linle it uclvanced towards llle supplies on  ex- 
chequer bills  5  1,000,000, or  $4,444,444.44, 
to be paid in the year 1766. 
The charter was then renewed to the year 1786, and the 
divitlend in 1767 lvas raisecl to 5; per cent., which on its now 
capital amounts to  $2,635,111.10. 
Soon after the csta)~lisll~~~ent  of  ille  balk, it assisted go- 
vernment, in  anticipntioll of  the land  and malt  taxes,  and 
also by advances on csclleq~~er  bills, and other securities. 
In  1781,  the adval~ces  in this may alnountcd to $8,000,000, 
in addition to the perl~iallelat  debt of  $11,686,800, 
making in all  $19,686,800,  or  $87,496,888.88. 
On conditioll of advancillg $2,000,000, or $8,888,888.88, 
on exchecluer bills, at 3 per cent. interest, to l)c paid off  from 
the  sinlting ii~nd  within  thrce years,  thc bank obtained  an 
extension of  its charter to illc year 1812. 
To  enablc it to maltc good, this  advance, n call mas made 
of eight per cent. on its capital; which was now 
incl.eascd to $11,642,400, or $51,744,444; 
ancl tlle dividend set~lccl  at 6 per cel~t., 
anlounting to  $3,104,646 ; 
iind the told advance to  governn~cilt,  on  thc land and malt 
taxes, and exchequer bills, 
amounted to  $9,991,678,  or $44,407,457.77 ; 
I~ut  in 1786, the sun1 was 
reduced to $6,634,872, or $29,488,320 ; 
ancl  from  thcncc,  to  1793, the amount  of  these advances 
have fluctuated, from seven to nine millions. 
In 1788, the dividend was raised to 7 per cent., which con- 
tinued to be the rate until 1807. The  dividend, from 1767, to 
1787, inclusive, at 5'  per cent, per annum, 
is  $56,868,880 ; 
and from 1788 to  1807, both  inclusive, at 7 per  cent.  per 
annum, is  $72,442,220. 
In the year 1800, tllc charter  was renewed, by  the 40th 
George 3, chapter 29 ; and continued to 1835, on  condition 
of  aclvancing to thc 111-~blic  service 
~3,000,000,  or $13,333,333.33, 
without interest, for six years, ending in 1806. In that year, 
it was stipulated, by 46 George 3, chapter 4, that thcsc three 
 nill lions shoulil remain with the public, until six nlontl~s  after 
definitive treaty of  peace, at three per cent. interest, during 
thc war ; wllicll is a present to the nation, 
of  $60,000, or $266,GG6.66, 
ancl  which  shows the rcsources, and profitsblc trade of  the 
1)nnlc of  Englancl. 
'I'llc  circulaf ion of  thc notes of  this bank, in the years 
1787 was  f, 8,688,570, or $38,615,8GG.GG 
1790 was  10,217,360, or  45,410,488.88 
1795 was  13,539,160, or  60,174,044.44 
1706 was  11,030,010, or  49,022,711.11 
1  SO5  mas  1S7397,8S0,  or  81,7G8,355.55 
I806 was  17,093,570, or  75,971,422.22 
1807 mas  16,621,390, or  73,872,844.44 
1810 was  21,000,000, or  93,333,333.33 
In 1797 the bank suspcnded specie paymenls ; and an act 
was passccl for that purpose ; whicll suspension was renewed 
annually. 
From thc report  of  a committee, appointed in this year, to 
inq~~ire  into the state of  the bank, the total credils were 
$17,597,293,  or $78,210,191.10. 
The  debt owing by government 
$13,770,390,  or $61,201,733.33. 
Thus leaving a balance in favor of  the bank, 
$3,82G,CI03,  or $17,008,457.77. 
Since that time the profits of  the  bank llarc been  consi- 
clcrably augmented ; and the proprietors  have received 110- 
nuscs,  in addition  to  7  per cent. ; I~ut,  in April,  1807, the 
permanent dividend was fisccl at 10 per  cent. per  rtnllum ; 
which, 61.  t~vrnl,y-two  yeare, up  to 1829,  inclusive, 
js $1 1  3>837,768. 2C  HANK OF PRANCE. 
Thus  has this wonderft~l  institution withstood the ravages 
of  time !the  convulsions of  nations !-the  wreck  of  em- 
pires !-the  vicissit~tdes  of  war  and peace !-cliffusing  life, 
light, and heat, throughout the immense rcgions of  the body 
politic, from age to age, down to the present clay ! And its sta- 
bility is now  believed to  be commensurate with  the  British 
empire. 
From the above well managed and prosperous institution, 
we will  now turn our eyes to  a  rival institution,  nearly si- 
multaneous in its origin ; which bid  fair to supersede its com- 
petitor ; and, for  a  time, outvied it in the magnitude of  its 
operations, and the splendor  of  its achievements ; but, in a 
few  short years, from  bad  management, exploded ; spread- 
ing  devastation and horror in  its progress ; convulsing the 
nation to its centre ; and  had well nigh sapped the vitals of 
the throne. 
BANK OF FRANCE, 
CHARTERED IN THE YEAR 1716. 
The French  nation,  though  lcss  enterprising than  the 
English,  in every thing  relative  to commerce, have yet, in 
some  respects, successfully imitated them.  But,  in the par- 
ticular instance of  banking, they have not bccn so fortunate ; 
owing, more to causes connected  with their  political institu- 
tions, than to any want  of  knowledge, genius, or activity in 
the people. 
In the year 1716 a bank was  established in  Paris, by the 
celebrated John Law, of  Lauriston.  The object of this bank, 
according to Mr. Law's professions, was to increase the circu- 
lation of  money ; 
To  put a stop to the progress of  usury ; 
To  facilitate the exchange  between  Paris and the pro- 
vinces ; 
Augment the circulation of  manufactures ; 
Alld  to enable the people to pay, the more easily, the hea.vy 
taxes to which they were subjectecl. 
The letters patent, establishing this  bank, stipulated, that 
the stock  should  consist  of  1200 shares,  of  5,000 livres 
each,  at the rate of  40 livres the  nark ;  SO that each share 
was \vorth 5250 sterling, and the whole stock of  the  bank 
at $300,000  sterling, or  $1,333,333.33. 
The  regulations of  this bank werc  wise and salutary.  It 
was declared, that the bank securities belonging  to, as well 
as the money lodged by foreigners, should  not be  subject to 
confiscation,  even in case of  war with the  nations  to  which 
the proprietors belonged. 
The bank, of  which Mr.  Ilaw and his  brother  William 
were the proprietors, assumed, the  firm of  TIIE  GENERAL 
BANK  OF  LAW  & COMPANY  ; anil the afkirs of  the  bank 
were so prosperous, that, at a general meeting, on the 20th 
December, 171  7, a dividend was cleclarecl of  7;  per cent., for 
six months, amounting to  $100,000, 
There can be no doubt, but this bank would soon hare ri- 
valled that of  Amsterdam, or of  Engla~~d,  and produced con- 
sequences eclually beneficial to France : but  the strong arm 
of  power interfered, and changed the institution  from a pri. 
vate, to a public concern. 
By an edict  of  council, bearing  date the 4th December, 
1718, the public  were informed, that his majesty had  taken 
Mr. Law's bank into his own hands, under the name of TITE 
ROYAL  BANK  ; of  which,  Mr. Law  was  appointed dil-ector 
general ; and branches were established in different cities. 
The bank  now  proceedcd  on  public  credit, or  in  otllel 
words, was entirely dependent on the zoill of  the sovercig~a  ; 
and as the schemes of monarchs  are seldom guided by  mo- 
deration or reason, it embraced objects so  magnificent,,'^^ vast, 
and extensive, that all  Europe loolceil  on with anxiety, and 
trembled for the issue ! 
It was  proposer!  to vest  fhc  whole privileges, effects, and 
po3sessions  of  foreign trading  companies, the Grcat, Fanas, the mint, the general receipt of the king's  reveilues, and the 
nlanagement and property of  the bank, in  one great com- 
pany ;  which, haviag  in  their  hands  all the trade, taxes, 
and royal revenues of the kingdom, might multiply the notes 
of  the bank to any extent they pleased. 
Accordingly, a  company was  formed  in 1727, under the 
name  of  THE  COMPANY  OF THE  WEST,  to  which Was 
granted the province of  Louisiana,  and from this circumstance, 
the operations  of  tlie  company obtained the name  of  the 
MISSI~SIPPI  SYSTEM. 
Of this company 200,000  shares were  issued, at the rate 
of  500 livres each, 
amounting to  100,000,000 livres, or $18,750,000. 
On the 4th  September, 1718, THE  FARM  OF  Ton~cco 
was made over to the Company of  the West, on their agree- 
ing to pay to the king rent in advance, 
2,020,000 livres, or'$378,750. 
On the 15th December folloming,tl~ey  obtainecl the charter 
andeffects of   SENEGAL GAL COMPANY;  but the most iinportant 
grant they obtained, was in May, 1719, when an edict mas 
published,  transferring  to  them the  excl~isive  privilege  of 
trading to  the East Indies, China, and the South seas, on 
condition of  paying the lawful debts of  these companies, now 
dissolved.  On this condition, the Company of  the West as- 
sumed the titleof  TI^ COMPANY  OF THE IN DIES,^^^ 50,000 
new shares were constituted, at the rate of  550 livres cach, 
amounting to  27,500,000 livres, or $5,156,250, 
to be employed in building vessels, in satisfying the creditors 
of  the  old  companies,  and in preparations for  the general 
trade ; and from the vain expectation of  possessing a  lucra- 
tivc branch  of  commerce,  the price  of  a share rose in  the 
market to  1000 livres, or  $187.50. 
On the 25th July, 1719, the mint was made over  to  the 
company, for a consideration 
of  50,000,000 livres, or $9,375,000, 
to be paid to the king. 
Ill  to raise that suin 50,000 new shares were ordered, 
at the rate of  1000 limes, 
amounting to 50,000,000 livres, or  $9,375,000. 
On the 27th of  August  following, the great  farms were 
made over to the company, on  their  agreeing to  pay in ad- 
vance of  rent to the king for them 
3,500,000 livres, or  $656,250. 
And, on the 31st of  same month, they obtained the gene- 
ral receipt of  other branches of  the king's revenue. 
The company now  promised an annual dividend  of  200 
livres on a share. 
There was now 301,000 shares, which, at 200 livres each, 
amounted to  60,240,000 livres, or $11,295,000. 
In consideration of  which, the price rose in the market 
to 5,000 Iivres, or  $937.50. 
The company now  agreeing to  lend the king, to pay off 
his creditors  1,500,000,000 livres, or $281,250,000, 
at 3 per  cent.  interest, created, in  September and  October, 
300,000 new shares, at 5,000 livres each, 
amounting to  1,500,000,000 livres, or $281,250,000. 
The company's capital was now  601,200 shares ; which, 
at 5,000 livrcs each, is 3006,000,000 livres, or $563,625,000. 
And the annu~l  income arose as follows, viz. 
Interest from the king,  48,000,000 livres, 
Farms, mint taxes, &c.,  39,000,000  (' 




From so  great  a revenue they could  well  afford  to  pay 
200 livres on a share, as a dividend; which, on their present 
capital, amounted to  120,240,000  livres, or  $22,545,000. 
The infatuation, which  at this  ti~e  prevailed in Franw, 
was so great, as to raise the price of  shares 
to 10,000 livrcs each, or  $1,875, The  original proprietors acquired immense fortunes.  Mo- 
ney  was  abnnclaiit ; agriculture,  manufactures  and  com- 
merce flonrisllecl ; allit the governincnt mere enabled to  re- 
lieve the people from taxes, to the 
amoiint of 87,000,000 livres, or $16,312,500. 
Notwithstanding, the general confidence in the stability of 
the bank, and India  company, there  were individuals  who 
held a different opinion ; and they converted their paper into 
specie,  which  they either hoarded  up,  or  shipped to  other 
countries ; and this occasioned  a run upon the bank, until 
there was not enou,gh  left in  France, for  the common pur-  - 
poses of  circt~lation. 
To  avert the danger, wliicll now threatened the whole sys- 
lem, several edicts were  passed, restricting payments i11  spe- 
cie ; prohibiting the manufacture of  plate, without the royal 
license ; and declaring, that  all  rents,  taxes,  and customs, 
should be paid in notes, tlie value  of  which, was to remain 
always invariable ; while the standard  of  coin was kept  in 
coi~stant  fluctuation. 
Rut the restriction  was carried  to  its  greatest height by 
the edict of  27th February, 1720, which  prohibited indivi- 
cluals, and secular or  religious communities, from having in 
their possession more than 500 livres in sl~ecie,  under penalty 
of coaiiscatioi~,  fine, and imprisonment. 
These ineasures had the eff'ect of  thro\ving into the bank 
in specie, between the months of  February and April,  1720, 
ll~c  suln of  300,000,000 livres, or  $56,250,000. 
The royal bank was now incorporated with the company 
of the Inclies, and the king remained guaranty of  the notes, 
of which none were to be fabricated in  future,  except by an 
edict of  council. 
Tlle profits of  the bank, since  his  inajesly  had taken it 
into his own hands,  in  December, 1718, were  given  up  to 
the colnlxttly ; and  as they  were supposed to be immense, 
thc ~~~iblic:  clltcstairlecl  CI  high idect of  tlle company's opulence. 
At thib period, tlle crcdit of  France was at its lleighl;  but 
it so011  espcrici~ccil  a reverse, that iavolved tflousands in mi- 
scry and cli-;tress. 
Tllc ministry, ~vlio  Tvcre  opposecl  to no law, represented 
to the regent that it  was  jiecessary  lo  eclualize the value of 
paper currency, and the coin, by  either raising the denomi- 
natioii of  tllc latter to 130 livres the mark, or  reducing the 
former onc half. 
This absurd notion prevailed in the council, and it was re- 
solved to climiiiish the value of  the bank notcs, and the India 
company's actions, tllnt n just proportion between thein and 
thc coin might be mniataincd. 
For that pmposc, an cclict was  passed  on the 21st May, 
1720, ordering that shares should be reduced to 8000 livres, 
and on the 1sl of  July, 7500 livrcs, and so on 500 livres a 
month, till thc 1st  of  Dccembcr, when  they were to be fixed 
at 5000 livres. 
It ordered, also, that bank notes shoulcl  be  reduced as 10 
to 8, but that on tlie first clay  of  July they should be further 
reduced-those  of  10,000 livres to 7,500, and so on month- 
ly,  at  tlle  rate of  500 livres, until  Deccmbcr,  when  they 
sllould remain fised. 
']'his  iii11~olitic,  and disgracefi~l  nleasurc, was followed with 
corresponding consequcnces : the notes  lost  a11  credit, and 
the ~vhole  papcr fiabric fcll to the ground.  Mr. Law's system 
was overturiiecl; and, in its  ruin,  involvecl thousands, who 
hail converted their property into banlr currency, on the faith 
and  declarations  of  government,  which  had  soleinnly en- 
gaged, that, whatever should change the coin, the bank notes 
~houlcl  always remain the same, and be paid in full. 
At this time, the  notes  in  circulation, amounted  to  the 
enormous sun1 of  2,225,085,590 livres, or $419,078,535.62. 
Rail, as they would notpnss for any fixed value, the distress 
of the people becaine extreme, aiicl threatened the very exist- 
ence of  government. 
-1 To  alleviate, in soine nleasure, the evils existing, the bank 
was shut for a few days, under pretence of  esamini~ig  the ac- 
counts ; but was opened agoill on the 10th June, for the ex- 
change of  notes of  10  livrea ; and notes of  100 livres were 
to be changecl int,o small notes ; bat ollly one to be  brought 
by each  person, comi~~g  for  that  purpose.  The 17th July 
was fixed  for  the paylnent of  notes of  100 Iivres ; but the 
concourse of  pcople  mas so  great, that a scene of  riot and 
confursion took  place, u-hich was  only quelled by a  military 
force. 
To  absorb, Ilowever, the  illl~lle~lse  amount of  paper, with 
which tl~e  nation ~vus  deluged, the government had recourser 
to granting annuities to the lloldcrs of  banlt paper. 
Accordingly 25,OU0,000 of  perpetual annuities, at  the rate 
of  forty years l>urcllase, and 400,000 at the rate of  twenty- 
five years purchi~se,  were constituted,  Books of  account cur- 
rent, and transfers of  600,000,000 mere opened at the bank ; 
and in IIugu$t, 81000,000 more, of  perpetual annuities,  at 
the rate of  filty j-edrs pllichas~,  were issued, 
By these means, 2,000,000,OUO were  expected  to  be  re- 
turned, amountilig to  $375,000,000, 
but the discredit of  the paper, and the unfavourable nature of 
the terms, made the people hesilate.  And an edi;t was passed 
on the 15th August, that notcs  of  10,000 and  1,000 livrea 
should hare no  currellcy, csccpt for the purchase of  annui- 
ties and bank accounts.  And LL  further edict passecl 1st No- 
vember, prohibiting all paynients in notes. 
Thus tern~ii~ated  Mr. Law's  celebrated banking  system ; 
which, though founded on principles calculated for  stability, 
could not  resist  the perfidy,  or  folly, of  a despotic govern- 
ment.  But France hi13  rcaped some advantage from its es- 
tablishinent, in her  agriculture, her manufactures, and com- 
merce ; and the  people had  becoille  Inore inclustrious,  and 
better acquainted with the  principles of  trade, by  the  abun- 
dance of  the circulating nlediun~,  which it I~ad  produced. 
ft  is utlnecessary to follow our inquiries as to the balllting 
establishmellt~  of  the French, through the pcriod of  the revo- 
lution, as a new and iinporlant  itistitution for that purpose, 
under the sanction of  the imperial republic, has superseded all 
otl~ers  in France. 
The regulations of  this bank mere decreed by  the law of 
24th Gennaine, year 12, (1SOd) and are as follows : 
lst. The association formed  in  Paris,  under  the title of 
THE  BANK  OF  FRANCE.  This institi~lion  shall have the 
exclusi~ve  privilege of  issuing cash notcs. 
2d.  The capital of the bank shall consist of  4,500 shares, 
at 1000 francs each, which, at 25 francs the pound  sterling, 
is $1,800;000, or  $8,000,000, 
as primitive capital, sul~ject  to increase, tlvough the medium 
of reserved funds.  The banlt  shall  cliscount  bills  of  ex- 
change, notes, or bonds, brlt not to carry on any kind of  com- 
merce, except in money matters. 
?'he  annual dividend shall nct esceed  G per cent. yearly. 
The benefits over  and abovc  the annual dividend shall be 
converted into reserved funds.  The  rules for t.he directioil of 
this bank  are sirnilas to those ill thc United States. 
Any person forging the  notes  of  this bank,  arc  liable to 
capital punisliment. 
The dividend on this bauk, lip to  3 830, incl~~sive,  at  G per 
cent., is  $12,480,000. 
The  rules and regulations of this bank, are well calculated 
for its security and prosperity ; but whether any insti~ution  of 
this kind can flourish in a dcspotic country, where the Iilndv 
are liable to be diverted from ll~eir  original purpose, by the in- 
fluence of  power, is extremely questionable. 
It is  well known,  that  all mercantilc associatic~na  derive 
their stability and credit from a strict observance of  the rules 
by which they are constituted, as the confidence of  lnanltind 
can be firrnly placed only on what is Itaown, fixed, and de- 
terminate ; and there are no c.stablishmetlla lllore in~riolabl~ 
than banking coinpnnics. The  utility of banlrs arises from thcir airorcling a circulating 
mecliuin, reprcseiiting property, tile quantity of  which is only 
limited  by the necessity that occasio~ls  it, or in otilcr words, 
by the demand iaduced by t11c  cliversiiiecl opcrntions of coin- 
merce. 
As this substitute for moncy can be  fal~ricnted  at littlc ex- 
pense, it n~ay  be rlee~ned  an artificial ail~l  inexhaustible inilvc 
for supplying the deficiency of  Chc prccious metals, or  allo- 
gether supplaizting tlzcm, as a circulating mecliuin. 
As gold and silver, ho~vevcr,  havc so lor12 rcprescntcd pro- 
perty, thc habits of n-~allkincl  have attachccl an idea of value 
to them,'which is allnost universal ; ancl it  is  only  anlong 
polished nations that bank bills  are currcnt ; but to civilized 
society they are of thc higllcst iu~portancc,  aiid thc illveiltion 
of the banking system introduced a nciv crn in the annals of 
commerce. 
THE  BANKTKG  SYSTEM OF SCOTL,ABD. 
The banking systein  of  Scotland  presents  tliree  great, 
and lending  featurcs ;  it  offers  to  tlie  fi-ugal  a  safc,  and 
at the same tiiile  a profitable  dcpoaitory  lor their  savings ; 
the industrious it fi~rilishes  with  loans, adva~lceil  u~>on  cash- 
credits ; and the public  at  large  il providcs  \zri~ll  n safe, 
economical, and convcizicnt circulating i:icrlium,  Thc  uti- 
lity of thc t~vo  for~ner  fi~riclions  is loo 111aliifcA to ilcllllil of dis- 
pute; but with regard to the lntlcr l~~ilctioil,  that of  pro:  iding 
a circulating inedium, it is slrcnuon.;ly contcnclcd, tllnt this is 
not an essential feature of, b~lt  incrcly an ad;uucl lo, the sys- 
tem.  Those wl~o  hold this opiizici~~,  ulgc, that altllougli the 
Scotch systcm of  1)nuBing  be goocl, as it  ~lnncl~  at present, it 
would be still bctter  witliout thi.;  aclju~~ct,  ~vhicll  tlrcy rcprc- 
sent  as  an unucceasary  and  cvcn  it~jnrious  excreeccncc. 
From thrsc cicxn .:  \:  t.  inrr :  t:~'rc  11:c l;i  I ft  (lf rr.plcsii,,rr our 
unequivocal dissellt : far  fro111  rcgardillg this  f~lllction  as an 
excrescense, svllich  night be 10ppccl  elf, if not  with advan- 
tage, at least \vithout illjury, ive consider it as the hinge  on 
which the wllole systeni praclically turns.  Our rcaders need 
scarcely be rcmi~ided,  that a very large pro1)ortion of the most 
impoytallt transactions of tllosc banks, receiving clep;sits,  and 
advanciilg loails u1)011 cash credits, is coacluctecl tllro~~gll  the 
rnediL1m of  bralvcl~es,  dispersed tliroughoat  tlic various  dis- 
tricts of  that country; thc expense  of  maintaing these local 
establishinetlts  is consiclerablc ; and ~voulcl,  uivcjucstional~ly, 
exceed  any profit  mliiclz coultl  nccruc  to  tlic  parcnt bank, 
fronl its deposits, ancl cash crcclit trnnsactioils alone ; the loss, 
thus occasioncrl, is now innde up to  I.!Ic  parcnt banlts by tlio 
profit derived ft.orn  tllc circulation of  llieir notes.  If the pa- 
rent  banlrs  werc  deprivcd  of  this source of  einolulnent, it 
cannot adinit of  a doubt, that  all or  at least  ncarly all  the 
branchcs ~vould  be reliuc~uishecl.  In solvie toivas and popu- 
lous places, they might  clcar  thcir  espensea, and i~laiiitain 
their grouncl, even if this prcmit~m  wcrc withdrawn ; but for 
the poorer and more tl~iilly  pop~ilatecl  clistricts, where tlie ac- 
coniinodation which  tlzcy f~~raisli  is inost  ~vantecl,  ancl per- 
haps nlost  useful, they \vould infallil~ly  c!isnpl~cnr.  The  ~vit- 
ncsscs examiner1 by the ccmmiltee of the l~ouse  of  ccnunons, 
appointecl to iivquirc into tlzc principles and practicai operation 
of  the system, mcre  very closely questioned as to this poiilt ; 
and their unifonn nnswcr was, that, witliout tlle profit arising 
from the circulation ol a paper currency, nndcr  five pounde, 
the branch banks could not bc continucci ; lllc colnmission of 
one pcr cent., (which is tlic diKcrencc l:et\vccnthe  interest al- 
lowed up011  deposits, nncl  that  chargcd on advances madc 
under cash  credits,) not being, ol itself, suEclent  to dcfiay 
the unavoidable  cxpcnscs of  sucl~  cs~blisil~llcnts,  ill tbillly 
populated districts micl  sn~nil  to~,vi~s,  iirllerc 111.:  niaoullt of the 
business transactcd is nccessaril~~  liulitcd.  it  lvns suggcstcd, 
by some  of  thc 1nc1nbcr.j: col~iposing  thot  committee, that, 
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charging so much  Inore  intercst  on casli credit  loans, the 
banlrs of  Scotlai~cl  iriiglit nial;c  up for the loss ~vhich  mould 
be occasioned by the discontinuance of  paper moacy.  Tliis 
suggestion  the  witnesses  cf-l'cctually  rebutted,  by  observ- 
ing, that either of  tliese two modes of  supplying the defalca- 
tion  which  would  arise  from  tl~e  witl:dra\val  of  a  paper 
currcncy, would  inevitably prove  fatal, at least  to  the cash 
credit branch of  the system.  'Fhc interest allowed up011 de- 
posits is always reduced to tlie lowest rate at which it can be 
maintained, without driving away the capital now intrusted 
to the manageinent  of  tlic  Scotch banlters : an additional 
reduction,  even  of  a  trifling  amount, might,  and unques- 
ably would, force a very consiclerable proportion of the whole 
body of  depositors to witl~dmm  their funds, and to  seek out 
for another, and morc profitable channcl of inve'stment.  The 
interest now allowccl upon baak deposits is less, by tcn shil- 
lings per cent., than could  bc obtained on private loans ; but 
the superior credit of  tlie  banks, as well as various other ad- 
vantages, incident to this  inoile of  investment,  induce capi- 
talists to give it tlie prcfcrcnce.  If, however, the rate of  in- 
terest, already below the average lcvcl of  mhat is obtained on 
private loans, should bc still f~~rlher  rcducecl, it is ccrtain that 
the capitalist would no longer transact his affhirs throng11 the 
mediurn  of  the banlrs, but lvould, ratlier  tllan consent to a 
filrther sacrifice, cxpose liilnsclf to tllc risk ancl inconvenience 
of  dealing  clirectly  with  thc  privatc  borrower.  Any  at- 
tempt, therefore, to augment the profits of  the Scotcll banks, 
by reducing the rate  of  intercst  allowed upon  clcposits, still 
further below the averagc rate of  interest in the general mo- 
ncy inarlret of tlie einpire, would unavoidably fail.  It would, 
indeed, appear about as rational, as well  as effectual, as an 
attempt, by ineans of  a  sicve: to keep  the water of  one side 
of  a stream higher than tlie lcvel of  the same channel on  tlie 
other side.  'l'hc  bankcrs of  Scotland 11avc  liitl~crto  enjoyed 
the  reputation of  being-: not  only tolcral~ly  veil  accjuainted 
with their OII~II bnsincss, hnt, also  pretty much alive to their 
owll interests ; and we  may, thcrefore,  be  well  assured that 
this wary, sagrncious, ancl intelligent class of  traders, never al- 
low a  rate of  interest upon deposits which  exceeds by a sin- 
gle sllilling what is  necessary, in  orcler  to  retain the capital 
now  illtrusted  to  their  rnanagemc~it.  Comparing the loss 
.crroi~ld  be  snstnincd  from the  ~vithclramal  of  a very 
considerable portion of  the lnoncy wliich now passes through 
their hancla, with tlie profit which ~roulcl  accrue from reducing 
the  rate  of  interest  alloiircd upon  the ~cinainder,  they ar- 
rive at the prrtcticnl  conchxsion, that the foriner would  n~ore 
than counterbal~znce  the latter. 
Equally futile would prove tlic  eiitleavor  to inake up tho 
deficiency of  rcvcnue, occasioned by the suppiession of  a pa- 
per circulating n~ediun~,  ll~-  the ilnpositioii of  a higher rate of 
interest than is now cliargcd  upon  loons  advanced on  cash 
credits.  The  rate of  interest charged upon these loans is al- 
ready son~cwhat  above the  average  01  tlie  nloiiey market. 
Thc  borrowers are willing tobcnr this extra chargerather than 
encounter  the trouble and delay which generally embarrass 
all applications to privatc cal)italists;  bat if  the banks should 
raise the intcrcst charged upon  cash credit  loans, still highcr 
above the average  level of  the ifioney  market, it would in- 
evitably have the eflect of  driving  at least a very  large pro- 
portion  of  tlic class  of  borromeis,  to deal  directly with the 
class of  lenders ; and the additional profit  which would  ac- 
crue  on tlie loans  advanced  to  tlie  lesser  number,  which 
lllight  perhalx still coutinuc to  clcal  ~iritll  tllc  bank, would 
not countcrvnil the ~mavoillablc  loss of  a largc portion of  its 
preseiit custom.  In  either of tliese  cases, the practical result 
would  be  precisely the saine;  if  the banks reduced too low 
the rate  of  intcrest upon deposits,  thcy  would  l~ave  less to 
Icrld ; if they charged too high an intcrest upon loans, they 
mould dimini::li thc 1lult11)cr  of  Loiroivcrs : and hence would 
~~n~voidal11yfo~io.t~  tl~e  dl$contlnunllce of  tlie various branches 
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It must, n:,  rioubt,  IJ~  nrimittecl, tlrnt  1111:  ustnblishmcnt of 
joint stocl;  con~panfe.,  lor  tllc pnrposc  of  c~n~loying  in dis- 
counting bills of csclinnge buch balances as inight be placed 
at their disposal 1)y  thcii customer.,  \roulrl  Le  an important 
improvement ul~ou  GLir  1;iosellt  l~racticc  cf banliil~g. Com- 
mercial capitniists \vould by li1i.3 ~ncans  bc f~~rnished  with safe 
depositories for such sinall I)alnilcrs as TVOLII~  1~  required for 
conductiilg their daily tra~~sactions  ; the aggregate  of  these 
balances TVOIIICZ  afird  a s11p1)Iy of capital for  the purpose  of 
disco~unting  good bills ol" crcliangc ; a11d  the creclit of  joint 
stock con~l~anjcs  .i\roulcl sccurc tllc resources  of  these institu- 
tiol~s  from being c~ipl~lcd  I)y tilc influciice of  those circunl- 
stances  wliich  so  ofien inllueuce  the custolncrs of  private 
baiiks lo ~vit!>din~v  tlreir bnlni~ccs  ~ritli  the abruptness of ter- 
ror.  But altllougl~  ilii-;  \\lonld 11c a grcnt i~nprovenlent  011 our 
subsisting prncticr, it  jvor~lcl still &dl  infinitely short of  the 
efliciei~cy  nil11 utility  of ills sysrem, \vhicli,  for upwards of n 
century, llns ])re\  [.ilccl c11  ti,(: otl~cr  siclc of tile Tweed ; and, 
in spite of  old Illcsid,iis ~l~~t:~itn,  no ~iatesinnn,  ~vho  is inaster 
of  11ir c~;iTt,  \rill  co11iel;t hirn-;clL wit11  half  an aclvantage, 
mllcn tlie ~vllole  is 1:i112!  icnlly 1i7i~hin  his rcacl~. No cominu- 
uity can dclivc lronz )~;i:li<i,l!;  dl  the nclvantages which the 
practice i.;  capable cl'yicl~liiig,  until csta1)lish~iients  have been 
cvery ~vlierc,  orgiliiize:l,  on principles which  must attract 1.0 
t1lcSc rc~.crvoi~;  tllc ~c~:I!IIII~~:~~cc~  s:~viiigs  of'  cach district, to 
be  illen laid oi~t  in cncoura~in:  eei~tei.l)rise,  and developing 
the rcsourccs ol  pruii~~i  tire inctusiry.  W it11 regard to the first 
of  thcse pcirits- 
LL It is astonislii~l~~,"  ob~crrcs  Mr. Scrope,  to what shifts 
and cspcciicu~.;  per-:ou-;  are c11.ivcn in  England, for  the utili- 
ztitioil of  vv,ilatevcr sinoll suais tltcy  have saved, in conse- 
quence of tlie Ui1g11,:ll  I~anIijl  not allo\ving interest upon depo- 
sits.  Tlie cstid~liil~~nc~~t  of  savings banlis mas of' iacalcu- 
lable aclvantage in this respect, but the alnouat of deposits in 
them being lirniled lo one hundred and fifty pounds, the dif- 
ficulty of  placin::  out Iar~cr  +itllls  w  it11 safety has led to much 
destruction  of  capital,  and great  individual  misery.  In  a 
slnall cou~ltry  district, within  the cognizance of  the writer, 
two attorneys have successively failccl, within a few years one 
of thc other ; the  first to  an amount  of  near  one hundred 
thousand  puunds-the  second  of  more  than two  hundred 
thousand.  The creditors  of  hoth,  on examination,  were 
found to co~lsist  almost wholly of old servants, retired trades- 
men, and farmers, and the widows and orphans of such per- 
sons, who had  deposited their small fortunes with either at- 
torney, on his personal responsibility.  It cannot be dofT;5ted, 
that had there been a bank of acknowledged security in this 
district, which, lilte tlie Scotcll banks, allowed a  fair  interest 
on deposits of any amount, the greater part, if not the whole 
of  this property, moulcl have been lodged there in safety, and 
hundreds of  inclividuals preservecl in a state  of comfort, who 
are now reduced in their old age to the \vretclied condition of 
parish paupers." 
Our own  experience enables us fully  to  corroborate this 
statenlent ; wc have personally  witnessed  several instances 
of a similar kincl, in which either  the failure of insolvent at- 
torneys, or country banks wliich allowed interest upon depo- 
sits, has overwhelmed  a,  very large proportion of the inhabit- 
ants of  whole districts at once wit11 poverty and despair.  But 
however useful  the northern banlts may be,  as depositories 
for the savings of the economical classcs, they are still  more 
valuable to  the  public,  on  account  of  the  encouragement 
which, through their system of cash credits, they hold out to 
enterprize and industry.  Their managers are impelled  by 
the most po~verful  n~otivea  to eserc theinselves in discovering 
a lucrative method  of  laying  out the capital placed  in their 
hands ; this being the only way in wiiich they can get back 
the interest  wliich  they  allo~v  upon  deposits.  It is  their 
prime object and business to searcl~  ii,r i~ietruinents  fit to ren- 
der ~roductivc  the capital  intrusted  to  their  nian~gement  ; 
and these instruments can be found only in that class of men 
who; possessing n  reputation for integrity and industry, ara 
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destitute of the capital required for the undertakings in  which 
their  enterprize  may lead them  to  engage.  The bankem 
are to the full as anxious to discover persons of  this descrip- 
tion, in order to lend,  as thmc persons  themselves  can  pos- 
sibly be to find out capitalists from whom they inay borrow, 
It is this saving of  calital, on the one hand, and encourage- 
ment to inclnstry, on the other, whicll  have  mainly  contri- 
buted to  advances which  Scotland is acknowledged  to have 
made in wealth aucl pro9perity within the last hundred years. 
Before the i~ltroduction  of  the present  banliing system, the 
people of that country l~acl  no safe depositories in which they 
could have placed small savings ; hence  their savings were 
hoarded up,  and remained unproductive, both to the owners 
and  the community.  Ullcter  the operation  of  the present 
system, evcry shiIIing \vhich an econolnical  membcr of  the 
community is cnablecl to save, id  instailtly carried to the loed 
bank, whence it passes into the hands of  some industrious 
and enterprising person, who will en~ploy  it profitably. 
Another observation may be adclecl  in this place.  Banks, 
which, by  their credit  and k~lown  solidity, have conciliated 
public confidence so far as to attract into their coffers the ag- 
gregate savings of  each district, in the form of  deposits bear- 
ing interest, are eclually useful every  where ;  they stimulate 
to industry ancl  econolrly the artisan and mechanic,  as well 
as the agricultural ld~orer. Bit1 the practice of gra~ltillg  cash 
credits apjjenrs lcss indiq)cnsal~Ie  for the pmposes of tile com- 
mercial, than for the wants of the agricultural classes.  The 
littlc sl~opl~eepers  or  tmclcsinen  of  fair  cllaracter, can easily 
get goods on crcdit from soirlc tvholesale dealer ; the  rant of 
capital  does not,  therelore, ulterly  preclude  any individual 
belonging to this class f~om  coinrne~lcing  business on his own 
account ; but the farmc-r who wants capital, has no resource 
of  this kind ; whatcvcr  iiapiovemeats he may desire to  ac- 
complish,  must be  delayed  in  cvcry  instance;  and in  the 
greater numbcr of  cases altogether  relinquisl~ed,  because  he 
cannot cornnland thc means rec~lirecl  to carry them into ere. 
cution.  It may be said that this irnpediment  to agricultural 
improvement might be obviated by  a loan, advanced  to the 
farmer by seine private  friend,  or by a  bank ; but  granting 
that the necessary accol~~modatioi~  could be thus obtained, it is 
clear that it would be much more expensive to the party ac- 
colnmodated than a cash  credit  of  equal efficiency.  Under 
the system of cash credits, a maximum is fixed above which 
the borrower is not allowed to draw upon  the banlr: : but he 
js  not obliged to take the whole  of this at once;  and, in con- 
sequence  pay interest upon  it ; he draws it  out  gradually, 
as his necessities require, and interest is charged only  from 
the  time  when  each  particular  sum  is  drawn  out ; on 
the other hand,  he is  not only  allowed,  but  expected,  to 
pay into  the bank:  the proceeds of  the produce  of  his  farm, 
which from time to time he disposes of in the market ; and on 
these payments interest is also  allowed on the credit side of 
his account.  Hence it necessarily  follows, that the farmer 
who conducts  his affairs with the aid of a cash credit, never 
pays interest for more money than he actually employs inhis 
business, nor keeps a pound  lying idle  and unproductive in 
his desk.  This ecoi~oiny  of capital forins a peculiar feature 
of the banking systen~  of the north, and gives the industrious 
classes there, in all their operations,  a  very great advantage 
over ours.  When an English farmer sells any portion of his 
produce, he has generally no alternative which can serve his 
purposes better than  to  keep  the proceeds loclied up in his 
drawer until the nest rent day.  He may, it is true, lodge it 
in the hands of some country banker-but  then he can get 
no interest for  it, and,  besides,  the banker may  fail.  The 
result  of  this  absence of  the  sti~nulus  of  profit on the one 
hand, combined with the fear of loss on t11c  other, is, that a 
very large portion of tho capital enlploycd  in agriculture, in 
this country, remains, during intervals of considerable length, 
absolutely idle.  The  individual  loss thus incurred by each 
farmer, is by no means inconsiderable, and thc aggregate loss 
of  the  public  is,  unquestionably,  of  very  great  amount. 36  ~~LINKINQ  SYSTEM OF  SCOTL~IND, 
Under the operation  of  the banking system of our northern 
neighbors,  on the contrary, the whole mass of  capital is  in 
a constant state of circulation ; no portion,  however  minute, 
remains for  the space  of  one day stagnant.  The  Scottish 
system of  banlring  may therefore claim  the merit  of  pro- 
ducing the greatest practical  results,  with the least expend- 
iture of  means.  Compared with England, the amount of 
capital employed  in productive  industry, in the sister Iring- 
dom, appears  inconsiderable ; but  the facility as well as ra- 
pidity with which this capital circulates, more than conlpea- 
sates for this deficiency ; and taking into consideration the 
different extent  of  the surfaces over which they are spread, 
it may be asserted, oil the best grounds, that the scanty capi- 
tal of  Scotland yields annually a  larger produce, both  to  the 
owners and the public at large, than the much more abun- 
dant capital  of  England ; it bcing  ~vell  known, that under 
the operation of  the system  of  deposits aid ca~h  credits, a 
given extent of land inay be equally well cultivated with two 
thirds, or  perhaps one half of the capital  \i?hich  mould be re- 
quired for a similar purpose in Englnacl, where it lnay be as- 
sumed  that, combining  tiine  with  amount, onc half  of  the 
whole farming capital rc1nr;ins in a state of  stagnation, and, 
by  consequence,  unproc?uctire.  Ht  is  2lso  clear, that under 
the northern system, capital rnuet bl:  more equally diflused 
than it is in England ; the surp!us  ci the wealthy  farmer 
passes without delay into the Esnk rcscrvcir, whence it finds 
its way  into the  llands of  his  less  opulent  neighbor, who 
stands in need  of  temporary  assistance.  En  Eilglaild, the 
agricolturalist  who possesses  capital  sufficient to  lneet  the 
most expensive seasons or cinergencies, inust at certain times 
have  a  considerable  porrioll  lying dead  up011  his  hoods; 
while the tillage  of  farm ill  his  vicinity, occ~~pied  bv  less 
fortunate persons,  languishes for  want of  funds.  Hence a 
double injury : the rich agricultuinliet loses from an overplus, 
and the poor one from a defective sayply of  capital.  Under 
the Scottish syst,em;  on the contrary, the supply is invarialllv 
and  proportioned  to the wants of  each individual, 
at every season ; the rich man need not be at the expense of 
more capital than con be profitably absorbed in his business ; 
and his poor  of fair reputation for honesty and in- 
dustry, may ali$7a;7~s  coinmand an abundant supply. 
~t must at the sanle time be  manifest, that pecuniary ac- 
commodation, by way of  private  loan,  is  not only lnore ex- 
pensive when procured, but  incalculvbly more difficult to be 
obtained, t]lan it is under the cash-credit system of  Scotland. 
Private individuals who lend up011 personal security, incur at 
all  times a  very  considerable  risk  of  losing  their  money ; 
fully occupied, in general, with their own pursuits, they have 
no leisure to watch the conduct of  their debtors ;  and if they 
enjoyed the leisure required  for this purpose, they possess no 
lneans of  acquiring much inforination as to this point, which 
may be useful to them ; hence  it occurs that, in nine  cases 
out of  ten,  money lent upon  personal  security is finally lost 
to the owner.  Speaking in general terms,  we  inay there- 
fore say that the practice is unknowl~  in England ; however 
industrious and steady a poor man inay sliow hitnself  in this 
country, he can rarely, if  eyer, ol~tain  a loan of  money upon 
his own personal security ; and still rnorc  rarely can he pre- 
vail upon any persons of  substance to beconze bound for him, 
if  he should  meet with  a capitalist u-illii~g  to  ~ccoinmodate 
him on these terms.  Eut the money lcnt under cash-credits 
is advanced upon a syst,ein 11-hich allnost infallibly insures its 
repayment.  It is the first object of  a Scotcl~  banker to ascer- 
tain the  character oi  the person who applies to hinz for a cash- 
credit ; and, fron~  the moment in which this accomlnodation 
is granted,  it hecomes his  regular and incessant business to 
watch  with the utmost care, the coricluct and proceedings of 
his debtor ; and to enable him to  acconlplish this object, he 
requires  little  further  aid than that which  is furnished him 
by his own books.  By examining the accounts of  any per- 
son accommodated with a cash-credit, he can tell at once and 
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whether, in consequence, any portion of  the capital lent runs 
the risk of being  lost.  The lno~nent  such a person ceases 
to pay into, as well as draw from the bank, the siispicions of 
the manager become excited, an explanation is instantly de- 
manded, and if  this  shoulcl not  prove satisfactory, the cash- 
credit is withdrawn, and  the payment of  the balance  rigo- 
rously enforced.  By glancing  their  eyes  once or  twice a 
week over their books, the n~magers  can ascertain what their 
cash-credit  debtors are  about, and how they are  going on, 
very nearly as well as if  they accompanied them to every fair 
or market in the  district.  The niolnent  any coma~odity  is 
sold, the proceeds are  eagerly talren to the bank ; firstly, be- 
cause this tends  very materially  to sustain the credit of  the 
borrower ;  and secondly, because he is ulirvilling to lose, even 
for a single day, the interest which accrues upon deposits from 
the hour  in which they  are lodged.  The managers of  the 
Scotch banks  thus  constitute a species of  social police, infi- 
nitely superior to any thing that has been evcr Irnown in any 
other part of  the world : they form a corps of  thoroughly or- 
ganized and vigilant-what  shall we call them ?-spies,  im- 
pelled  by the strong  impulse of  interest to watch with the 
most careful attention, the collduct  and proceedings of  the 
classes engaged in productive industry.  The prodigious in- 
fluence which such a  system of  vigilant inspectioil and con- 
trol must exercise over the whole  of  the industrious popula- 
tion, is far too palpable to render it necessary for us to do more 
than to point it out to the attention of  the pnblic. 
To  the i~lfluencc  of  this  admirably orgrcnized system may 
justly  be  ascribed, in perliaps a  more  especial  manncr, the 
rapidity with which  agriculture  11as advanced in  Scotland, 
since the middle of  the  last  century.  Whenever  the land- 
owners of  any district deterlnillcrl upon con~mcncing  s career 
of  improvement, thcir  first measure  has  generally been  to 
encourage the introduction of  a branch bank ; and few are 
the instances in which the advantages  anticipated  from this 
preliminary step hare not  heen realizad.  The small sums 
saved by the working classcs were regnlarly deposited in the 
local bank, ~vhenccc  they founcl  their way  in larger masses 
alnong the firmers of  the district.  =ving  passed through 
the hands of  thc fanners, this capital, in the form of  wages, 
calne a second time into the pockets of  the laboring classes, 
who  to  tlleir  previous  deposits every  shilling which 
they could save from their \vcelrly earnings.  There is, there- 
fore, good  ground for assertitlg that a very large  portion  of 
the territory of  Scotland l~as  been reclaimed  and improved 
not only by the labor, but also by the savings, of  the working 
pasantry : rt result  which  llas  been  alike beneficial to all 
the parties interested in the cultivation of  the soil.  To  the 
landlord it has proved the source of  an augmented rent ;  to 
the farmer it has yiclded a  hnndso~ne  profit, over and above 
the interest paid  for  the capital which he borrowed of  the 
banlr, for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  his  improvements, 
and  to the  working  classe;  it  has  proved  the means  of 
furnishing, not  oilly  constant  cmnployn~ent,  but  a  higher 
compensation for  their  labor.  The capital  saved and  de- 
posited in the banks by this class has enabled  the farmers of 
.every district  to undertake  agricultural improvements :  this 
has  created  an  additional  clelnniid  for  labor, and  raised 
wages ; and the economy  thus encouraged  by  banks  for 
deposits, has procluced a reaction highly favoral)le to the con- 
dition of  the body of 1aLorer:i. 
Lc..don  Quarterly Review. 
The  paper circulatioi~  of  Scotlancl  is  carried on, first, by 
chartered banks : and second, by private establishments. 
FIRST-CHARTERED  BANKS. 
There are three corporate bodies by whom notes are issued 
-"  the  Bank  of  Scotland,"-':  the  Royal  Bank ;'-and 
"  the  British Linen Comp~y." The latter, though  origi- 
nally intended for nltlnufacturing  purposes, was afterwards 
converted into ii ba~kiug  cstnbliuhlnent. A  short account of  the bank  of  Scotland is give11 in the 
general report of  thc kingdom."  It is  suflicient here to ob- 
serve,  that,  after  several  augmentations,  its  capital  now 
amounts to ~1,500,000  ; of  which only one million has  been 
paid up.  The  remaining &500,00U niny be called for ; but 
there is no reason  to suppose it  will be necessary, as its pre- 
sent capital, with the large  cleposits it  receives, is  fully ade- 
quate to the business it  carries on.  Each share consists of 
S1,000 of  old  Scotch moncy, or f  83.6.8;sterling : and as 
shares now sell for $200  sterling, there is a profit on each to 
the  amount  of  C116.13.4.  The  interest  per  share  is 
&7.18.4., being only about 4 per cent.  This proves the high 
estimation in which the interest of  the stock of  that bank is 
held, in consequence of  the ability and success with which 
its affairs are conducted.  Indeed, there is not a more advan- 
tageous mode  of  investing money than in the stock of  that 
bank; for, in addition to the annual dividencls, it has, at va- 
rious times, been enabled to give bonuses to ils proprietors, to 
the an~ount,  it is said, of  about S200,OOO. 
The  Royal Banlrhas a si~nilarcapiti~l,  i1amely,6;1,500,000, 
which is all paid up.  It  dividcs annually, &150,000, in  pro- 
portion to ~vliich  income is thc  price of  its stock.  Its affairs 
are likewise conducted with much prudence and economy. 
The  British Lincn Company, an account of  which is given 
in the general report of  Scot1nnd:t  has n capital of  $500,000, 
with which it carries on a great extent of  business, in a most 
successful manner.  It has paid up all its capital, the annual 
dividend on which  is 8;9  per  cent.  Its  stock now  sells for 
S246 per &I00 ; fi~rnishing  a11  immense profit to the origi- 
nal proprietors, besides several bonuses which havc been di- 
vided amongst them. 
On the whole, the "chartered bnnks"  of  Scotland carry on 
their  business  with capitals to tlie  amount of  £3,000,000, 
(to which  Q500,OGO lniglit be added by the  Bank  of  Scot- 
+ See Gewral Report of Scotland, v. 5, p. 311. 
t Cieneral Fieport of  Scollarrd, v. 5, p. 439. 
land, if  Iiecessary ;)  and by the esccllence of  thek manage- 
lllent, they have not  only essentially benefitecl their country, 
but enriched themselves. 
SECOND-PRIVATE,  OR PROVINCIAL BANKS. 
In Scotland, there are no restrictions in regard to the num- 
ber of partners in a banking establishmeiit,, issuing notes.  It 
may consist of  one, or of  a  ihousand  proprietors.  This is 
cel.tainly going too far ; ibr the security of  om, two, or three 
individuals must always bc  precarious ; and the greater the 
number of  partners, the less is the risk of  fraud.  One man 
may do, what it would be difficult to persuade twenty to con- 
cur in.  This error, though it has not hitherto occasioned any 
material public injury, ought to be corrcctecl by law. 
It  is a great advantage, howevcr, attending the Scotch sys- 
tem of  banking, that thcre is no precise  limit to the number 
of  partners who can join in the san~e  concern.  Thus, nuin- 
bers being interested in thc prosperity of  thc bank, its circu- 
lation and credit arc wginented ; and a  greater quantum of 
prosperity being involved in the concenl, there is hardly any 
possible risk of  public loss. 
There are, in Scotland, besides the tl~ree  cl~artered  banks, 
twenty-six private banking establishments,  issuing promis- 
sory notes.  Scveral of these havc hranchcs situated at a con- 
siderable distance from thc mothcr banlr."  The nuinber of 
partners,  exclusive of  the three  char~erecl  banks,  may  be 
stated at 1400, or, on an average, 53.  One (the Commercial 
Jhnk  of Scotland,) has no less a nuinber than 606 partners; 
others, where the business is small, lrave only two or three. 
In order to give an idea of  the excellent nlanagement of 
the Scotcll private or provincial Ijanlis, the following account 
of the Aberdeen bank has beell procured. 
This bank was established in  1767, with  n nominal ca- 
~ihl  of  &lOO,OO4  in two  hundrecl  shal.es, of  $500  each. 
* The number  of  banks  in Scotland, public and private, is 29; but they 
in all. about LOO branebn, :crticrecl over ills whulc Lin;rluln,  einanaling 
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Only $150  per share, or &30,000 in all, were originally paid 
in; and no future call has, ever since, been inacle on the part- 
ners.  The annual dividends were, at first,  s20  per share ; 
for many years they were $40,  and they are now g60. 
Instead of any extra clividenda, it  has been the usage  to 
add a bonzss to the stoclc of  each partner.  In this way, not 
only has the original capital of  $500  per share been paid up, 
but also  the capital since  it  has been  doubled, for it  now 
amounts to &I000 per share.  The partners were originally 
about 160 in number ; and in the first contract, the number 
of  shares to  be  held  by each  individual mas limited.  But 
when the contract was renewed, that clause was clone away, 
The  number of  partners  is  now about  80.  Several shares 
stand in the name of  the company. 
The highest  price  hithcrto given for any share, has been 
%1,500;  and the price varies from that sum down to &1,400, 
according to the opinion of Lhe  parties buying and selling  at 
the time. 
A very large sum, now only at 3 pcr cent., has been lodged 
with tFe bank, in consequence of  tlle high idea entertained of 
the prudence ancl good conduct with wliich the affairs of the 
company are managed.  The directors are thus enabled to 
be sufficiently liberal in the creclits  thcy  give, and the loans 
they furnish, to the commercial, manufacturing, arid agricul- 
tural interests. 
Among the unchartered establishn~ents,  (( The  ComnlerciaI 
Banking  Company  of  Scotland"  ought  to  be  pnrticularly 
mentioned, as it is distinguislled, not only by the number of 
its partners, (606,) but by the spirit and success  with which 
its operations are conducted.  It commenced business on the 
25th of  March,  1810, with  a  capital of  thrce  millions, of 
which  it has only been necessary to call for $500,000,  Its 
dividend is at the rate ol' six  per cent., and its  stoclr  already 
sells for &l50  per share.  Its profits could afford a larger di- 
vidend, but it  prefers  laying  up  an  annual  suni,  to guard 
against contingencies. 
It would he in vain attempting, in a short work of  this de- 
w;riptiol~,  to enter into thc details of  the management of these 
most  valuable  institutious.  Gilt I csllllot deny myself the 
satisfaction  of  exl)lainilzg the  pz~blic  advantages  desirable 
froin  these  establishments,  ii~cluding  the  chartered  com- 
panies. 
1..  From the liceases the private coiilpanies are obliged to 
kke out, and the stainps on the notes of both the chartered 
and the unchartered banlrs, considerable sums  are  received 
by government. 
2.  They are of  great use  to  private  individuals, furnish- 
ing  hem ~vith  8 place of  securit,~,  where they can safely de- 
posit  small, or  even large sums ; receiving for them a mode- 
rate_interest,  forincrly at the rate of  4 per cent., but now re- 
duced to 3 or 3;  per cent.  The  whole, however, or any part 
of  the stun thus placecl, can  be obtained whenever it  is de- 
manded.  Thc  result  is  very satisfactory.  These deposits 
in the various Scotcll banking estal~lishmcnts  amount, in all, 
to  several inillions  ste~.ling,  (f~0111  15 to  20 millions,) and 
thus the banks arc cnabled to be  of  greater use to the indus- 
try of  the  country, than if  they relied  upon their own capi- 
tals alone. 
3.  The advantages derived froin  these establishlneiits by 
the  agriculture  of  Scotland, is  of  the  highest  inlportance. 
The  celebrated Sir James Stewart, in his  work  on Political 
Economy, says,  "To the banks  of  Scotland  the  irnprove- 
ment of  that counl,ry is enlirely o~uir~,g."* 
4.  111  coinlnon wit11 all othcr such institutions, the bank- 
ing establishinents of  Scotland are highly favorable to com- 
merce and inanuljct,ures, enabling them to  be  carried on to 
an extent which  would  otherwise be  impracticable.  This 
has been greatly owing to the banks  giving ~vhat  are called 
CASH ACCOUNTS.  Credits of  this lrind are frequently granted 
* Stewa1.t'~  Political Economy, last ed. vol.  iii, p.  197.  Without going no 
it may be safely asserted, that to Ihe irnprov~rnent,  of Scotland they have 
essentially contributed. by banks and banlrers in other countries.  But the readiness 
with which money is  advanced without  the intervention of 
bills, and thc casy lnanricr  in which  these banks  accept  of 
repayment  (discounting tllc interest as each sum as paid in) 
are peculiar  to tIlem.  Tlle ol~erations  on  such credits are 
principally carried  on  by  making  of  drab, or  passing of 
cllecks, as if  the banks  held  money  of  the dealers.  The 
system of  casls accounts, conducted as it is in Scotland, has 
been  thc  principal  cazue, both  of  the great trade  of  thc 
banking cornpanics  thcrc,  and  of  the great  benefits  wllicll 
the country l~as  derived fro111 thclu. 
5. These banlis are of  ~nucll  usc in  collecting  the grcat 
revenue which  Scotland, for  so  small  n  country, produces, 
and afterwards renlitting it to the English treasury. 
6.  The  number of  banks is a great check upon the forge- 
ry of  notes,  which can hardly cscape speedy detection,  from 
the rapiclity with which they imincdiately return to the bank, 
or the branch that issued them."  And 
In  the last place, a iiulnbcr of  banks is a  great means of 
securing an  adequate limitation.  No bank, with a number of 
rivals, can issue notes beyond the real demand ; for they im- 
mediately revert  on  the  issues.  No  inordinate  circulation 
can take  place  where the  several banks  make weekly ex- 
changes, and receive payment of  the balances in cash, or by 
bills, at short dates on London. 
But the most evtraordii~ary  circuinetance  is this, that with 
twenty-six banks issuing notes, there has not becn, since the 
year 1776, a  period  of  fifty-six years, a single failure, with 
the  exception of  one,+ wllerc  the stoppinz occasioned any 
general alarnj, as is so frequently in  Englallil or Ireland ; or 
* Thc morc cxtcndcd thc circulation of  a banli, tlte lnorc liablr it is to havc 
it8 notes forgcd. 
i  This was the Ayr Jlank, 01.  Douglas, IIcron, and Company, whichstopped 
in the year 1772,  but wllich was  ncrcr declared  hanlcropt,  and  which  ulti- 
mately paid all its notes and otlrcr demands upon  it.  The ruin of  that banlc 
was owing to  thc  groeaest  mismanagcmcr~f  ; 2nd  its fitilure  orranioned  n 
grnnral nl~rtn  and *IIII~;II  pi.iv:~tr  (J~s~I.PP?I. 
,ly  discredit  thrown  on tho  other  banlts  by who111  notes 
mere issued.  As to public loss,  hardly any has been  expe- 
rienced,  even where  a,  stoppage did  take place,  of  which, 
in fifty years, tllcre werc onlysix instance5 whereas, in Eng- 
land, seveai,y-~ne  bnnlrs slopped in  orle year. 
On the ivholc  tllc  banking cstablishments  of  Scotland 
produce thc finest specinlcns of practica2 economy to be met 
wit]l  in Emope : for though, in the circulation of  Scotland, 
scarcely any gold is to be met with, yet industry, agriculture, 
manufactures,  and conIinercc, flourish 11lore than if  the pro- 
duce of all the mines of  Mcvico a1lc1 l'eru  were circulated in 
it.  If the same systenl  of  banking  establishments  which 
Scotland  now  enjoys were cstelldcd  to  England and  Ire- 
land, thesc countries possessing such  a superiority of soil and 
climate, would rise  to  a degree of  prosperity hitherto unex- 
ampled. 
It eviclently appears, from  the prececling short account of 
the circulation of  Scotland, that the advantages of  which it 
is productive is a  matter  not  of  speculation, but of  experi- 
ence ;  for it has now  becn carried on  almost  uninter- 
rupted success for  above  half  a century, and during periods 
of  considerable commercial as ~vcll  as political difficulty. 
It  would be of grcat public importance, if the Bank of Eng- 
land adopted the plan that has been founcl so useful in Scot- 
land, that of  granting "  cash accozmts," the nature of  which 
is this:  a bond, say for onc thousand pounds, is subscribed by 
one responsible pcrson, and two or inore sureties, to the ex- 
tent of that sum ; the principal in the bond is entitled to draw 
as he may find it necessary, and hc pays in, from time to time, 
such sums as 11c  receives from llis debtors.  The  account  is 
settled yearly, or haZJyearly;  and the interest,  at the rate 
of five per cent. for thc sum drawn out, bcyond  what is peri- 
odically paid in, is cllargecl to lris clebit in tlie new  account. 
It  is calculated in thc Scotch baalcs, that about onc third part 
of the sum advancecl to their customers, is issued on cash ac- 
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a paper currency, being entirely independent  of  commercial 
discounts,-equally,  if not inore secure,-and  where the notes 
issued are likely  to  remain  longer  in circ~~lation.  In this 
way, persons uncoiinected wit21 trade, may be accolnmodated ; 
and by this new source of  circulation, the UanIi of  England 
might become as usefrd to the agricultural class of  the cob- 
munity, as originally il  ~vas  intended to have been, when it 
was anticipated that it would render "the gentry  rich, and 
the farmer flourishing." 
Dr. Adam Smith,  in his "  Wealth of  Nations,"  (book ii. 
chap. 2.)  lias taken soine trouble to explain the advantages of 
granting these credits, mhicll he considers to be, perhaps, the 
principal  cause, both  of  the great  trade  and  circulation  of 
these banking companies, and of  the benefit wllich tlie coun- 
try has derived from thein.  With tlie advantage of  such a 
credit, he observes that a merchant can, ~vithout  any impru- 
dence, have at all times in his warehouse a larger quantity of 
goods than otherwise Ile could venturc upon ;  and can thereby 
make both a greater profit himself, and give constant employ- 
ment to a greater number of  industrious people, who prepare 
his goods for the marlict. 
In a recent publication,'  the nature of these credits is more 
minutely explained.  Such credits, we are informed, merely 
give the option to the principal in the bond, of  clrawing out 
upon  interest, the notes of  the bank ; and the very  great 
proportion of  these credits are frequently unused, fiaom  the in- 
ability of  the parties to  employ the money profitably.  The 
bankers exercise  clue  deliberation  before  any credit of  this 
kind is  granted; and as  it is generally found to  exist  for a 
considerable number of  years, it  is only given upon such se- 
curity as is  likely to  continue pernm~ze~ztly  good for their 
amount.  The bank account of  the principal is always open 
to  the inspection of  the sureties, who  may withdraw their 
guaranty,  if  the  principal  is mismanaging  or  imprudent. 
~hc:  sureties are also liable for  bill transactions with the bank, 
to the amount of  the whole sum subscribed, but no further. 
Among the many numerous  advantages attending credit ac- 
counts, they enable many to enter upon useful undertakings, 
requiring outlay for a  consiclerable  period, who might other- 
wise have been unable, or afraid to do  so.  If  a  young man 
gets his  sureties to  sign a  bill at three or  four months date, 
instead oi signing a bond  for a credit account, he  inust be 
dependent  upon  the caprice  or  convenience  of  the  bank 
for its renewal for such periods as inight be desirable, in any 
protracted operations  he may have  embarked  in, upon  the 
faith of  this credit by bills ;  whereas in the case  of  bonds, 
the banks seldom if ever call themup, so long as the principal 
continues to  keep an operative account, or  the sureties and 
hiinself  remain good for the amount.  At all events it is pro- 
vided for in the bond, that such warning shall be given before 
it is put in force, as may enable the parties  to get  a  similar 
accominodation  at some  other  bank, or to dispose of  their 
property, without the disaclvaatages of  sudden or pressing de- 
mands for  repayment.  Since  the act of  George 3,  c.  74., 
cash credits have been frecluently  granted on the security of. 
lands, and this practice iniglit  certail~ly  be greatly extended 
with much public benefit. 
On the whole, the granting of  cash accounts cannot be too 
strongly recomnlended to Ilie attention of  tlie Bank of  Eng- 
land.  If  the plan were adopted, it inight resolve to discount 
bills under  60  days at 4 per cent. : and all hills of  a longer 
duration at 43 per cent.-and  might charge 5 per  cent. on all 
lnoney advanced on  casli accounts.  This would  place the 
system of  granting loans or credits on the most advantageous 
footing possible, and ~vould  prove  equally  beneficial to the 
bank and to the public." 
* From the author's experier~cc  as a director of thc  Bank of Scotland, he is 
flllly satisfied of the great a~lvantages  dcrivablo from cash accounte. 
+ Muir's Rcvirw of thc Enaliing Sgstcm of G1.ent. Britain. The preceding article lcavcs nothing to  be  wished for, as 
well with regard to the history of  the niost pron~inellt  bank- 
ing institotions in Gorope, as to tlle correctness of  tlle general 
view of these operations, and illair beneficial influence 011 in- 
dustry and commerce. 
We now  proceed to detail the institutions of  the United 
States. 
The first of these is the BANK  OF NORTH  AMERICA. It 
owes its origin to the vigorous  mind and enterprising genius 
of  Robert Morris, Esq. who  conceivecl  the idea  of  it when 
superintendent of the public financcs, and submitted to con- 
gress in the month  of  May, in tlrc year  1781, the plan for 
establishing a national bank of  North America. 
Agreeably to this 13la11, the capital was  to consist of  1000 
shares, of  $400 each,  $400,000, 
in gold  and silver, to  be increased by new subscrip- 
tions, from tinle to time, at the pleasure of the directors. l'lle 
directors, twelve in number, were to be cl~osen  by  the stock- 
holders,  and were to be  intrustetl  with the manapmellt of 
the institution.  The notes of  the bauli, payable on demand, 
to  be made  a  legal  tender in the discl~arge  ol duties  and 
taxes, &c.  On the 26th May,  ol the same ycar,  congress 
approved  of  the  plan,  and  passed  scveral resolt~tions,  by 
which they pledged tl~emselvcs  to support thc proposed insti- 
tution ; to incorporate tho subscribers, under the name of the 
president, directors, and conlpany of  tlie Banlc of  North Ame- 
rica ; to recommend to the several  statcs  the  prevention of 
similar establishments  within  their  resl~ective  jurisdictions, 
during  the war ; to  receive  the notes of  the institution in 
p,zyment of taxes, duties, and debk, clue to the United States, 
and to  use their influcnce with  the several legislatures, to 
have laws passed, which should make it felony to counterfeit 
the notes of  the banlc, kc. 
After this, subscriptions were immediately opencd,  during 
the summer  and autumn of the same ycar.  In November, 
directors were chosell.  Ta  I)ecclnl-ies, (:ODF~CSFI, ~011iomal11c 
their  hllilcr resolves, passed a11 o~ltrlal~cc  which (;lealed 
the subscribers to the 1)ank a corpolatioll for  ever, nncler  the 
title of "  The President, Directors, and Conipany of  the Uanlc 
of North America."  Tlic original features of  the plan were 
preserved, but the bank was restricted from holding property 
exceeding thc amount of  $10,000,000. 
The institution com~nenced  its  operations in the inonth of 
January  following, and  Robert Morris, who  may  be justly 
styled the  father  of  the system  of  credit,  and paper  circu- 
lation, in the United States,  succccdcd in securing to it  tllc 
good will and confidence of  the people  at large, by various 
judicious measures, of  which  a  circular letter, addressed to 
the governors of  the several statcs, explaining the object of 
the institution, and tlie certain advanta&s to be clcrivecl fronl 
it, was not  the least effectual.  Thus the first  ba13k  in the 
United Stales came into existence, and such  was  its happy 
and immediate influence on the public finances, and on com- 
mercial concerns in general, that it  ~ilay  be  justly  doubted 
whether, without its seasonable aid, thc revolutiouary struggle 
for independence could have been  brought  at all to  a satis- 
ftictory termination.  The United  States, for  several  years, 
were constantly indebted  to the bank, to a lnrgcr suln than 
tlie stock they owned ; nor could thc various devices for cre- 
ating a revenue have  answered their end, or the army have 
been fed and clothed, or any degree of order and punctuality 
maintained in the dispatch of public affairs, but for  the great 
facility in the managenlent of busincss, and the restoration of 
confidence, which  were  created by  this institution.  The 
sense of  the great utility of  tlie bank, was so universal, that 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania corroborated tlle ordinances 
of  congress, by additional  charters,  and Rhodc Island, Con- 
necticut, and  Delaware  passcd Iavs for the purpose of  prc- 
venting the counterfeiting of  its noles.  >fet  when peace had 
been concluded, and the pressure of  thc times was over, thcre 
were not wanting those who vicwcd  the pro::yeioufi  nta.l(: of 
the afTai~ti  of  tlie  133,1111  with a.  js;tlou+  eye, a~~d  cr)i~jlllrd  11p 
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imaginary fears of  an overbearing oppression, an alarmirlg 
foreign influence, and fictitious credit, from te~nporary  punc- 
tuality ; of a created scarcity of  specie ; possible comnlercial 
convulsions, from the stopping of  discounts ; partial favors, 
and comparative disadvantages, under which distant traders 
labored : as if, in n moral community, the bare possibility of 
abuse could ever furnish a good argument against the decided 
utility of a thing ; or as if  a benefit were to be relinquished, 
because all callnot  be benefited  alike.  And  so effectually 
were these  objectio~ls  against the institution  urged, that on 
the 13th of September, 1785, the legislature of  Pennsylvania 
actually repealed their charter ! 
?'he  repeal was persevered in by  the  succeeding legisla- 
lature, notwithstandinginnumerable  petitions to the contrary, 
and vast efforts to enlighten their proceedings. 
The bank, however, continued its  usual operations under 
the charter  from congress, and  in the enjoyment of  corpo- 
rate rights, which, it  was  presumed, could  not be arbitrarily 
wrested from them, after having been once legally bestowed. 
The legislature  which  met  in  Decenlber,  1786, at last 
thought proper to renew the charter of  the bank, and passed 
an act to that effect, on the 7th March, 1787, by which, how- 
ever, the term of  the charter  was limited  to fourteen years, 
and the capacity of  the corporate body of  holding property, 
restricted to two millions of  dollars.  The  same charter was 
extended for  the  term  of  fourteen  years more, by  an act 
passed on the 20th March, 1799. 
Thc  capital of  this bank l~as  been from time to time  in- 
creased.  It is now 2,000 shares of  $400 each-$800,000. 
It has usually divided 12  per  cent. on the original price of  the 
shares ; \vhich, talring the medium capital  from the  com- 
mencement, will make the eum total of  the dividend amount 
to $3,456,000. 
Thus  has this institution existed under the double security 
of a  perpetr~al  charter from congress, and ic charter from the 
etates, with laws in its favor from several states, after haviag 
the burden and heat of  the days of  a triumpltant 
revolutionary struggle-continued  for nearly half  a century, 
and is now a flourishing institution. 
REPORT  OF ALEXANDER  HAMILTON, 
(WHII;E SECRETARY OF THE TREABURY,) 
ON  THE BUBIECT OF 
A  NATIONAL BANK. 
Read in the Houseof Representatives, Dee. 13th, 1790. 
Treasury Department, Dec. 13.1790. 
IN obedience to the order of  the HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTA- 
TIVES, of  the ninth day of  August last,  requiring the 
SECRETARY  OF  TIXE TRE~SURY  t0 prepat-e and report, 
on  this day, such further  provision  as  may, in his 
opinion,  be  necessary for  establishing the PUBLIC 
CREDIT-the  said 8ecrctary further 
THAT,  from a conviction that a  National Bank  is an  in- 
stitution of  primary importance to the prosperous administra- 
tion of  the finances, and would  be  of  the greatest utility in 
the operations connected with the support of the public credit,  \ 
his attention has been drawn to devising the plan of  such an 
institution, upon  a  scale which will entitle  it  to  the confi- 
- --.. 
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Previonsly to entering up011 the detail of  this l~lan,  he en- 
treats the iudulgence of  the house, towards some  prelimina- 
ry reflections  naturally &rising out of  the subject, which he 
hopes will be deelned neitlier i~seleas  nor out of  place.  Pub- 
lic  opinion beil~g  the t~ltiniatc  arbiter  of  every measure of 
government, it can  scarcely appear improper, in deference to 
that, to  arcompany the originatioiz  of  any new proposition 
with explanations, which the superior information of  those to 
wllom  it,  is  im~neiliatcly addressed,  would  render  snper- 
flllo~ls. 
It is a fitc~  ~vcll  uncterstood, that public banks have fortnd 
aclrnission aiicl patronage among the principal and most en- 
lightened corl~mercial  nations.  They have successively ob- 
tained in  Italy, Germany, Holland,  England, and France, 
as \!re11  as in the  United States.  And it  is  a circumstance 
which cannot but llave considerable weight, in a candid esti- 
mate  of  their  telldency, that, after  an experience of  centu- 
ries,  there  exists  not  a question  about  their utility in the 
countries  in  which  they  have  been  so long  established. 
Theorists and men of  business unite in the acknowledgment 
of it. 
Trade and iizdustry, wherever they have been tried, have 
been indebted to them for  important aid.  And government 
has been repeatedly under the greatest ohligations to them, in 
dangerous and distressing emergencies.  That of  the United 
States,  as well  in some of  the most critical conjunctures of 
the late war, as since the peacc, has received assistance from 
lliose established  among us,  with  which  it  could  not have 
clispetised. 
1Vjtl1  this two-fold evidence before us, it might be expected, 
111i1t  there  would be a perfect union  of  opinions  in their fa- 
vor.  Yet doubts have been entertained ;  jealousied RII~  pre- 
luclices havc circulated ; and though the experiment is every 
day dissipating them, withill the splleres in which effects are 
best known ; yet tlicrc. are still persons by whom they hava 
not bwn entirely  renonnced.  To  give  a  full and accurate 
of  tllc s~~l>ject,,  ~voulil  l)e to malie a lreatiqe of  a report; 
but tllere are certain aspects in which it 11la.y  be cursorily ex- 
hibited, which  may perhaps conduce to a just  impression of 
its  'I'hese  will  involve a comparisoli of  the advan- 
tages, with the disadvantages, real or supposed, of  such iasti- 
tutions. 
The  following are  among the prir~cipaI  advantages  of  a 
bank : 
First.  The  augmentation of the active or productive capi- 
tal of  a country.  Gold and silvcr, where they are einployed 
lnereljl as thc inst~.unlents  of  exchange and alienation, have 
been, not  improperly, deno~ninated dead  stock; but  when 
deposited in banks, to  become  the  basis of  a paper circula- 
tion,  which  takes their chamcter  and place, as the signs or 
representatives  of  value, they then  acquire life,  or, in other 
words, an active and productive quality.  This idea, which 
appears rather subtilc  and abstract, in  a  general  form, may 
be made obvious and palpable, by entering into a  few  par- 
ticulars.  It is evident, for instance, that the money which a 
merchant  keeps  in his chest, waiting for "a favorable oppor- 
tunity  to employ it,  produces  nothing till that opportunity 
arrives.  But if, instead of  locking it up in this manner, he 
either deposits it in  a  bank, or invests it in the stock of  a 
bank, it yields a profit during the interval, in  which he par- 
talres or not, according  to the .choice hc may hove  made of 
being a depositor or  a proprietor ; and when any advanta- 
geous speculation offcrs, in order to be able to embrace it, he 
has only to withdraw his money, if  a depositor ; or if  a pro- 
prietor, to  obtain  a loan from the bank, or to ilispose  of  his 
stoclc ; an alternative seldom  or never attended with difficul- 
ty, when the affairs  of  the  institution arc in  a prosperous 
trnin.  His money thus deposited or invested, is a fund upon 
which  himself  and others  can  borrow  to  a  much  larger 
amount.  It is a  well  established fact, that banlrs  in good 
credit call circulate a  far greatcr sum than  the actual quan- 
tuln ~f  their capital  ill gold and silver.  The extent of  the possible excess seems indeterminate ; though it has beencon- 
jecturally stated at the proportions of  two and three to  one. 
This faculty is produced in various ways.  First-A  great pro- 
portion of  the notes  which are issued, and pass  current  as 
cash, are indefinitely suspended in circulation, from the con- 
fidence which each holder has, that he can at any moment 
turn them  into  gold  and silver.  Secondly-Every  loan 
which a bank makes, is,  in its first shape, a credit given to 
the  borrower on its books,  the  ainount of  which  it stands 
ready to pay, either in its own notes, or in gold  or  silver, at 
his option.  But, in a great number  of  cases, no actual pay- 
ment is made in either.  The  borrower frequently, by a check 
or order, transfers his credit to some other person,  to whom 
he has a  payment  to make ; who, in his  turn, is  as often 
content with a  similar credit, because  he is satisfied that he 
can, whenever he plesses, either convert it into cash, or pass 
it to some other hand, as an equivalent for  it.  And in this 
manner  the  credit keeps  circulating,  performing, in every 
stage, the office  of  money, till it is extinguished by a discount 
with some person who has a  payment to make to the bank, 
to an equal or greater amount.  Thus large  sums are lent 
and paid, frequently through a variety of  hands, without the 
intervention of  a single piece  of  coin.  Thirdly-There  is 
always a large quantity of  gold and silver in the repositories 
of  the bank, besides its own stock, which is placed there with 
a view, partly to its safe keeping, and partly to the accom- 
modation of an institutioa, which is itself  a source of  general 
accommodation. These deposits are of  immense consequence 
in the operations of  a bank.  Though liable to be redrawn at 
any moment,  experience proves,  that the  money so much 
oftener  changes proprietors  than  place,  and  that  what is 
drawn out is generally so speedily replaced, as to authorize 
the counting upon the sums deposited, as an efective  fund ; 
which, concurring with the  stock of  the bank, enables it to 
extend  its loans, and to answer all the  demands  for  coin, 
whether in  consequence of  those loans, or  arising  froin the 
occasional return of  its notes. 
These  different  circumstances  explain  the  manner  in 
the ability of  a bank to circulate a  greater sum than 
its actual capital in coin, is acquired.  This, however, must 
be gradual ; and must be preceded by a firm establishment of 
confidence;  a confidence  which !nay  be bestowed on the most 
rational grounds ; since the excess in question will  always 
be bottomed on good securiq of  one kind or another.  This 
every well conducted bank carefully requires, before .it will 
consent to advance either its money or its credit ;  and where 
there is an auxiliary capital,  (as will be the  case in the plan 
hereafter submitted,)  which, together with the capital in coin, 
define the boundary that shall not  be  exceeded by the en- 
gagements of  the bank, the security may, consistently with 
all the maxims of a  reasonable circumspection, be regarded 
as complete. 
The  same circumstances  illustrate the truth of  the position, 
that it is one of  the properties of  banks to increase the active 
capital of  a country.  This, in other words, is the  sum  of 
them-The  money of  one  individual, while  he  is  waiting 
for an opportunity to employ it, by  being  either deposited in 
the bank  for safe keeping, or  invested  in its  stock, is  in  a 
condition to administer to the wants-of others, without being 
put  out  of  his own reach,  when  occasion presents.  This 
yields an extra profit, arising from what is paid for the use of 
his money  by others, when  he could not himself make use 
of it ; and keeps the money itself  in a state of  inces,  .ant  ac- 
tivity.  Jn the almost infinite vicissitudes and competitions 
of mercantile enterprise, there never can be danger of an in- 
termission of  demand, or that the money will  remain for  a 
moment idle in the vaults of the bank.  This additional em- 
ployment given to money, and the faculty of  a bank to lend 
and circulate a greater sum than the ainount of  its stock in 
coin, are, to all the purposes of  trade and industry, an abso- 
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general, can be carried on by  any given sum of  bank paper 
or credit, as effectually as by an equal suin of  gold and silver. 
And thus by coniributing to enlarge the mass of  industrious 
and commercial enterprise,  banks become  nurseries of  na- 
tional wealth : a consequence, as satisfactorily verified by ex- 
perience, as it is clearly deducible in theory. 
Secondly.  Greater facility to the government in obtaining 
pecuniary aids, especially in sudden emergencies.  This is 
another, and an undisputed advantage of  public banks ;  one 
which,  as already remarked, has been realized in signal in- 
stances among ourselves.  The reason is  obvious : The  ca- 
pitals of  a great number of individuals are, by this operation, 
collected to a point, and placed  under  one direction.  The 
mass formed by this union is, in  a' certain sense, magnified 
by the credit attached to it.  And while this mass is always 
ready, and can at once be put in motion in aid of  the govern- 
ment, the interest of the bank to afford that aid, independent 
of regard to the public safety and welfare, is a sure pledge for 
its disposition to go as far in its  compliances, as can in pm- 
dence be desired.  There is in the nature of  things, as will 
be more particularly noticed in another place, an intimate con- 
nection of interest between the government and the bank of 
a nation. 
Thirdlv. The  facilitating of  the payment of  taxes.  This 
advantage is produced in two  ways.  Those who  are in a 
situation to have  to the bank, can have the assistance 
of loans to  answer  with  punctuality  the public  calls upon 
them.  This accomvnodation has been  sensibly felt  in the 
payment of  the duties heretofore  laid, by  those who reside 
where establishments of  this nature exist.  This, however, 
though an extensive, is not a universal benefit.  The other 
way in which the effect here contemplated is  produced, and 
in which the benef t is general, is the increasing of  the quan- 
tity of  circulating  medium, and the quickening of  circula- 
tion.  The manner in which the first happens, has already 
been traced. 'I'he  last may require ;jomc illustration.  When 
paynlents  me to be made betwecn different places, having an 
intercourse of  business  with  each  other, if  there happen to 
be no private bills  at  market, and there  are no bank  notes 
have a currency in both, the consequence is, that coin 
must be remitted.  This is attended with trouble, delay, ex- 
pense, and risk.  If,  on  the contrary, there  are bank notes 
current in both places, the transmissio~~  of  these by the post,, 
or any other speedy or convenient  conveyance, answers  tht: 
purpose ; and these again, in the alternations of  demand, are 
frequently returned very soon after to tl~e  place fro111 whence 
they mrere  first sent ; whence the transportation and retraas- 
portation of  the metals are obviated, and a more convenient, 
and more  expeditious medium  of  payinent  is  subst.ituled. 
Nor is this all-the metals, insteadof being suspended fronl their 
usual functions, during this process of  vibration frorn place to 
place, continue in activity, and administer  still to the ordi- 
nary circulation ; which of  course is  prevented  from suffcr- 
ing either diminution  or  stagnation.  These circumstances 
are additional causes of what,  in a practical sense, or to the 
purposes of  business, may be called greater plenty of  money. 
And  it is evident, that whatever  enhances  the  quantity of 
circulating money, adds to the ease with which every indirs- 
trious member of  the con~munity  may acquire that portion of 
it of which he stands in need ; ancl enables him the better to 
pay his taxes,  as well as to supply  his other wants.  Eve11 
where the circulation  of  the bank paper  is not  general, it 
must still have the same effect, though in a less degree.  For 
whatever furnisl-res additional supplies to the channels of  cir- 
culation, in one  quarter; i~durally  contributes to  keep  tile 
streams fuller elsewhere.  This last view of the sukject, serves 
both to  illustrate the position, that  hanks  tend  to  facilitate 
the Payment of taxes, and to exemplify their utilit,y to  bugi- 
ness of every kind, in which money is an agent. 
It would  be  to intrude  too  much on  the patience of  the 
house, to prolong the details of  the advantages of banks ; es- 
pecially  all  those which might still be  partic&rizea,  ale 
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readily to be inferred as consequences from those which have 
been enumerated.  Their disadvantages,  real  or  supposed, 
are now  to be  reviewed.  The  most serious of  the charges 
which have been brought against them, are- 
That they serve  to increase usury : 
That  they tend to prevent other ltinds of lending : 
That, they furnish temptations to overtrading : 
That  they afford aid to ignorant adventurers, who disturb 
the natural and beneficial course of trade: 
That they give to bankrupt  and fraudulellt traders a fic- 
titious credit, which enables than to  mai~ltain  false appear- 
ances, and to extend their inlpositions : And lastly, 
That  they have a t,elldency to banish gold and silver froin 
the country. 
There is great reason to believe, that on a close and candid 
survey, it will  be  discovered, that these  charges  are either 
without fouaclatioa, or that, as far  as the evils they suggest 
have been found to exist, they have  proceeded from other, or 
partial, or temporary causes ; are not inherent in the nature, 
and permanent  tendency, of  such institutions ; or are more 
than counterbalaaced by opposite advantages.  This survey 
shall be had, in  the order in which the charges have been 
stated.  The  first of  them is- 
That  banks serve to increase usury. 
It  is a truth, which ought not to be denied, that the method 
of conducting business, which is essential to bank operations, 
has among us, in particular instances, given occasion to usu- 
rious trtnsactions.  The  punctuality in payments, which they 
necessarily exact, has sometimes obliged those who have ad- 
ventured  beyond  both  their ,  capital  and credit, to  procure 
money, at any price, and consequently to  resort  to  usurers 
for aid. 
But experience and practice gradually bring a cure to  this 
evil.  A  general habit  of  p~ulctuality  among traders, is the 
natural conseciuence of the necessity of  observing it with the 
bauk ; a circumstance which itself  more  than  compensates 
for any occasiollal ill which IllaJT  have sprullg froill tllat ne- 
cessity, in the particular under consideration.  As far, there- 
fore, as traders depend on each other for pecuniary  supplies, 
they can calculate their ex~ectaticns  with greater certainty ; 
and are in  proportionably  less  danger  of  disappointments, 
which might compel them to have recourse  to so pernicious 
an expedient as that of borrowing at usury ; the mischiefs of 
which, after a few examples, naturally  inspire great  care in 
all but men of  desperate circumstances, to  avoid the possibi- 
lity of being subjected to  them.  One, and not  the least  of 
the evils incident to the use  of  that expedient, if the fact be 
known, or even strongly suspected, is loss of credit with  the 
bank itself. 
The  directors of a bank too, though in order to extend its 
business and its popularity, in the infancy of  an  institution, 
they may be  tempted to go further in  accommodation than 
the strict rules  of prudence will warrant, grow more circuin- 
spect of  course, as its affairs become better established, and as 
the  evils  of  too  great  facility  are experimentally demon- 
strated.  They  become more  attentive  to the situation and 
conduct of  those  with wllom they deal ; they observe more 
narrowly their operations  and pursuits ; they economize the 
credit they give to those of suspicious solidity ; they refuse it 
to those whose  career  is  more  ryanifestly  hazardous : in a 
word, in the course of  practice, from the very nature of things, 
the interest will make it the policy of a bank, to succor the 
wary and industrious ; to  discredit  the rash and unthrifty ; 
to discountenance  both  usurious  lenders and ~xsurious  bor- 
rowers. 
There is a leading.vie\v, in which the tendency of  banks 
will be seen to be, to  abridge, rather  than to promote, usury. 
This relates to their property of  increasing the quantity, and 
quickening the circulation, of  money.  If  it be evident, that 
usury will  prevail or  diminish,  according  to  the proportion 
which the demand  for  borrowing  bears  to  the  quantity of 
nloiley at markt  to be  lent ; whatever  has the property just mentioned, whether  it be  in  the shape of  paper or  coin, by 
contributing to render the supply inore equal to the demand, 
must tend to counteract the progress of  usury. 
But bank  lending,  it  is  pretended, is an impediment to 
other kinds of  lending ; wl1icl.1, by confining  the resource of 
borrowing to a prticular class, leaves the rest of  the commu- 
nity more destitnte, and therefore more exposed to the extor- 
tions of  usurers.  As the profits of  bank stock exceed the le- 
gal rate of interest,, the possessors of money, it is argued, prefer 
investing it in that article, to lending it at this rate ; to which 
there are t be additional rnotives of  a more prompt command 
of  the capilal, and of  more frequent  and exact returns, with- 
out troul~le  or perplexity in the  collection.  This constitutes 
the second charge which has been enumerated. 
The  fact on which this charge rests, is  not to to be admit- 
ted  without  several qualifications ; particularly in reference 
to the state  of things in  this  country.  Z1irst-The  great 
bulk of the stock of  a bank, will consist of  the funds of  men 
in trade, anlong ourselves,and moneyed foreigners; the former 
of  whom could not spare their  capitals out of  their reach, to 
be invested in loans for long periods, on mortgages or petsonal 
security ; and the latter of  whom would not be willing to be 
subjected  to  the casualties,  delays,  and embarrassments, of 
such  a  disposition  of  their  money  in  a  distant  country. 
S'econdly,  There will always be a  considerable proportion of 
thoas who are properly the money lenders of a country, who, 
from that spirit  of  caution which  usually characterizes this 
description of  men, will incline rather to vest  their  funds in 
mortgages on real estatc, than in the stock of  a bank, which 
they are apt to consider as a more precarious security. 
These considerations serve in a material  degree to narrow 
the foundation of  the objection, as to the point of  fact.  But 
there  is  a more  satisfactory  answer  to  it.  The  effect sup- 
posed, as far as it ]:as  esistence, is temporary.  The  reverse 
of  it takes place in  the  general and permanent operation of 
the thing, 
The capital  of  every  public  bank  will of  course  be re- 
stricted within a certain defined  limit.  It is the province of 
legislative prudence so to adjust this limit, that while it will not 
be too contracted for  the demand, which the course  of  busi- 
ness may create, and for the security which the public ought 
to have for the solidity of  the paper which  may be issued by 
the bank, it will still be within the compass of  the pecuniary 
resources of  the community ; so that there may be  an easy 
practicability of  completing  the subscriptions to it.  When 
this is  once done, the supposed  effect  of  necessity  ceases. 
There is then no longer room for  the investment of  any ad- 
ditional  capital.  Stoclr  may indeed change hands by one 
person selling and another buying;  but the money which the 
buyer takes out of  the common mass to  purchase the stock, 
the seller receives and restores to it.  Hence the future sur- 
pluses  which  may  accumulate  must  take  their  natural 
course, and lending at interest must go on as if  there were no 
such institution. 
It must indeed flow in a more copious stream.  The bank 
furnishes an extraordinary supply for  borrowers, within  its 
immediate  sphere.  A  larger  supply consequently remains 
for borrowers elsewhere.  In  proportion as the circulation of 
the bank is extended, there is an augmentation of  the aggre- 
gate mass of  money for answering the aggregate mass of de- 
mand.  Hence greater facility in  obtaining it for every pur- 
pose. 
It  ought not to escape without a  remark, that as far as the 
citizens of  other countries  become adventurers  in the bank, 
there  is a  positive increase  of  the  gold  and  silver of  the 
country.  It  is true, that from this a half-yearly rent is drawn 
back, accruing from the dividends upon the stock :  but as this ' 
rent arises  from the employment of  the capital, by our  own 
citizens, it  is probable, that it  is more  than replaced by the 
profits of  that employment,.  It  is also likely, that a part of it 
is, in the course of  trade, converted  into the products of  our country : and it may even prove an i~icentive,  in some cases, 
to emigration to a country in  which the character of  citizen 
is as  easy to  be acquired, as it  is estimable  and important. 
This view of  the subject furnishes an  answer to an objection 
which has been  deduced from the circumstance here taken 
notice of; namely, the income resulting to foreigners from the 
part of  the  stock  owned  by  them, which  has  been  repre- 
sented as tending to drain the  country of  its specie.  In thia 
objection, the original investment of  the capital, and the con- 
stant use of  it afterwards, seein both to have been overlooked. 
That hanks furnish temptations to overtrading,  is the third 
of  the enumerated objections.  This must mean, that by af- 
fording additional aid  to  mercantile  enterprise, they induce 
the merchant sometimes to  adventure beyond the prudent or 
salutary point.  But the very statement of  the thing shows, 
that the subject of  the charge is  an occasional ill, incident to 
a general good.  Creclit of  every kind,  (as a species of  which 
only can bank-lending have the effect supposed,) must be, in 
different degrees, chargeable with the sameinconvenience.  It 
is even applicable to  gold  and silver, when they abound  in 
circulation.  But would it be wise  on this  account to decry 
the  precious  metals ; to root  out  credit ; or to prescribe the 
means of  that enterprise, which is the main spring of  trade, 
and a  principal source  of  national wealth, because  it  now 
and then runs into excesses, of  which overtrading is one ? 
If  the abuses of  a beneficial thing,  are  to  determine  its 
condemnation, there is scarcely a source of  public prosperity 
which will not speedily be closed.  In  every case, the  evil  is 
to be compared with the good ; and in the present case, such 
a comparison will issue in this, that the new  and increased 
energies  derived to  commercial  enterprise,  from  the aid of 
banks, are a source of  general profit and  advantage ; which 
greatly outweigh the partial ills  of  the  overtrading of  a few 
individuals, at particular times, or of  numbers  in particular 
conjunctures. 
The fourth and fifth charges may be considered together : 
These relate to the aid which is sometimes afforded  by banks 
to  unskillful  adventurers  and  fraudulent  traders.  These 
charges  also have  some  degree of  foundation, though  far 
less thail has been pretended ;  and they add to the instances 
of partial  ills, connected with  more  extensive and  overba- 
lancing benefits. 
The  practice of  giving fictitious credit to improper persons, 
is one of  those  evils  which  experience,  guided  by interest, 
speedily corrects.  The  bank itself  is in so much jeopardy of 
being a sufferer by it, that it  has the strongest of  all induce- 
ments to be on its guard.  It may not only be  injured imme- 
diately by the delinquencies of  the persons to  whom such 
credit is given ; but eventually, by the incapacities of  others, 
whom their impositions or failures may have ruined. 
Nor is there much danger of  a  bankls  being betrayed into 
this  error  from want of  information : The  directors them- 
selves being for the most part  selected  from  the class of  tra- 
ders, are to be expected' to  possess individually, an accurate 
knowledge of  the characters  and  situations of  those  who 
come within that description.  And they have, in addition to 
this, the course of  dealing of  the persons themselves with the 
bank, to assist their judgment, which is in most cases a good 
index of  the state in which those persons are.  The  artifices 
and  shifts, which  those  in  desperate or declining  circum- 
stances,  are  obliged to employ to  keep  up the countenanw 
which the rules of  the bank  require, and  the train of their 
connections, are so  many prognostics, not difficult to be in- 
terpreted, of  the fate which awaits them.  Hence it not un- 
frequently happens, that banks are the  first to discover the 
unsoundness of  such characters, and by withholding credit, 
to  announce to the public they are not entitled to it. 
If banks, in spite of  every precaution, are sometimes be- 
trayed into giving a false credit to the persons described, they 
more frequently enable honest and industrious men, of small, 
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with advantage  to themselves  and to the community ; and 
assist merchants of  both  capital  and credit, who  meet with 
fortuitous and unforeseen shocks, which might, without such 
helps, prove fatal to them and to others, to make head against 
their misfortunes, and finally to retrieve their affairs ; circum- 
stances which form no inconsiderable encomium  on the uti- 
lity of banks. 
But the last, and heaviest charge, is still to be examined : 
this is, that banks tend to  banish the gold and silver out of 
the country. 
The  force of this objection rests upon their being an engine 
of paper credit, which by furnishing a substitute for  the ine- 
tab, is supposed to promote  their  exportation.  It is an ob- 
jection which, if it has any foundation, lies not against banks 
peculiarly, but against every species of paper credit. 
The most common answer given  to  it  is, that the thing 
supposed is of little or no consequence ; that it is imn~aterial 
what serves the purpose of  money ; whether  paper, or gold 
and silver ; that the  effect of both apon industry is the same ; 
and that the intrinsic  wealth of a nation is to be measured, 
not by the abundance of the precious rnetals contained in it, 
but by the quantity of  the productions  of  its labor  and irt- 
dustry. 
This answer is not destitute of solidity, though not entkeiy 
eatisfactory.  It is certain, that the vivification of industry, by 
a full circulation, with the aid of a proper and well regulated 
paper credit, may more than compensate for the loss of a part 
of the gold and silver of a nation, if the consequence of avoid- 
ing that loss should be a scanty or defective circulation. 
But the positive, and permanent  increase  or  decrease  of 
the precious metals in a country, can hardly ever be a matter 
of indifference.  As the conlmodity taken  in  lieu  of  every 
other, it is a species of the niost effective wealth ;  and as the 
money of the world, it is of great concern to the state that it 
possesses a sufficiency of  it  to face any demands which the 
of  its external interests inay create. 
l'be objection seams to admit of another  and a more con- 
clusive answer,  which controverts  the fact itself.  A  nation 
that has  110  mines of  its own, must derive the precious me- 
tals from others ; generally  speaking,  in exchange for  the 
of its labor and industry.  The  quantity it will pas- 
sess will, therefore, in the ordinary course of things, be regu- 
lated  by the favorable or  unfavorable balance of  its  trade ; 
that is,  by  the proportion  between its abilities to supply fo- 
reigners, and its wants of  them ; between the amount of  its 
exportations, and that of its importations.  Helm  the state of 
its agriculture and rnaiiufactures ; the quantity ancl  quality 
uf its labor and industry ; must,  in the main, influence and 
determine the increase or decrease of its gold and silver. 
If this be true, the inference seems to be, that well consti- 
tuted banks favor the increase of the precious metals.  It has 
been shown, that they augment, in different ways, the active 
capital of  a country.  This it  is  which  generates employ- 
ment; which  aniniates  and expands labor  and industry. 
Every addition which is made to it, by contributing to put in 
motion a greater  quantity of  both, tends to  create a  greater 
quantity of the products of  both.  And  by furnishing more 
materials for exportation, conduces to a favorable balance of 
trade, and consequently to the introduction  and increase  of 
gold and silver. 
This  conclusion appears to be drawn from solid premises. 
There are, however, objections to be made to it. 
It may be said, that as bank paper affords a  substitute for 
specie, it serves to counteract  that rigorous necessity for  the 
metals as a medium  of circulation,  which, in the case of  a 
wrong balance, might restrain, in some degree, their exporta- 
tion ; and it may be added, that from the same cause, in the 
same case, it would retard those economical and  parsimonious 
reforms in the manner of  living, which the scarcity of  money 
calculated to produce, and which might be necessary to rec- 
tify such wrong balance. 
9 There is, perhaps, some truth in both  these observations : 
but they appear to be of  a  nature  rather to form ex~ept~ions 
to the generality of the conclusion, than to overthrow it.  The 
state of things in which the absoltcte  exigencies of circula- 
tion can be  supposed to resist with any effect the urgent de- 
mands for specie which a wrong balance of trade may occa- 
sion, presents a11  extreme  cnse.  Ancl  a situation in which 
a too expensive manner of living of a community, compared 
with  its means, can stad  in need of  a  corrective, from dis- 
tress or necessity, is one which perhaps rarely results but froin 
extraordinary and adventitious causes ;  such, for example, as 
a national revolution, which unsettles all the established  ha- 
bits of a people, and inflanles the appetite for  extravagance, 
by the illusions of an  ideal wealth, engendered  by  the conti- 
nual multiplication of a depreciating currency, or some  simi- 
lar cause.  There is good reason to believe, that where  the 
laws are wise and well executed, and  the inviolability of pro. 
perty  and contracts  maintained,  the economy  of  a  people 
will, in the  general course  of  things,  correspond with  its 
means. 
The  support of industry, is probably in every case of more 
consequence  towards  correcting a  wrong balance  of  trade, 
than any practicable retrenchments in the expenses of  fami- 
lies or individuals ; and the stagnation of it would be likely 
to have more effect in prolonging, than any such savings in 
shortening, its  continuance.  'That  stagnation is a natural 
consequence of  an inadequate  medium,  which, without the 
aid of  banlr circulalion, ~voultl:  in the cases supposed, be ss- 
verely felt. 
It also deserves notice, that as the circulation of a bank is 
always in a compound  ratio to the fund upon  which it de- 
pends, and to  the demand  for it ; and as that fund is  itself 
affected by the expoi-tation of  the metals, there is no danger 
of  its being overstocked, as in the case of paper issued at  the 
pleasure of the government, or  of  its preventing  the  conse- 
quences of  any unfavont,ble brtlance  from  being suficiently 
felt to produce tlle reforms alluded to, as far as circumstances 
nlay require and admit. 
Nothing can be more fallible than the colnparisons 
llave been made between different countries, to illustrate die 
truth of the position under consideration.  The comparative 
quantity of  gold and silver  in  different  courltries,  depends 
llpon an infinite  variety  of  facts  and cornbinationa, all  of 
which ought to be known, in order  to judge whether the ex- 
istence or non-existence of  paper currencies, has any  share in 
the relative proportions they contain.  The  mass and value 
of the productions of  the labor and industry  of  each, com- 
pard  with its wants ;  the ~lature  of its establishnlents abroad; 
the kind of  wars in which it  is  usually engaged ; the rela- 
tions it bears to the countries which are the original  possess- 
ors of  those  metals;  the privileges  it enjoys  in thcir trade ; 
these,  and a number of  othqr  circumstances, are all  to be 
taken into the account, and render the investigntion too cotn- 
plex to  justify  any reliance  on the vague and general sur- 
mises which have been hitherto hazarded on the point. 
In  the foregoing discussion, the objection has been consi- 
dered as applying to the permanent  expulsion  and diminu- 
tion of  the metals.  Their  temporary  exportation, for  par- 
ticular purposes, has not been contemplated.  'This,  it must 
be  confessed, is facilitated by banks, from the faculty banks 
possess of  supplying their place.  But their utility  is in no- 
thing more conspicuous than in these very cases.  They ena- 
ble the government  to  pay its foreign debts,  and to answer 
any exigencies which  the external concerns of  the commu- 
nity may have produced.  They  enable the merchant to sup- 
port his credit, (on  which  the prosperity of  trade  depends,) 
when  speciai  circumstances  prevent  remittances  in  other 
xnodes.  They  enable him also to prosecute enterprises, which 
tend Wan augmentation of  the species of wealth 
in question.  It is evident, that gold and sil\ er may often be 
employed in procuring com~nodities  abroad ; which,  in a cir- 
cuitous commerce, replace the ot iginal filnd with con~iderable addition.  But it is not to 1x  il~ferred  from this facility given 
to temporary exportation, that banks, which  are  so friendIy 
to trade and industry, are in their general tendency  inimical 
to the increase of the precious metals. 
These several views of the subject, appear sufficient to im- 
press a full conviction of  the utility of  banks, and to demon- 
strate that they are of great importance, not only in relation 
to the administration of  the finances, but in the general sys- 
tem of the political economy. 
The  judgment  of many concerning them, has,  no doubt, 
been perplexed by tlie nlisinterpretation of appearances, lvhiclt 
were to he ascribed  to  other cause;.  The  general  clerasta- 
tion of  personal property, occasioned  by  the late \t.ar:  natu- 
rally produced on the one hand, a great clemand  for money ; 
and on the other, a great deficiency of  it  to  answer the de- 
mand.  Some injudicious laws, which grew out of  the public 
distresses, by impairing confidence, and causing a part of the 
inadequate sum in the country  to be  locked up, aggravated 
the evil; the  dissipated  habits contracted  by  many indivi- 
duals during the war, which  after the peace  plunged them 
into exposes beyond their  incomes ; the number of  adven- 
turers without capital, and in many instances without  infor- 
mation, who at that epoch rushed into trade, and were obliged 
to make any sacrifices to support a transient credit ; the em- 
ployment of considerable sums in speculations upon the pub- 
lic debt, which from its unsettled state was  incapable of  be- 
coming itself  a  substitute : all these circumstances  concur- 
ring, necessarily led  to usurious  borrowing ; produced  most 
of  the inconveniences, and were the tlue cause of most of the 
appearances which, where banks were established, have been 
by  some  erroneously  placed  to  their  account: a  mistake 
which they might easily have avoided, by turning their  eyes 
towards places where there were none ; and  where,  never- 
theless, the same evils would  have  been  perceived  to  exist, 
even in a  greater degree than where  those institutions  ha4 
obtained. 
rIyllese  evils have either ceased, or  been greatly  mitigated. 
l'lleir  inore coinplete extinction may be looked for fiom that 
additional secnrity to  property  which the constitution of  the 
United States happily  gives ; (a circ~imstance  of  prodigious 
monlellt ie the scale, both  of  public  and private ~ros~erit~,) 
from the  of  foreign  capital, under the auspices of 
that security, to be enlployed upon objects, and in enterprises, 
for which the state of this country opens n wide and inviting 
field; from the consistency  and stability  which  the public 
debt is fast acquiring, as well in the public  opinion at home 
and  as in  fact ; fro111  tlie  auplnentatioil  of  capital 
which that circun~sta~lce  and the quartcr yearly paynlent of 
interest  will aflbrd ; and  from  tllc more  copious circulatioil 
whicll will be likely to be created by a well constitutioned na- 
tional bank. 
The establishment  of  banks in this country,  seems to be 
recommended by reasons of  n peculiar nature.  Previously 
to the revolution, circulation  was in a great measure carried 
on by paper emitted  by the several local  governments.  In 
Pennsylvania alone, the quantity of it was near a millio~l  and 
a  half of  dollars.  This auxiliary may be said to be now at 
an end.  And it is  generally  supposed, that there has been 
for some time past a deficiency of circulating medium.  Ikw 
far that deficiency is to be considered as real or imaginary, is 
not susceptible of demonstration ;  but there are circumstances 
and appearances  which, in relation to the country  at large, 
countenance the supposition of its reality. 
The circumst~nces  are,  besides the fact  just  mentioned 
respecting paper emissions, the vast tracts of  waste land, and 
the little advanced  state of  manufactures.  The progressive 
settlement of the former, while it promises  ample retribution, 
in the generation of  future resources, diminishes or obstructs, 
in  the mean time, the aclivc wealth  of  the country.  Ii not 
only draws off a part of the circulating money, and places it 
in a more passive state, but  it  diverts into its own  channels 
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otherwise  he  employed iu  furnishing  liiaterials  for  foreign 
trade ; and which, by  contributing  to  a  favorable balance, 
would assist the introduction of specie.  In  the early periods 
of new settlen~ents,  the settlers  not only furnish no surplus 
for exportation, but they consume a part of that which is pro- 
duced by the labor of  others.  The  same thing is a cause that 
manufactures do not advance, or advance slowly.  And not- 
withstanding  some  hypotheses  to  the contrary,  there  are 
many things to induce a suspicion, that the precious metals 
will not abound in any country which has not  mines or  va- 
riety of  manufactures.  They have been sometimes acquired 
by the sword ; but the nlodern  system of  war has expelled 
this resource ; and it is one upon  wliich it is to be hoped the 
United States will nercr he inclined to rely. 
The  appearances alludcd  to  are, greater prevalency of  di- 
rect barter, in the more interior districts of  the country, which, 
however, has been for  some time past  gradually lessening ; 
and greater difficulty generally in the advantageous alienation 
of  improved  real estate ; which also has of  late diminished, 
but is still seriously felt in different parts of the Union.  The 
difficulty of  getting money, which has been  a general com- 
plaint, is  not added to  the number ; because it is  the  com- 
plaint of  all times, and one in which imagination must  ever 
have too great scope to permit an  appeal to it. 
If  the supposition of  such  a  deficiency be in any degree 
founded,  and some aid to circulation  be desirable, it remains 
to inquire what ought to be the nature of  that aid ? 
The  emitting of  paper money by the authority of  govern- 
ment, is wisely prohibited to  the individual states, by the na- 
tional constitution ; and the spirit of  that prohibition ought 
not  to  be  disregarded  by  the  govcrnment  of  the  United 
States.  Though paper  emissions,  under  a  general  autho- 
rity, might  have  some  advantages  not  applicable, and be 
free from  some disadvantages which are  applicable, to  the 
like emissions by the states separately ; yet they are of  a na- 
ture so liable to abuse, and it may even be  affirmed, so  cer. 
talll of  being abused ; that  the wisdom of  the  government 
will be  in never trusting  itself with the use of  so se- 
ducing and dangerous an  expedient.  In times of  tranquillity, 
it might have no ill consequence ; it rnight even perhaps be 
managed in  a  way to  be productive of  good ; but in great 
and trying emergencies, there is almost a  inoral certainty of 
its becoming mischievous.  The  stamping of  paper is an  ope- 
ration so  much easier  than the laying of  taxes, that a  go- 
vernment, in the  practice  of  paper  emissions, would rarely 
fail in any such emergency, to  indulge itself  too  far  in the 
employment of  that resource,  to avoid, as much as possible, 
one  less  auspicious  to  present  popularity.  If it should not 
even be carried so far as to  be  rendered an absolute bubble, 
it would at lcast, be  likely  to be extended to a degree, wliich 
would occasion an inflated and artificial state of  things, in- 
compatible with the regular and prosperous course of  the po- 
litical economy. 
Among other material differences between a paper curreil 
cy,  issued  by the  mere  authority of  government, and one 
issued by a bank, payable in coin, is this : that in  the  first 
case, there is  no standard to which  an appeal can be made, 
as to the quantity which will  only satisfy, or which will sur- 
charge the circulation ; in the last, that standard results from 
the demand.  If  more should be issued than is necessary, it 
will return upon the bank.  Its emissions, as elsewhere inti- 
mated, must always be in a compound ratio to the fund and 
the demand :-Whence  it is evident, that there is a limitation 
in the  nature of  the thing ; while  the discretion of  the go- 
vernment is the oilly measure of  the extent  of  emissions by 
its own authority. 
This consideration  further  illustrates the danger of  emis- 
*ions of  that sort, and the preference which is due to  bank 
paper. 
The Pqment of  the interest of  the public debt, at thirteen 
different places, is a weighty reanson,  peculiar  to our immedi- 
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per,  in  general  currency,  eqilivalent  to  gold  and  silver, 
a considerable proportion  of  the specie of  the country must 
always  be  suspended  from  circulatiotl,  and  left  to  accu- 
mulate, preparatorily, to each day of  payment ; and as often 
as one approaches, there must, in several cases, be an actual 
transportation of  the metals  at both  expense and risk, froin 
their natural and proper  resemoirs, to  distant places.  This 
necessity will be felt veryirljuriously to the trade of  sonle of 
the states, and will  embarrass  not  a little, the operations  of 
the treasury in  those  states.  It will also obstruct those ne- 
gotiations, between different parts  of  the Union, by the in- 
strumentality of  treasury  bills, which  have already afforded 
valuable accommodations to trade  in general. 
Assuming  it then as n  consequence, fioin what  has been 
said, that a national bank is  a  desirable institution, two in- 
quiries  emerge-Is  there no such institution, already in be- 
ing, which has a  clairn  to  that character, and which super- 
sedes  the propriety  or  necessity  of  another?  If  there be 
none, what  are  the principles upon  which  one ought to  be 
established ? 
There are at present  three  banks in the United States : 
that of  North  America, established  in  the city of  Philadel- 
phia; that  of  New  York,  established  in  the city  of  New 
Yorlc ; that of  Massachusetts,  established  in  the town  of 
Boston.  Of  these three, the first is the onlyone which has 
at any time had  a direct relation  to  the government of  the 
lJnited States. 
The  bank of  North America  originated in a  resolution of 
congress of  the 26th of  May, 1781, founded upoil a proposi- 
tion of  the superintendant of  finance, which was afterwards 
carried  into  execution by an ordinance of  the 31st of  De- 
cember following, entitled  "  An ordinance to incorporate the 
subscribers to the Bank of  North America." 
The  aid afforded to the United States by this  institution, 
during  the  remaining  period  of  the war, was  of  essential 
consequence ; arid its co~~ci~ict  towards then] since the peace. 
1lot weakened its title to their patronage  and  favor.  So 
far its pretensions to the character in question are respectable ; 
but there are circumstances which inilitate against them ;  and 
consideratioi~s  which indicate the propriety  of  an establish- 
lnent on different principles. 
The directors  of  this  bank, 011  bellall of  their coiistilt~ 
ents,  have since  accepted  and acted under  n  new charlcr 
fro111 the state of  Pennsylvania, ~natcrially  variant from tl~eir 
one ; and which so  narrows  the foundation of  the 
institution,  as to  render  it  an incompetent  basis for the ex- 
tensive purposes of  a national bank. 
The  limit  assigned  by the  ordinance of  congress to  the 
of  the bank, is ten millions of  dollars.  'I'he last c11ar- 
kr  of  Pennsylvania confines it to  two millions.  Questions 
naturally arise, whether there be not  a direct repugnancy be- 
tween two charters  so  differently circumstanced ; and whe- 
ther the acceptance of  the one, is not to  be  deemed a virtual 
surrender of  the other ?  But perhaps it is neither advisable 
nor necessary, to attempt a solution of  them. 
There is nothing  in the acts of  congress, which  imply an 
exclusive right in the institution to which they relate, except 
during the tern1 of  the war.  There is tl~erefore  nothing, if 
the public good  require it, which  prevents the establishment 
of  another.  It  may,  however,  be  incidentally  remarked, 
that  in the general  opinion of  the citizens of  the  United 
States, the bank  of  North America has taken the station of 
a bank  of  Pennsylvania only.  This is  a  strong argument 
for a new institution, or for a renovation of tlie old, to restore 
it to the situation in which  it originally stood, in the view of 
the United States. 
But though the ordinance of  congress contains no grant of 
exclusive privileges,  there  may be room  to  alledge, that the 
governinent of  the United States ought not, in point of  can- 
dor and equity, to establish  any  rival  or interfering  institu- 
tion, in  prejudice of  the one  already established ; especially 
10 *. ,- 
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as this has, frorn services rendered, well founded claims to pro- 
tection and regard. 
The justice of  such an observation  ought, within  proper 
bounds, to  be  admitted.  A  new  establishment of  the sort 
ought not to be made without cogent  and sincere  reasons of 
public good.  And  in  the manner of  doing it, every facility 
should be given to  a consolidation of  the old with the new, 
upon terms not inj~lrious  to the parties concerned.  But there 
is no ground to maintain, that in a case in which the govern- 
ment has made no condition restricting its authority, it ought 
voluntarily to restrict  it, through regard to  the interests of  a 
particular institution, when those of  the state dictate a differ- 
ent course ; especially too, after  such circumstances have in- 
tervened, as characterize the actual  situation of  the bank of 
North America. 
The inducements  to  a new  disposition of  the thing  are 
now to be considered.  The first of  them which occurs is, 
the at  least ambiguous situation in which the bank of  North 
America has placed itself, by the acceptance of  its last char- 
ter : If this  has rendered it  the mere  bank  of  a  particular 
state, liable to disssiution at the expiration of  fourteen years, 
to whish  term the act of  that  state has restricted  its dura- 
tion; it would be neither fit nor expedient, to accept it as an 
equivalent for a bank of  the United States. 
The  restriction of  its  capital also,  which, according to the 
same supposition, cannot be extended beyond two millions of 
dollars, is  a  conclusive  reason  for a  different  establishment. 
So  small a capital pron~ises  neither the requisite aid to govern- 
ment, nor the requisite  security to the community.  It may 
answer very well the purposes of  local accommodation, but is 
an inadequate  foundation for  a circulation  coextensive wit11 
the United States ; embracing the whole  of  their revenues, 
and affecting every individual  into whose  hands  the paper 
may come. 
And inadequate as such a capital would be to the essential 
ends of  a national bank, it is liable to  be rendered still more 
so,  tllat principle of  the constitution of the bank of  North 
America, contained equally in its old, and in its new charter, 
wIlicIl  leaves  the increase of  the actual capital at ally time, 
(now far short of  the allowed extent,) to the discretion of  the 
directors or stockholders.  It is naturally to be expected, that 
the allurements of  an nclva~lced  price of  stocl~  and of  large 
dividends, may disincline those who are interested, to an ex- 
tension of  capital;  from  which  they will  be  apt  to  fear  a 
dilninution of  profits.  And  from this circun~stance,  the in- 
terest and accommodation of  the public, (as well indvidually 
as collectively,)  are rnade Inore subordinate to the interest, real 
or imagined, of the stockholders, tl~arl  they o~xgllt  to be.  11  is 
true, that unless the latter be consulted,  here can be no bank 
(in the sense at least in wliicli institutions of this liincl, worthy 
of  confidence,  can  be  established in this country).  But it 
does not follow, that this is alone  to be consulted, or  that it 
even  ought to  be  paramount.  Public utility  is  more truly 
the object of  public banks, than private profit.  And it is the 
business of  government, to constitute them on such principles, 
that while the latter will result, in a sufficient degree, to afford 
competent motives to engage in them, the former be not made 
subservient to it.  To  effect this, a principal object of attention 
ought to be to give free scope to the creation of  an  ample capi- 
tal ; and with this view, fixing the bounds which are deemed 
safe and convenient, to leave no discretion either to stop short 
of  them, or to overpass them.  The  want of  this precaution, 
in the establishment of  the bank of  North America, is a fur- 
ther, and  an important  reason,  for  desiring  one differently 
constituted. 
There may be room at first sight, for a supposition, that as 
the profits of  the bank will bear a, proportion to the extent of 
its operations ; and as, for this reason, the interest of  the stock- 
holders will not be disadvantageously affected by any neces- 
sary auglnenlatiolls  of  cal~ital  ; there id  no  cause  to appre- 
hend that  they  will he  indisposed  to  such  augmentations 
But  most  men,  in  matters  of this  nalure, prefer  the cer- tainties they erljoy, to  probabilities depenrling on untried ex- 
pcri~nerlts  ; especially when these  promise  rather that they 
will not be il?jurecl, than that they will be benefited. 
Fro111  tlie  infl~~ence  of  this principle, and a  desire of  en- 
hancing its profits, the directors of  a bank will be more apt to 
overstrain its faculties, ill an attempt to face tlle additional de- 
mai~ds  which the course  of  business may create, tlian to set 
on foot new subscriptions, which may hazard a diminution of 
the profits, and even  a  temporary reduction of  the price  of 
stock. 
Banks are among tllc best espedienls for lowering the rate 
of  interest in a co~xntry  ; but to have this efkct, their capitals 
nli~st  be completely eclunl to all tlle demands of  business, and 
such as will tend to  remove  the idea, that  the accoinmoda- 
tions they ariord arc in any degree  favors ; an idca very apt 
to  accolnpany  the parsimonious  dispensatio~l  of  contracted 
frlncls.  I11  this, as in every other case, the plcnty of  tlie coin- 
1nodit.y ought to beget a moderation of  the price. 
The  want of  a  principle of  rotation, in the constitutiorl of 
the bank of  North America, is another argument for a varia- 
tion of  the establishment.  Scarcely one of the reasons which 
militate against this principle in the constitution of a country, 
is applicable to that of  a  bank ; while there are strong rea- 
sons in favor of it, in relation to the one, which do not apply to 
the other.  The  knowledge to be derived from experience, is 
the only circumstance common to both, which pleads against 
rotation in  the directing officers of  a bank. 
But the objects of  the government  of  a nation, and those 
of  the  government  of  a  bank, are so  widely different, as 
greatly  to weaken  the  force  of  that  consideration, in refer- 
ence to  the latter.  Almost every important case of  legisla- 
tion requires, towards a right decision, a general and accurate 
acquaintance  with  the  afljirs  of  the state; and  habits  of 
thinking, seldom acquired but From a familiarity with public 
concerns.  The administration of  a  bank, on the contrary, 
is regulated by a few simple fixed maxims, the application of 
which is  not  difficult to  any lnan of  judgment, especially if 
instructed in the principles of  trade.  It is, in general, a con- 
stant succession of  the same details. 
But though this be the case, the idea of  the advantages of 
is not  to be  slighted : room  ought to be  left  for 
the regular  transmission of  oficial information ; and for this 
purpose, the head of  the direction ought to be excepted from 
the principle of  rotation.  With this exception, and with the 
aid of  the information of  the subordinate  officers, there can 
be  no danger of  any ill  effects  from want  of  experience, or 
knowledge;  especially as the periodical exclusion ought l10t 
to reach the whole of  the directors at one time. 
?'he  argument in favor of  the principle of rotation is this ; 
ihat by lessening the danger of  combinations among the di- 
rectors, to make the institution subservient to party views, or 
to  the  accommodation,  preferably,  of  any particular  set of 
men, it will render the public  confidence  Inore  firm, stable, 
and unqualified. 
When  it  is  considered,  that  the  directors  of  a  bank 
are  not  elected  by  the great  body  of  the community,  in 
which  a  diversity  of  views  will  naturally  prevail,  at  dif- 
ferent conjunctures ; but  by a small and select class of  men, 
among whoin it  is far  more easy  to  cultivate a  steady  ad- 
herence to  he same persons and objects ; and  that those direc- 
tors  have  it in  their power so  inlmediately to conciliate, by 
obliging the  most  influentialof  this class, it  is easy to per- 
ceive, that without the principle  of  rotation, changes in that 
body can rarely happen, but as a concession which they may 
themselves think it expedient to make to public opinion. 
The continual  administration of  an institution  of  this 
kind, by the same  persons, will  never  fail, with or without 
cause, from  their  conduct, to  excite distrust and discontent. 
The  necessary secrecy of  their  transactions, gives unlimited 
scope to  imagination to infer that  something is, or may be, 
wrong.  And this inevitable mystery is a solid reason for in- 
serting in:the  constitution of  a bank the necessity of  a change of  men.  As neither the nlass of  the parties  interested, nor 
the public in general, can be permitted to be witnesses of  the 
interior ~nnnagcment  of  the  clirectors, it  is  reasonable  that 
both  should  have that  check upon their conduct, and  that 
security against the prevaleilcy of  a partial or pernicious sys- 
tem, which  will be  produced  by the certainty  of  periodical 
changes.  Such too is the delicacy of  the credit  of  a bank, 
that every thing which can  fortify confidence and repel sus- 
picion, without injuring ils operhtions, ought carefully to be 
sought after in its forn~ntion. 
A  further  consideration in  favor of  a  change, is the itn- 
proper rule, by which the right of  voting for directors is regu- 
lated in the plan upon which the bank of  North America was 
originally  constituted ; namely, n  vote for  each  share,  and 
the want  of  a  rule in the last  charter;  unless the  silence 
of  it on that  point  may signify that every  stockholder  is 
to have an equal and a single vote, which would be a rule  in 
a different extreme,  not less  erroneous.  It is of  importance 
that a rule should be established  on this head, as it is one of 
those things which ought not to  be left to discretion ; and it 
is consequently  of  equal  importance, that the rule should be 
a proper one. 
A vote for each share, renders a combination between a few 
principal stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits 
of  the bank, too easy.  An  equal  vote to  each stockholder, 
however great or small his  interest in the institution, allows 
not  that degree of  weight  to  large  stockholders, which it is 
reasonable they should have, and which  perhaps their secu- 
rity, and that of  the bank, requirc.  A prudent mean'is to be 
preferred.  d conviction of  this, has produced a  by-law  of 
the corporation  of  the  bank of  North  America, which evi- 
dently aims at such a  mean.  But a  reflection arises  here, 
that a like majority with that which enacted this law, may at 
any moment repeal it. 
The last  inducement  which  shall  be  mentioned, is  the 
want of  precautions to guard against ,I  foreign infl~le~lce  in- 
sinuating  itself  into  the  direction  of  fhe  bank.  It  seelns 
reconcileable with a due caution, to permit, that any 
but citizens should be eligible, as directors of a national bank, 
or that non-resident foreigners should be able to influence the 
appoint~~ient  of  directors, by thc votes  of  their  proxies.  In 
the event, however, of  an incorporation of the bank of  North 
America, in the plan, it may be necessary to qualify this prin- 
ciple, so as to  leave  the right of  foreigaers, who now  hold 
shares  of  its  stock, unimpaired,  but  without the power  of 
transmitting the privileges in question to foreign aliences . 
It  is to be considered that such a  bank is not a mere mat- 
ter of  private property, but a political machine of  the great- 
est importance to the state. 
There  are  other  variations  from the constitution of  the 
bank of  North America, not of inconsiderable moment, which 
appear desirable, but which are not  of  magnitude enough to 
claim a preliminary discussion : These will  be  seen in the 
plan which will be submitted in the sequel. 
If the objections which have been stated to the constitution 
of the bank of North America,are admitted to be well founded, 
they will  nevertheless  not  derogate  from the  merit  of  the 
main design, or of  the services which that bank has rendered, 
or of  the benefits which it  has produced.  The  creation  of 
snch an  institution, at the time it took place, was a  measure 
dictated by wisdom.  Its utility has been amply evinced by 
its fruits-Ameiican  independence owes much to it.-And  it 
is very conceivable, that reasons  of  the moment, may have 
rendered  those features in  it inexpedient, which a revision 
with a permanent view, suggests as desirable. 
The  order of  the subject, leads next to an inquiry into the 
principles  upon  which  a  national  bank  ought to  be  or- 
ganized. 
The situation of  the United  States naturally inspires a 
wish that the form of  the institution  could  admit of  a plu- 
rality of  branches.  But various  considerations  discourage 
from  pursuing  this idea.  The complexity of  such  a  plan 
would be  apt to inspire doubts, which  night deter fxom ad- venturing in it : And the practicability of  a safe and orderly 
administration, though  not  to  be  abandoned  as desperate, 
cannot be so manifest in perspective, as to promise the remo- 
val of  those doubts, or to justify the government in adopting 
thc idea as an original  experiment.  The most that would 
seem advisable, on this point, is  to insert -a provision, which 
may lead to it hereafter, if  experience  shall more  clearly de- 
monstrate its utility, and satisfy those  who may have the di- 
rection, that it may be adopted with safety.  It is certain, that 
it would have some advantages, both peculiar and important. 
Besides  more  general  accommodation, it would  lessen the 
danger of a run upon the bank. 
The  argument againsl it is, that  each branch must be un- 
der a distinct, though subordinate direction, to which a consi- 
derable latitude of  discretion must of  necessity be intrusted. 
And as the property of  the whole  institution would be liable 
for the engagements of  each part ;  that, and its credit, would 
be at stalie upon the prudence of  tlie directors of  every part. 
The  mismanagen~ent  of  either branch inight hazard serious 
disorder in the whole. 
Another  wish, dictated by  the particular  situation of  the 
country,  is, that the banlr could be  so  constituted as to  be 
made an immediate instrument of  loans to the proprietors of 
land;  but  this wish  also yields  to  the difficulty of  accom- 
plishing it.  Land is alone an unfit fund for a bal11r circula- 
tion : If  the notes issued upon  it were  not to be  payable  in 
coin, on demand, or  at a  short date, this would  amount to 
nothing more than a repetition of  the papel. emissions, which 
are now exploded by the general voice.  If the ilotes are to 
be payable in coin, the land must first  be  coaveried into it, 
by sale or mortgage.  The difficulty of  effecting the latter, 
is the very thing which begets the desire of  finding another 
resource ; and the former would not be practicable on a  sud- 
den  emergency, but with  sacrifices which  would make the 
cure worse than the disease.  Neither is the idea of  consti- 
tuting the fund partly of  coin and partly of  land, free  korn 
ilnpedilnents : these  two  species of  prope1t.y do not,  for the 
most part, unite in the same hands.  Will the moneyed man 
consent to  enter into  a partnership with  the landholder, by 
which the latter will share in the profits which will be made 
by the money of  the former  ?  The money,  it is evident, 
will be  the  agent or efficient  cause of  the profits-the  land 
can only be regarded  as a additional security.  It is not dif- 
ficult to foresee, that a  union on such terms, will not readily 
be formed.  If the landholders are to procure the money by 
$ale or mortgage  of  a  part  of  their  lands, this they can  as 
well  do, when the stoclr  consists  wholly of  money, as if  it 
were to be conlpounded of  nioney and land. 
To  procure for the landholders the assistance of loans is the 
great desiderat,um.  Supposing other difficulties surmounted, 
and a fund  created,  colnposed partly of  coin  and partly of 
land, yet the  benefit contemplated could  only  then be  ob- 
tained, by the bank's  advancing them its notes for the whole, 
or part of  the value of  the lands they had subscribed to the 
stock.  If this advance was small, the relief aimed at would 
not be  given ; if  it was large, the quantity of  notes  issued 
would be  a  cause of  distrust, and, if  received at all,  they 
wo~dd  be  likely to return  speedily upon  the Sank  for  ppay- 
ment ; which, after exhausting its coin, inight be  under the 
necessity of  turning  its lands into  money, at any price that 
could be obtained for them, to the irreparable prejudice of  the 
proprietors. 
Considerations of  public advantage suggest a further wisl~, 
which is, that the banlr could be  established upon principles 
that would cause the profits of  it to redound to the immediate 
benefit of  the state.  This is  contemplated  by many who 
speak of  a national bank, but the idea  seems liable to insu- 
perable objections.  To  attach full confidence to an institu- 
tion of  this nature, it appears to be an essential ingredient in 
its structure, that it shall be under a private, not a public di- 
rection, under  the guidance  of  individual interest, not  of 
1?*&blic  policy ;  which  would be supposed  to be, and in cer- 
11 tain emergencies, under a feeble or  too sanguineadministra. 
tion, would really be, liable to being too  much influenced by 
public  necessity.  The suspicion of  this, would most pro- 
bably be a canker that would continually corrode the vitals of 
the credit of  the banlr, and would  be  most likely to  prove 
fatal in those situatioils iiz which the  public  good  would  re- 
quire that they should te  most sound and vigorous. It would, 
indeed, be little less than a  miracle, shorild the credit of  the 
bank be at the disposal of  the government, if, in n long series 
of  time, there was not experienced a calamitous abuse of  it. 
It is true, that it would be the real interest of  the governinent 
not to abuse it ; its genuine policy to  llusband and cherish it 
with the most guarded circumspection, as an inestimable trea- 
sure.  But what government ever uniformly consulted its true 
interests, in opposition to the temptations of  momentary ex- 
igencies?  What nation  was  ever blessecl with  a  constant 
succession of  upright and wise administrators '? 
The  keen, steady, and as it were magnetic sense of  their 
own interest as proprietors, in the directors of  a bank, point- 
ing invariable to  its true pole, the prosperity of  the institu- 
tion,  is the only secu~ity  that can always  he relied upon for 
a careful and prudent  administration.  It is, therefore, the 
only basis on which an enlightened, unqualified, and perma- 
nent confidence, can  be  expected to  be  erected  and main- 
tained. 
The  precedents  of  the banks  est:xblisllecl  in several cities 
of  Europe ; Amsterdam, Hainburg, and others ; mag seen1 
to militate against tllia  position.  Without a  precise  know- 
ledge of  all the peculiarities of  their  respective constitulio~~s, 
it  is difficult to prollouilce  how  far  this  may  be  the case. 
That of  Amslerdam,  however,  which  we  best  know,  is 
rather under a ~ziunicipal  than a goverlzmental direction.  Par- 
ticular inngistrates  of  the city, not  officers of  the republic, 
have the managemelit of  it.  It  is also a Lank of deposit, not 
of  loan, or circuliition ; consecluently, less liable to abase, as 
well as less useful.  Its general l~usiness  consists in receiving 
money for safe keeping, which if  not called for within a cer- 
tain  time,  becomes  a part  of  its stock,  and irreclaimable : 
~ut  a credit is given for  it 011  the books of  the bank, whicli, 
being transferable, answers all the purposes of  money. 
The  directors being magistrates of  the city, and the stock<- 
holclers, in general, its most influential citizens ; it is evident, 
that the principle of  private interest must be prevalent in the 
management of the banlr.  And it is eclually evident, that from 
the nature of  its operations, that principle is  less essential to 
it, than to an institution coiistituted with a view to the accom- 
modation of  the public  and inclividuals, by direct loans and 
a paper circulation. 
As far as may concern the aid of  the bank, within the pro- 
per limits, a good government has nothing inore to wish for, 
than it will  always possess ; tliough the management be in 
the hands of private individuals.  As the institution, if rightly 
constituted,  must depend  for  its  renovation  from  time  to 
time on the pleasure of  the government, it will not be likely 
to feel a dispositioli to render  itself  by its  conduct, unworthy 
of  ptiblic patronage.  The  government too, in the adminis- 
tration of  its finances, has it in its power to reciprocate bene- 
fits to the bank, of  not less importance  than those which the 
bank  affords  to  the  government, and  which,  besides,  are 
never unattended with an immediate and adequate compen- 
sation.  Independent of these more particular considerations, 
the natural weight and influence of  a good government will 
always go far towards  procuring a  coinpliance with  its  de- 
sires ; and as the directors will  usually be composed of  some 
of  the most  discreet, respectable, and well-informed citizens, 
it can hardly ever  be  difficult to make them sensible of  the 
force of  the inducements which  ought to stimulate their ex- 
ertions. 
It will not follow, from what has been said, that the state 
may not be the holder of  a part of  the stock of a bank,  and 
consequently a sharer in the profits of  it.  It will only follow, 
that it ought not to  desire any participation  in the directios of it, and therefore ought not to own the whole or  n pri~lcipal 
part of  the stock ; for if the mass of  the property should  be- 
long to the public, and if the direction of  it should  be in pri- 
vate hands, this would be to commit the interests of the state 
to persons  not  interested,  or  not  enough interested in their 
proper management. 
?'here  is one thing, however, which the government owes 
to itself and the community ; at least to all that part of  it who 
are not stockholders ; which is to reserve to  itself a right of 
ascertaining, as often as may be  necessary, the state of  the 
bank, excluding,  however,  all  pretension  to  control.  This 
right forms  an article  in the primitive  constitution  of  the 
bank of  North  America,  and its  propriety  stands upon the 
clearest reasons.  If the piper of  a bank is to be permitted to 
insinuate itself into all the revenues and receipts of  a country ; 
if it is even to be tolerated as the substitute for gold and sil- 
ver, in all the transactions of business ; it becomes, in either 
view, a  national concern of  the first  magnitude.  As such, 
the ordinary rules  of  prudence require that the government 
should possess the means of  ascertaining, whenever it thinks 
fit, that  SO delicate a. trust is executed with fidelity and care. 
A right of  this nature is not only desirable as it respects  the 
government, but it ought to  be  equally  so to all those con- 
cerned in the institution, as an additional title to  public and 
private confidence, and as a thing which can only be formi- 
dable  to  practices  that imply  mismanagement.  The pre- 
s~lmption  must always be, that the characters who would be 
intrusted with the exercise of  this right on behalf of  the go- 
vernment, will not be deficient  the discretion which it may 
require ; at  least the admitting of this presumption cannot be 
deemed too  great a return  of  confidence for that very large 
portion of it which the government is required to place in the 
bank. 
Abandoning, therefore, ideas which  however agreeable or 
desirable, are neither practicable nor safe, the following plan 
for  the constitution of  a  national  bank-,  is  respectf~~lly  sub- 
mitted to the coilsideration of the house. 
I.  The  capital stoclr of the bank shall not exceed ten  inil- 
lions of dollars, divided into twenty-five thousand shares, each 
&are being four hundred dollars ; to  raise which  sum, sub- 
scriptions shall be opened on the firf't Monday of April next, 
and shall continue open  until the whole shall be subscribed. 
Bodies politic, as well as individuals,  may subscribe. 
11.  The  amount of each share shall be payable, one fourth 
in gold and silver coin, and three fourths in that  part of the 
public debt, which, according to the loan proposed by the act 
making provision for the debt of the United States, shall bear 
an accruing interest at the time of payment of six per centum 
per annum. 
111.  The respective sums subscribed, shall be payable in 
four equal parts, as well specie as debt, in succession, and at 
the distance  of  six calendar  months from  each other; the 
first payment to  be  made  at the  time of  subscription.  If 
there shall be a failure in any subsequent payment, the party 
failing shall lose the benefit of any dividend which may have 
accrued prior  to  the  time  for  making  such  payment, and 
during the delay of  the same. 
IV.  The subscribers  to  the bank,  and their  successors, 
shall be incorporated, and shall  so  continue,  until  the final 
redemption of that part of its stock which shall consist of the 
public debt. 
V.  The  capacity of  the corporation  to  hold real and per- 
sonal estate, shall be limited to fifteen millions  of  dollars, in- 
cluding  the amount of  its capital  or  original  stock.  The 
lands and tenements which it shall be permitted to hold, shall 
be only such as shall be  requisite  for the immediate accom- 
modation of the institution ; and such as shall have been bona 
fide mortgaged to it by way of  security, or conveyed to  it in 
satisfaction of debts previously contracted, in the usual course 
of its dealings, or purchased  at sales upon  judgments which 
*hall have been obtained for such debts. VI. The  totality of  the debts of  thc compa~~y,  whether by 
bond, bill, note, or other contract,  (credits for deposits except- 
ed,) shall never esccecl the amount of its capital stock.  I11 
case of  excess, the directors under  wllosc  aclministration it 
shall happen, stlttll be linblc lor it in theit private or separate 
capacities.  Those who  may  have  dissented, may excuse 
themselves from this responsibility, by iminecliately giving no- 
tice of the fact ailcl their dissent, to the president of the United 
States, and to the stoclrholclers, at a  general  meeting to be 
called by the president of  the hanli, at their request. 
VII.  The  conlpany may sell or demise its lands and tene- 
ments or may sell the whole or ally part  of  the public  debt, 
whereof its stock  shall  consist ; but  shall trade in ilotlling 
except bills of exchauge, gold and silver bullion, or in the sale 
of goods pledged for  money lent ; nor shall take inore than 
at the rate of  six per  centuln pcr  annum, upon its loans or 
discounts. 
VIII.  No loan  shall be inacle by  the bank, for the use or 
on account of the governinent of the United States, or of either 
of them, to an  amount  exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or of 
any foreign prince or state, unless previously authorized by a 
law of  the United States. 
IX.  The  stock of the bank shall be transferrable according 
t;,  such rules  as shall be  instituted by the company in that 
behalf. 
X.  The affairs of  the bank shall be under the inanage- 
ment of twenty-five directors, one of  whom shall be the pre- 
sident.  And there shall be on the first Monday of January, 
in each year, a choice of directors, by a plurality of suffrages 
of  the stockholders,  to  serve for  a year.  The  directors, at 
their first meeting after each election, shall choose one of  their 
number as president. 
XI. The  number of  votes to which each stockholder shall 
be entitled; shall  be  according  to the number of  shares he 
shall hold, in the proportions  following : that  is to  say, for 
one share, and not  more  than  two  shares,  one  vote;  for 
every two shares, above two, and not exceeding ten, one vote : 
for every four shares above ten, and not exceeding thirty, one 
vote ; for  every six shares above  thirty, and not exceeding 
sixty, one vote ; for every  eight shares above sixty, and not 
exceeding one hundred,  one vote ; and for  every ten  shares 
above  one hundred, one vote : but no person, copartnership, 
or body politic, shall be  entitled  to  a  greater number than 
thirty votes.  And after the first election, no share or shares 
shall confer a right  of  sufiage, which sl~all  not  have been 
holden three calenclar months previous to the day of election. 
Stockholders actually resident within the United  States,  and 
none other, may vote in elections by proxy. 
XII. Not more than three fourths of  the directors in office, 
exclusive of the president, shall be  eligible for  the next  suc- 
ceeding year.  But the director who shall be presidcnt at the 
time of an election, may be always re-elected. 
XIII. None but a stockholder, being a citizen of the United 
States, shall be eligible as a director. 
XIV.  Any number of stockholders not less than sixty, who 
together shall be proprietors of  two hundred  shares, or up- 
wards, shall have power at any time to  call a general meet- 
ing of the stockholders, for purposes relative to the institution ; 
giving at lcast six weeks' notice, in two public gazettes of the 
place where the bank is kept, and specifying, in such notice, 
the object of the meeting.  - 
XV.  In case of  the deatli, resignation,  absence from  the 
United States, or  renloval of a  director  by the stockholders, 
his place may be filled by a new choice for the  remainder of 
the year. 
XVI.  No director shall be entitled to any emolument,  un- 
less the same shall have been allowed by the stocl~holders,  at 
a general meeting.  The stoclrholclers shall make such com- 
pensation  to the president, for  his extraordinary  attendance 
at the bank, as shall appear to them reasonable. 
XVII.  Not  less  than  seven  directors  shall  constitute  a 
hoard for the transaction of  business. XVIII. Every cashier, or treasurer, before he enters on the 
duties of  his office, shall be  required to give bond, with two 
or more sureties, to the satisfaction of  the  directors, in a sum 
not less than twenty thousand  dollars, with condition for his 
good behaviour. 
XIX.  Half  yearly dividends shall be  made of  so much of 
the profits of  the banlc, as shall  appear to the directors  ad- 
visable.  And once in every three years the  directors shall 
lay before the stoclcholders, at a general meeting, for their in- 
formation,  an exact  and particulai statement of  the  debts 
which shall have remained unpaid, after the expiration of the 
original credit, for  a period  of  treble the term of  that credit, 
and of  the surplus of  profit,  if  any,  after deducting  losses 
and dividends. 
XX. The  bills andnotes of the bank originally made pay- 
able, or  which shall have  become  payable on  demand, in 
gold and silver coin, shall be receivable in all payments to the 
United States. 
XXI. The  officer at the head of  the treasury department 
of  the United  States, shall be furnished from time to time, 
as  often as  he may require, not exceeding  once a week, with 
statements of  the amount of  the capital  stock of  the bank, 
and of  the debts due to the  same, of  the moneys deposited 
therein, of  the notes in circulation, and of  the cash in hand; 
and shall have a right  to inspect  such general  accounts in 
the books of  the bank, as shall relate to the said statements; 
provided  that this shall not be  construed to imply a right of 
inspecting the account of  any private individual or individu- 
als, with the bank. 
XXII. No similar  institution  shall be established by any 
future act of the United States, during the continuance of the 
one hereby proposed to be established. 
XXIII. It shell be lawful for the directors of  the bank to 
establish offices, wheresoever  they shall think  fit, within the 
United States, for  the purpose of  discount and deposit only, 
and upon the same terms, and in  the same manner, as shall 
be pracllsed at the bank, and to  co~nnlit  the ma~~agemeut  of 
the said offices, and the  making of  the said discounts, either 
to agents specially appointed  by them, or  to  such persons as 
may be chosen by thc stoclrholders residing at the placc ivhere 
any such ofice shall be, uncler such agreements, and subject 
to such  regulations as  they shall deem  proper ; not  being 
vontmry to lair, or to the corlstit~~tion  of  the bank. 
XXIV.  And lastly-l'he  president  of  tl~c  United  Slates 
,hall  be authorized to  cause a subscription to be nlacle to the 
of  the  said company, on  behalf  of  the United  States, 
to  an amount not  exceeding  two millions of  dollars, to  be 
paid out of  the moneys which shall be borrowed by virtue of 
cither  of  the acts, the one  entitled  'L  An act  making provi- 
sion for the debt of  the United States," and the other entitled 
.!  An act  making provision  for  the reduction  of  the public 
ilebt," borrowing of  the bank an equal sun?, to be applied to 
the purposes for which the said moneys shall have been pro- 
cured,  seiinbursable  in  ten  years  by  equal annual  instal- 
ments;  or at any time sooner, or in any greater proportione, 
that the government may think fit. 
The reasons  for the several provisio~ls  contailled in  the 
foregoing plan, have been so far anticipated, and mill, for tbe 
most part, be so readily suggested by the nature of  those pro- 
visions, that any comments which neccl further be made, will 
be both few and concise. 
The  combination  of  a  portion  of  the public  debt, in the 
formation of  the capital,  is the priucipal thing of  which an 
explanation is requisite.  The  chief  object of  this is,  to  en. 
able the creation of  a capital sufficiently large to bc the basis 
of  an extensive  circulation, and an adequate security for it. 
As  has been  elsewh ere remarked,  the original plan  of  the 
bank  of  North  America, contemplated a  capital of  ten mil- 
lions of  dollars, which is certainly not too broad a foundation 
for the extensive operations to which a national bank is  des- 
tined.  But to collcct such a sum in this country in gold and 
silver. into  one depository, may, withont  hesiiation, be  prcr 
12 nounced impracticable.  Hence the necessity of  an auxiliary: 
which the public debt at once presents. 
This part of the fund will be always ready to come in aid 
of the specie.  It  will more and more command a ready sale ; 
and can therefore expeditiously be turned into coin, if  an  ex- 
igency of the ban]<  should at any time require it.  This  quali- 
ty of  prompt convertibility into coin, renders it an equivalent 
for  that  necessary  agent of  bank  circulation;  and  distin- 
guishes it from a fund in land, of which the sale would gene- 
rally  be  far less  con~pendious, and  at great  disadvantage. 
The  quarter-yearly receipts of  interest, will also be an actual 
addition to the specie fund, during the intervals between them 
and the half-yearly dividends  of  profits.  The objection  to 
combining land  with specie, resulting from  their  not being 
generally in possession of  the  same persons, does not apply 
to the debt, whicli will always be found in considerable quan- 
tity anlong the moneyed and trading people. 
The  debt composing part of  the capital, besides its collate- 
ral effect in enabling the bank to extend its  operations, and 
consequently  to enlarge its profits, will produce a direct an- 
nual revenue of  six per centum from the government, which 
will  enter  into  the  half-yearly  dividends received  by  the 
stocltl~olders. 
When the present  price of  the public debt  is considered, 
and the effect which its conversion  into bank stock, incorpo- 
rated  with a specie fund, would, in  all probability,  have  to 
accelerate its rise to  the proper point, it  will easily  be disco- 
vered, that the operation presents in its outset a very considera- 
ble advantage to those who may become subscribers; and from 
the influence which that rise would have on the general mass 
of  the debt, a  proportional benefit to all  the public creditors, 
and in a sense which has been more than once adverted to, to 
the community at large. 
There is an important fact,, which exemplifies the fitness 
of  the public debt, for a bank  fund, and which may serve to 
remove doubts in some minds on this point.  It is this. thn 
the bank of  England, on its  first  erection,  rested 1v11olly on 
that foundation.  The  subscribers to a loan to government of 
one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling, were in- 
corporated as a bank ; of  which the debt created by the loan 
and the interest upon it, were the sole fund.  The  subsequent 
of  its capital, which now amounts to between 
eleven  and twelve millions of  pounds sterling,  have been of 
the same nature. 
The  confining of  the right  of  the bank to contract  debts 
to  the  amount of  its  capital,  is  an important  precaution, 
which is not to be  found in the constitution of  the  bank of 
North America, and which, while the fund consists wholly of 
coin, ~vould  be a restriction attended with inconveniencies, but 
~rould  be  free  from any, if  the composition of  it  should  be 
such as is now proposed.  The  restriction exists in the estab- 
lishn~ent  of  the bank of  England, and as a source of  secu ri- 
ty, is worthy of  imitation.  The consequence  of  exceeding 
the limit there  is, that each  stockholder is liable  for the ex- 
cess, irl  proportion to his interest in the bank.  When  it  is 
considered, that the directors owe  their appointment-  a to the 
choice  of  the stockholders, a  responsibility of  this  ltind on 
the part of  the latter, does not appear unreasonable.  But on 
the other hand it may  be deemed a hardship upon those who 
may have  dissented  from the choice.  And there are inany 
among us, whom it might perhaps discourage from becoming 
concerned in the institution.  'I'hese  reasons  have induced 
the placing of  the responsibility upon the directors, by whom 
the limit prescribed should be transgressed. 
The  interdiction of  loans on account of the United States, 
or of  any  particular state, beyond the moderate sum specified, 
or of  any foreign power, will  serve as a  barrier to executive 
encroachments,  and  to  combinations  inauspicious  to  the 
safety, or contrary to the policy of  the Union. 
The limitation  of  the rate of  interest  is dictated by  the 
consideration, that different rates  prevail in different parts of 
'he Union : and as the operations  of  the hank may extend through tile 81101e,  soine rule seems to be inecessary  'Yllur~. 
is  room  for  a cluestion, whether  the  limitation  ought  not 
to be to five, than to six per  cent., as proposed.  It may 
with safety, be talcell for granted, that  the former rate ~vould 
yield an amlIle dividend ; perhaps as muah as the latter; by 
the extensioll xvltich  it mould  give to busiuess.  Tlie natural 
effect of  low interest  is to  increase  trade  arid industry ; be- 
cause  undertakings  of  every kind  can  be  prosecuted  wit11 
geater advantage.  This is  a  truth  generally  admitted : 
1,ut  it is  requisite to have  analy~ed  the subject  in all its re- 
lations, to be &e  to form a just  conception  of  the extent of 
that effect.  Silcll  an analysis cannot but  satisfy an intelli- 
gent mind, that tlie difference of  one per cent. in the rate at 
which  money may be  had, is often  capble of  making all 
esseiitial change for the better, in  the situation of  any  cou11- 
try or place. 
Every thing, therefore,  which tends to  lower the rate of 
interest, is peculiarly worthy of  the cares of legislators.  Al~d 
tllough laws  which  violently  sink the legal rate of  interest 
greatly below the market level, are not to be colnmended, be- 
cause they are not calculated to answer their aiin ; yet, what- 
ever has a tendency to effect a reduction, without violence to 
the ~iatural  course of  tl~ings,  ought to be attended to and pur- 
sued.  Banks are among the means most proper to  accom- 
plish this end; and the moderation of  the rate at which their 
discounts are made, is a. material ingreclient towards it ; with 
which their own interest, viewed on an enlarged and perma- 
)lent scale, does not appear to cliish. 
But as the most obvious ideas are apt to have greater force 
than those which depend 011  complex and  reluote  combina- 
tions, there  would  be danger that the persons whose funds 
,nust constitute tl~c  stock of  the  bank,  would  be diffident of' 
the suficie:lcy  of  the profits to be expected, if  the rate of loans 
;~nd  discounts were to  be  placed  below  the  point  to which 
they have been accustonled ; and might, on this account, be 
indisposed to ernharlti~rg  in the  plan.  There is, it  is  trilo. 
,,llc leflection, which, in regard to  lnen actually  ellgaged  111 
trade, ought to be a security against this  danger ; it  is  this; 
that the acco~ninodations  which they might derive in the way 
of their business, at a low rate, would more  than indemnify 
them for any difference in the dividend ; supposing even that 
some dinlinution of it were to be the consequence.  But upon  . 
the whole, the hazard of contrary reasoning among the mass 
of moneyed  men, is a powerful argument against the experi- 
ment.  The  institutions of the kind already existing, add  to 
the  difficulty of  making it.  Mature  reflection, and n Inlpc 
capital, may, of themselves, lead to tlie desired end. 
The  last thing which requires any explanatory rernnrk, ic 
the authority  proposed to be  given  to tl~e  president,  to sub- 
scribe to the amount of tnro millions of  dollars, on account ol 
the public.  The  main design of  this is, to enlarge the spccic 
hnd of the bank, and to enable it to give a more  early  es- 
tension to its operations.  Though it  is  proposed to borrow 
with one hand what is lent with the other, yet the disburse- 
ment of what is borrowed will be progressive, and bank notes 
lnay be tlirown into circulation instead of the gold and silver. 
Besides, there is to be an annual reimbursement  of a part  of 
the sum borrowed, which will finally operate as  an  actual in- 
vestment of so much specie.  In addition to the inducement. 
to this measure, which result from the general interest of  the 
government to enlarge the sphere of  the utility  of the hank. 
there is this more particular consideration, to wit : that as  far 
as the dividend on the stock shall exceed the interesl pait1 01  t 
the loan, there is a positive profit. 
The  secretary begs leave to coi~clude  with this gen~rnlob- 
-ervation--that  if  the bank of North America ~hitII  colne for- 
ward with any propositions, which  have for their object thr 
ingrafting upon that institution the characteristics which shall 
t'PPear  to the  legislature  necessary  to  the  due  extent  and 
safety of a national bank, there are, in his judgment, lveightp 
to  giving every reasonable  facility to the men- 
'ure.  Not  onlv the pretensions of  that  inqtitntion.  from it. tjngiual ielation to tlie governillent of tlie U~iited  States, auci 
from the services it has rendered, are such as to claim  a dis- 
position favorable: to it, if  those who are interested in  it  are 
willing, 011 their part, to place it on a footing satisfactory to the 
government, and equal to the purposes of a bank of the United 
States ; but its co-operation would  materially  accelel.ate the 
accomplishment of  the great object, and the collision which 
might otherwise  arise,  nlight, in  a  variety  of  ways,  prove 
equally  disagreeable  and injurious.  Tlie incorporation  or 
union here contemplated, may be effected in different modes, 
under the auspices of an act  of  the United States, if  it shall 
1)c desired by the Bank of North America, upon terms which 
41Li11  appear expedient to the government. 
411  which js 11umbIy  submitted. 
4LEXANDER HAMILTON, 
~Sccretccry  of  Ihr  Trec~,s?cr!/. 
'.LIHE LATK BANIZ  OF THE UNITED STATES. 
'I'his  institution, though 110  longer existing, has rendered 
to government, and to the community at large, so many es- 
sential services, that its history will not be uninteresting.  The 
idea of  it  was conceived immediately  after  the adoption of 
the present constitution, by Alexander Hamilton, Esq., then 
secretary of  the treasury.  The  acute intellect and enlarged 
mind  of this  man, caused  him  to  master  every  subject  to 
which his attention was directed, and to embrace it in all its 
details and consequences, whether immediate or remote.  It 
had not escaped him, that the work of  the  revolution would 
remain unfinished, without a solemn compact, which should 
give to the new born political society consistency  and shape, 
and unite  its wide  spread  members  into a  well  organized 
commonwealth.  His efforts, therefore, as his writings testify, 
had been clirert ad tnrnxrrl~  effec,ting.  the formation nf  a rnn~ti- 
tutloll, and causlng it to be adopted.  But wlieu this was at- 
tained, Ile perceived further, that in order to give permaizeilcp 
to the new  fabric,  it  was  necessary  to  render  it  respected 
abroad, and to strengthen it by the support of self-interest at 
home ; he perceived that it was necessary to raise the etlifict: 
of public credit,  and that this  could only be  attempted with 
success, by laisinq it on the basis of justice and good faith. 
This required that the general goverilment shoulc1 acknow- 
ledge the debts contracted during the revoIutionary  struggle, 
lnake provision for the regular discharge of  the accruing in- 
terest, and for an ultimate payment of the principal itself. 
They were consecluently funded ; a system of revenue was 
created, to meet the future expenditures ; and nothing coulif 
be happier than the further idea of establishing a NATIONAT, 
BANK,  the stock;  of which was chiefly to consist in public se 
curities, in order to procure at once to those securities a great 
market  vaIue, give precision  and method  to the fiscal ope- 
rations of the new government, and blend  its  stability with 
the comforts of individual existence.  It would also have tho 
advantage of turning credit into capital, and enable the coun- 
try to procure  from abroad  the  innumerable  things  which 
were wanted, to  start  with vigor  in the career of  industry. 
though  nearly  exhausted  with  the efforts to  attain inde- 
pendence. 
The  pIan of such a bank was  therefore submitted to COII 
gress on the 13th December, 1790.  It was opposed in con 
grew, by the party then in the minority, but who have since 
come into favor, chiefly on the ground of the presumed un- 
constitutionality of  the  measure  proposed.  The power  of 
creating a bank, or any corporate body whatever, not having 
been expressly delegated  to congress, it  was  contended that 
no such power  n  as  possessed.  The  cabinet was divided or1 
the question, as well as the public councils.  The  then secre- 
tary of state in particular  argued, that though  the  constitu- 
tion, in a  saininary manner, granted  to  congress  power  to 
I)~\SS  ~11~11  laws  a= vT@re  ~PCC=:~;.{T  tn  cnrrf7 tl16.  sp~r.ifierf po\vei"iu~o  eftbct, yet this clause could only be considereci it:. 
applicable to  acts, io justification  of  which  there  could  be 
pleaded  ail  absolute, pnramoiint,  and irresistible necessity : 
not  to  tliose which, lilre  the  bank  proposed,  woulcl  only 
rest  on  tllc  gtoull(1s  nf cxpediencp,  superior  convenience. 
i~ect:Jent,  nnJ gzaernl t~j~f~il~lt~:. 
'Fhe  manly understantling,  I~owevel.,  oi' the  secretary  o~ 
the treasury, ancl tlie practical  ~visdom  of  the  nugust chiel' 
then at the head of  the nation, could not be swayed by gram- 
lllatical corisideratioris  so futilc.  The  former investigated tlic 
rluestion,  and refutetf  thc  pretendecl constitutio~lal  objection, 
with a forcc of reasoning which could  not fail  to remove all 
tloubts on  the subject  from  every  sound  and unprejudiced 
~nind  ; ~tnd  the latter, conseclnently, gave his  sanction to the 
act of  congress incolporating  the banlc, which passed into a 
law on  the 25th February, of  the year following.  Agreeablc 
to  this law,  tlie capital  stock  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States was lirrlited to 25,000 shares of $400 each, 
~10,000,000, 
payable one fourth in  gold  and  silver, and three  fourths ill 
public securities, bearing an interest of  six and three per cent. 
Tile corporation were  restricted  from  contracting  debts  be- 
yond the alnount of their capital, and froni holding property 
acceding in value  $15,000,000; 
IJr real estate more than  llecessary for  the convenient trans. 
acting of their business.  The affairs of this bank were to bc 
managed by twenty-four directors, to be elected by the stocli- 
holders.  Only citizens of  the United States, and stockholders, 
were eligible as such.  Only thrcc fourths of  their number 
could be re-elected eircry succestling year ; ancl several otller 
regulations  were  contained  in  the  charter,  generally  well 
calculated to guard agitinst political danger from this national 
establishment, to extend its  usefi~lness,  and confirm  its so- 
lidity.  The  duration of tlic bank \%-as  limited to the 4th  of 
;March, 181  1 
'rhe  subscriptions  were  filled  as soon as opened.  'i'lle 
trovernment,, conformably to tlie right reseri-ed in tlie cllarter 
2 
subscribed for  5000 shares, equal to  $2,000,000. 
and the banlc  went  into  iin~ncclinte  operntio~:.  The divi 
tlel~ds  were  semi-annually.  Jts stoclc,  n grcnl,  proportion 
of which was hcld in  Europe, soon rose  considerably abo~c. 
pal;  and the institution proved ulzunys co7~ve~iie~zt  ; on solnc 
occasions anziszestily ztsef2d to the govmnmclat, and not lee-' 
Ileneficial to the public at  large. 
This  bank made an average annual dividend of eight a~lil 
one third per cent,., during the continuancc of  its charter of 
twenty years, amounting to  $1 6,666,666 ; 
and from a report of the trustees  of  that illstitut~on,  made  n 
few monflls since, t11e p11blic  are given to expect fi~rther  divi- 
dend. 
Tt is 1101~  a well 1;nowu  l~isl~orical  iitct, tliat in tlie infancy 
of our republic, we were but little respected by foreign nations, 
and by  some scarccly aclruowledged, until we had established 
;I,  sound and efficient national systeim of finance.  This  bank, 
cxl~ibiting  the  profound  wisdo~n  of  its  projectors,  tended 
greatly to estaldish not only  stability of  cllaractcr at home, 
bi~t  to corn~nnncl  respect abroad.  Besides the facilities afforded 
to  the government,  the public at large rcaped an advantage 
from this institution, during its exist.ence, as above stated, to 
the alnount of  $16,666,666 ; and it is  altogether  doubtful: 
whether, under tlle then  situation  of  tlic  country, an equal 
sun? could  havc  been  realized from an investment,  in tlic 
ordinary course of the then business, to double the amount. 
Yct wl~cu  thc period of  the terminatioil of  its  charter ar- 
rived, and  tlie  stockholders  applied  to congress for  the re- 
~~e~vnl  of it, 1.11~  same objection of u~~constilutionality,  which 
Iind  been  snccessfully  combated  twenty  years  before,  was 
again revived.  The institution had become the more invi- 
clious to the party in power, for having been,  at its very ori- 
gin, unsuccessfully opposed by their principal leader ; an op- 
popition. ~xvllich  prrhnps even  then nrnFP  from ihe  deeire 6f 
13 98  BANI< OF  THE:  UNI'I'EU STATICS. 
signalizing a system of political principles and  measures, diil 
ferent from those  which  were  adopted.  When  the subject 
came  notv again  under discussion, the force of  sound argu- 
ment, the considerations of  general usefulness, ancl the un- 
questionable fiscal expediency of the renewal of  the charter. 
could not be  expected  to  prevail  against  unfriendly  senti- 
ments of so long standing. 
An impulse  was  given  accordingly, the  renewal  of  tllc 
charter refused, and  the  institution  dissolved.  The public 
prosperity might  have received a  severe shoclr,  and the go- 
vernment  itself been exposed  to  difficulties and  embarrass- 
ments,  much more serious than those  under which it must 
now8necessarily  labor, from the want of  a national bank, il' 
the same course of deliberate  prudence, which  has marked 
the conduct of the late Bank of the U. States throughout, had 
not been also pursued iu their mode of withdrawing from bu- 
siness.  But they proceeded in this work so slowly, and acted 
towards individual debtors,  and towards other banks on which 
they had claims, with so much liberal forbearance, that time 
was gained to supply the public with the circulating medium 
of new bank credits, in lieu of  those to be withdrawn ; re  con- 
duct which was inoreover dictated by the intcrests of the es- 
piring institution  itsclf, and signally favored by  the general 
stagnalion of commerce, at the period in which it took place, 
BANK OF ?'HE  UNIri'ED STATES. 
The  present BANK  OF  THE UNITED  STATES,  located at 
Philadelphia, with branches in the several states, was created 
by an  act of congress of  the 3d Ma.rch, 1816,to  endure twenty 
years,  composed  of  350,000  shares of  $100  each.  The 
United States hold in five per cent. stock, 7'0,000  shares, 
Tndividnal~  hold 2W.000 shor~c. 
'l'he president of  tl~e  bank at New Yorlc, is ex ofiicio loaiz 
&cer  of the United States, for the state of New York.  This 
bank  collects  thc revenue  of  the  United  States, and pays 
the debts  of  the  United  States in  every  commercial  city 
where  a  branch  is  established.  Its  di~idends,  from  thc 
coinmelicelnetlt to the present year, (1 830,) inclusive, amount 
to $70.10, making  $24,535,000. 
Although this  institution  has been  assailed  by foes within 
and foes without, and sustained severe losses, it has continued 
,zn  undeviating course, shedding  light, health, activity, and 
vigor throughout  the  body politic.  Anil  while  it  sastains 
and enlivens the fiscal  concerns  of  the  nation, it gives em- 
ployment to  many thousands  of  persons in its operations- 
constantly bearing on its fo1.e  front, in bold relicf.  thi* i~upc 
rative language to the powers that be : 
'i Sta per te ipsum, et permitte nos essr, poles ' 
Tlle history  of  this  institution  is  fully  detailed, and  it? 
prosperous condition  clearly  manifest,  from  tlie  follo~ving 
statement, extracted from their own authorized publication. 
REPORT  on the  condition of  the BANK  OF THE UNWED 
STATES,  by  the committee of inspectio~z  and ilzvestigu- 
tion ;  and afterzoards ado1~tcd  by  the  stocki~olders. 
At  a  tricnnial meeting of  the stockholders  of  the Bank 
of  the United States, held by adjounilxent at their hall in the 
city of Philadelphia, on Tuesday, the 1st of  October, 1822- 
THOMAS ELLICOTT, Esq., in the Chair, ant1 
WILLIAM MEREDITH: Secretary.  - 3  1  lie  followil~g  report of  the con~lnittee  of  inspection ant1 
investigation, appointed  agreeably to  tlie  resolution  of  thc 
~tocltholders,  at the meeting held on  the 2d of  September: 
1822, having been  adopted, it was "  Resolved that the re 
Port. wit.h it,s appendix, be  puh1ishe.d  in  the  pnhlic paper? : zlld that  the  president  nncl  direc;tors  of  tlie  Bank  of  tllc 
Uniteti States do also cause the same to be published in paln- 
yhlet form, and tliat a copy thereof  be helcl at the disposal ol 
each etockholder." 
YoLlr  cornllliltec, to ~vlion~  mas  rel'erred  an ena1ninatio:l  01 
tl~e  coiiilitio~~  of  tl~c  banlr, 
Itepor t, 
'I'hat they liave carefully considered and diligently investi- 
gated tlie subject confided to them.  But, before submitting any 
opinion or statement in detail, as to its actual sitaation, they 
beg leave to refer:to  the lulninous exposition of the president: 
hereto  appended, contilining a fund  of  information in rela- 
tion to tlie  institution  in  connection  with  various  topics of 
dound speculation and practical utility, whicli  cannot fail to 
1)rove l~ighly  interesting to  tlie stockllolders ancl to the pul~ 
lic; while,  at tlle same time,  they illustrate tlie  consoling 
truth that tlle   no st appalling difficulties may bc surmounted 
by the steady application of  industry, integrity, and talent. 
111  colnpliance  with the provisions of  the  13th article of 
the 11th section of  thc cllarter, your  colnrnittee have ascer- 
tained that the euspendcd clchts at the bnnli, and its various 
Lranches, are 
Dolls.  Ctr. 
Upon l~ersonal  ancl  otlier tl~an  stoclc sccu- 
rities,  -  6,401,255  90 
.:lnd  upon  loails  secured  by pledgcs  of 
~t~~li?  -  4,017,050  7G 
- - 
'l'ogctlier  nrnou~~ting  to  -  10,418,306  G(j 
Your co~nniittee  are decidedly of  opinion, that the loss  to 
the Bank upon this debt, together with overdrafts, counterfeit 
checks, and from all other sources, cannot exceed 3,743,899 
dollars, a loss arising partly from the peculiar situation of  !lie 
ill~~~~y  ed relations of  the coulztry, but principally froln a mis 
confidence in unworthy agents.  But your committee 
feel gratified in  saying, that it  fund more than sufficient has 
been derived froin the previous  profits of  the bauk, aucl spe- 
ciiically  pledged,  and set  apart to  meet  this  loss ; besides 
wl~ich  it  possesses  a  surplus  of  971,425  dollars 41 cents, 
arising froin a balance which stood to the credit of  the proiit 
nnil loss account on the 1st of  July last, from interest which 
llas actually accrued, but which has not yet been paid, up011 
that portion of  the suspended debts which  it  is  confidently 
believed  will  be  ultimately obtained, and from the advancc 
above  par upon  37,954 shares  United  States Bank  etocli, 
held by the banlr, estilnated as worth four  clollnrs per share 
:hove the par value. 
The preceding  facts,  with  tlie  followi~lg  analysis, your 
committee feel assured will rencler tlie  co~lviction  irresistible, 
riiat the Bank of  the United States has now arriveddat that 
l~oint  when its capital  may be declared to  be sound and ell- 
tire, while it possesses contingent interests of  nearly one mil- 
li011 of  dollars, to be applied to  such objects as the f~lture  ad- 
?uinistrators  of' its atfairs may deeln advisable. 
Dolls.  Ctu. 
DR.  Bank of  the United States, to stock- 
holders, for capital paid in,  -  -  34,992,139  63 
The  sun1 paid, but not yet extinguished, 
lor bonus, premiuni on four  millions of 5 per 
cent.  government  stocli,  and  for  banliing 
liouses,  provided for, and to be estinguished 
I)y the semi-annual appropriation of  60,000 
tlollars,  -  2,015,802  15 
Esti~nate  of  all the losses of  the banlr, up 
1 o the present period,  -  -  3,743,S99  00 
Balance,  -  971,425 41 bANI< OF  'l'Hl2  UNITED B1l'A'1'1?;d.  103 
Dolls.  Ltt. 
CR. Banlc of  the United States, by capi- 
talpaidin,  -  -  -  34,992,139 63 
The suin m111;h  II~Y  been  paid on bonus, 
premium on four millions 5 per  cent. govern- 
ment stock and banking  houses. and which 
will  be  extinguished  by  a semi-annual ap- 
propriation of  60,000  dollars,  -  1,620,000 00 
Value of  banking houses which have cost 
834,922 dollars 16  cents,  but which, at the 
expiralion of  the charter, will not then stand 
on the  books  of  the bank at a value  more 
than  -  -  -  39E,802  15 
Contingent  fund  of  3,550,000  dollars, 
which will  be  increased  by  the transfer of 
193,899 dollars from the balance of  the pro- 
fit and loss account as it stood  on the 1st of 
July last, to cover the losses sustained,  -  3,743,899  00 
The balance that will remain of  what ap- 
peared  to  the  credit  of  the profit  and loss 
account on  the  1st of  July,  after  having 
transferred to contingent fund, 193,899 dol- 
lars,  -  -  51,897 07 
The interest which has 
accrued on suspended debts 
amounting to  -  -  1,279,520  64 
After deducting interest 
on that portion  which  is  - 
deemed bad of  -  -  511,80820 
--  767,712 34 
Advance above par  on 37,954 shares  of 
stock  of  the Bank  of  the  United  States, 
which it holds-say  four dollars, per  share,  151,816 00 
In additioll to the above, the committee deem it  proper to 
exhibit the following brief  view of  the present  actual  situa- 
t,ion of  the funds of  the bank, andof their distribution : 
The capital of  the  bank paid in is  - 
Dolls.  Cia. 
34,992,139 63 
The circulation of  bank notes, amounts to  5,456,891 90 
The deposits are,  -  -  6,776,492 74 
Unclaimed dividends,  -  -  129,741 28 
Amount due to sundry banks, in current ac- 
count, and to  individuals in Europe,  1,964,898 3G 
Fund reserved to  cover the  losses  sustained 
by  the bank,  -  -  3,743,899 00 
Profit and loss account, after having  trnns- 
ferred to contingent ftmd  193,899 dollars,  51,897  07 
Interest, discounts, &c., received from  1st of 
July to  Septembel;  -  -  388,237 01 
Tlie total amount of  funds, are  53,504,196 93 
Which are  distributed  us follows : 
In United States 5 per cent. stock,  -  -  11,000,000 00 
United States 6 per cent. stock,  -  -  2,020,469  27 
Loans on personal security,  -  -  26,236,150  88 
Loans secured by bank stock,  -  -  5,974,725 80 
Loans secured by mortgage,  8,000  00 
Due by state banks, bearing interest,  -  739,918 7G 
Real estate taken for debt, part of  which is 
productive,  -  -  -  -  587,102 38 
Amount due by sundry  state banks, &c., 
in current account,  -  -  -  910,950 97 
Paid on account of  bonus, and premium 
on 5  per  cent. stock,  -  -  1,180,880 00 
Banking  house  in  Philadelphia,  and 
branches cost  -  -  834,922  15 
Notes of  state banks 011  hand,  -  -  664,642 56 
specie in United States Rank and branches,  3,346,434 22 
.-  - 
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It might be  deemed prudent  to  abstain fro111  expressiug 
an 01)inion  upon  the  future prospects  of  the bank, leaving 
cach  individual  to draw  liis own  inferences  from the facts 
exhibited ; yet your committee are unwilling to omit the es- 
lxession  of  what  they believe to  be  a  well grounded hope, 
that the profits of the banlr, and its public utility will continuc 
to increase with the gradual developinent of  its resources.  TT 
the bank  has,  under  the embarrassment and perplexity in 
which it has been placed, not  only sustained its own credit; 
but  that  of  the circulating  medium  of  the  country,  wit11 
which its interest and prosperity are indissolubly connected, it 
can  scarcely  be  doubted,  that  these  difficulties being  sur- 
mounted, and n  more an~ple  field opened for the exercise of 
its energies, an  increase oi  profit mill result from a correspond- 
ing extension  of  its bnsiness.  And  whilst your  coinmittec 
have  found it  impracticable to view  this institution, in ally 
other light, than as an establishment to  effect great national 
objects,  they have  been  compelled to  reinarlr that,  though 
these objects have been most fully attained, the institution it- 
self  has not  received  the support,  whicl~  it  is  clearly  thc 
interest of  the nation to afford. 
The past history of  the  bank has proved  that, where a 
sense of  moral  obligation  is wanting, the existing laws arc 
inadequate to deter the agents of  the bank from the commis- 
sion  of  frauds upon  its vaults.  Your  coininittee  tliercforc 
advise that thc prcsident  and directors  present to congres.; 
a respectful memorial, pray ing-lst,  The  enactment bf  effi- 
cacious  laws, that  adequate  punishments  may be  inflicted 
upon such agents of  the bank as may be guilty of malversa- 
tion in office.  2dlg,  That they ask  an alteration  in that, 
part of  the charter which  requires  that a11  the notes of  the 
bank which are payalle on demand shall be received in pay- 
ment of  debts  due to the government, inasmuch  as this  re- 
quisition, as heretofore  construed, has not only the tendency 
to prevent the bank from  restorillg to  some sections of  thc 
country n sonnd c,irculating medium, but  it map occur that 
the bank cannot safcly place to tllc credit 01'  the governaienl, 
in cash, notes st one  ofice, which,  itccortlirig to the contract 
on the face of  thenl, are payable at a  different  and  distant 
alone, and where only funds havc been placed for their 
redemption. 
Tllougli your committee are aware, that not only the con- 
venience of  the public  but thc interest of  the institution re- 
quire an additional emission of  its  notes, a~id  although they 
believe, that will1 a reasonable degree of  exertion on the part 
of  the cashier, these may be  executed and put in circulation, 
while the business of the banlr is confined to its present limit ; 
yet they are satisfied that a considerable extension of  the or- 
dinary business of the institution, would render it wl~olly  im- 
possible for its officers to perform  this  service : it is therefore 
respectfully suggested, that congress be prayed  also to pass a 
law, authorizing other agents of  the bank to sign its  notes, 
and in  the mean time  the committee recommend  that the 
best means in  the power  of  the president  and directors be 
taken, to put in circulation a large additional ainount of notes, 
not exceeding the denomination of  twenty dollars. 
Your committee have not discoverccl  that any serious con- 
sequences havc  resulted to  the interests of  the bank (except, 
those which  have been followed hy a public exposure)  from 
a  want  of  obedience  in distant agents ; they nevcrtheless 
deem it  proper to advise, that the president  alld  directors of 
the parent  bank keep steadily in view the absolute necessity 
of  enforcing its own orders through  all the various  depart- 
ments  of  the institution ; without  wl~icli,  neither harmony 
can be expected in its administration, nor security to Lhe  in- 
terests of  its stockholders. 
Your committee  feel  much gratification in being  able to 
state, that the current expenses of the bank have been essen- 
tially reduced since the year 1819, and while it might be sup- 
posed that the present embarrassed state of  the commerce of 
the country,  and the  limited  amount of  intel-est heretofore 
divided upon the capital of  the bank, are strong admoilitions 
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to your agents to observe the most rigid economy;  yet, inas- 
much  as the splendid edifice  in  which you  are assembled, 
is now so  nearly completed, they cannot but recommend that 
it be finished, provided the expense  shall not exceed  25,000 
dollars. 
In  taking into view the business of  the bank as conilected 
with its different offices, the  committee think it right  to re- 
commend to the continued attention of  the president and di- 
rectors the  necessity of  ~vithclrawing  those branches which 
are found to be unprofitable, and transferring  their funds to 
those offices which shall seem to require sclditional capital. 
Your comnlittce take great  pleasure  in unanimously de- 
claring  that the circumsta~lces  of  the bank fully realize the 
anticipations of  the stoclillolders, as  expressed  at their last 
meeting, in regard to the president, who, by his talents, dis- 
interestedness, and assiduitjr, has placed  its  affairs in an at- 
titude so safe and prosperous, as that the burden of  duty de- 
volving upoil his successor will be comparatively light. 
THOS. ELLICOTT', 
Chairmall of the Co~llmittee  of I~lspection  and Inveatigatiou. 
Bank Vthe Uniletl States, Oct. Ist, 1822. 
EXPOSITION. 
The stockbulders  generally have  lleter llitd ally view of 
the progress of  the  bank  sub~nitled  to  them.  At the trien- 
nialmeeting, in 18 19, it  was  my  intention  to  have given 
them such a view.  I wae, however,  advised  that  it would 
be more expedient lo reserve the mminunication  for  a com- 
mittee, and my opinion was cheerfully surrendered.  But as 
it is my determinatioil  in  a few months to quit  the station 
with which you have honored  ine, and as my silence on  a 
former occasion has kept you, as well as the public, in a great 
measure  ignorant  of  the difficulties  in  which  I found the 
bank, and has subjected the administration, of  which I have 
a  men~ber.  to  censures which  were  ulifounded, and 
~y]licl~  have fallen in tnally insta~lces  froin tl~e  lips of the very 
persoils who were the authors of the errors and mismanage- 
mellts, to use no harshcr language, by ~vhich  this institution 
was brought to the verge of lra~~ltruptcy  and ruin, I will now 
yrescnt to you a short \iew of  the progress and present  state 
of the bank.  You will probably raise a conlmittee of inspec- 
tion rn~d  i~ivestigation,  and  as far  as any facts  or  circum- 
stances which I shall present may be  deemed material, their 
accuracy or error may be ascertained. 
The institution  coinnlenced  active  banking  operations 
about the  1st of  January, 1817, and in  the course of  that 
year established eighteen  branches, being all that have been 
established.  One  was  prqjected  at Augusta, but  on recon- 
sideratio11 was abandonecl.  The  report of  the committee of 
congress, made in December, 1818, has made you fully  ac- 
quainted with so lnany of  the leading details  of  the previous 
management, and the lapse of time has i~ade  them so much 
less interesting than they would have been at a11  earlier day, 
that I mean to do little more, in relation to tlle period which 
preceded 1819, than present  the results  as they will be ex- 
hibited in the state of the bank when I came into it. 
The  bank, immediately on its con~inenceinent,  did a very 
extensive business, imported vast sums  of  specie, paid its notes 
and those of  the offices, without reference to the places where 
they were payable, at the bank, and all  the principal  offices 
north  of  the Potoinac, while  they  were, under the charter, 
necessarily received every wl~cre  in payment of debts to the 
government  of  the  United  States ; and drafts  were  given 
without limit, on the parent bank and northern offices, by the 
western offices, at par or at a premium merely nominal.  As 
soon as the notes of the southern or western offices were paid 
or received by the bank  and northern offices, they were re- 
turned to them, and reissued in perpetual succession.  An ac- 
companying  exhibit  n~ill  show  the  enormous  amount  of 
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chargeable on  thc bank, clireclly  and indirectly, through the 
northern offices.  The result  v:as,  that the bank  and the 
great ilorthern  were  clrnined of  their capital ; and on 
the 20th of JL~]~,  1818, on19 eighteen months after the insti- 
tution began its operations,it was obliged to commence a rapid 
and heavy curtailnlent of  the business  of  the bank and its 
offices.  During  all  this time it  llad  the advantage of  im- 
mense government  deposits.  -4t the moment these curtail- 
ments were ordered, the government deposits in the bank and 
its branches, including the deposits of public officers, amounted 
to eight millions of dollars," and they had been larger at pre- 
ceding periods.  Curtnilments were ordered, froir: time to time, 
at the souther11 and western offices, to  the amount of  seven 
millions of  dollars, anil at the parent bank to the amount of 
two millions, tlioug-11 at the  latter  they  mere  made  to  the 
amount  of  $3:(j00,000,  and upwards, between the 30th of 
July, 1818, and the 1st April, 1819. No curtailments were or- 
dered at the ofices of  New York  and Boston, because  there 
was no room for them ;  yet llecessity obliged them to reduce 
their business very much.  The curtailments  at all  points, 
within the abovementioned  claies,t being eight months, were 
$6,530,159.49.  Yet after thcse immense and rapid curtail- 
ments, the most sensible and vital points (Philadelphia, New 
York, and Boston) were  infinitely  in worse condition than 
when the remedy was devised. 
An  accompanying  exhibit  will  show  the  distribution 
of  capital at the close  of  this  period.  At that moment the 
discount  linc of  the important  ofice  at Boston  was  only 
$94,584.37.  And when in this wretched state, the southern 
and western  circulation  mas  pouring in  upon  these weak 
points, and the governnlent at liberty, according to the prac- 
ti~e  of  the time, to draw on  either oflice or the bank for the 
gross amount of its deposits, throughout the whole establish- 
* See the monthly statements, of  the Gth and 30th July, 1818. 
t I  refer to the monthly statements  of  the  30th  July. 1818,  and  1st April, 
1819. 
rnent, wlletller  so~~tll,  north, east, or  west.  The southern 
,vestern  offices  were  not restrained  from  issuing  their 
notes, which they did most profusely.  The  curtailments, in 
many instances, resulted merely in a change of  debts, bear- 
ing interest for debts due by local banks, or tlie notes of local 
banks,  on  neither  of  which  was  interest  received.  The 
western offices curtailed their discounted paper, but they pur- 
chased what were called race horse bills, to a greater amount 
than their curtailments.  The  bank itself  continued during 
the whole period, to purchase and collect drafts on the south- 
enl, and even western offices, though almost the whole active 
already lay in these quarters of the Union, and though 
the great object of the curtailments was to draw funds from 
these points.  The  debt due in Kentucky and Ohio, instead 
of  being  reduced, was within  this period  actually increased 
~lpwards  of half a million of  dollars.  An accompanying ex- 
hibit will show, that instead of getting relief from the south- 
ern and western  ofices generally,  where  curtailments  had 
been ordered, the bank was still further exhausted by the in- 
tervening operations. 
At  the  commencement  of  this  period,  (a  period  com- 
mencing with the order for curtailments, and ending March, 
1819,) the bank was  indebted  to  Baring,  Brothers  & Co., 
Reed, Irving & Go.,  Adams, Rol~ertson  & Co.,  and Thomas 
Wilson & Co.,  the sum of  $1,586,345.47,  growing  princi- 
pally,  if  not entirely,  out of its specie operations.  Of  this 
sum, the greater part  was paid during this period.  It had, 
however, contracted new debts with Baring, Brothers & Co., 
and Thomas  Wilson & Co., of  which  thqre remained due, 
including any balance  which  may have  been  due on  the 
former accounts, the sum of $876,64S ; and within the same 
period, it  had disposed of  $2,270,926.65  of  its funded  debt, 
fttrnishing, by these c,ompound operations, ways and means, 
in addition to its curtailments, to the amount of $1,561,229.13 
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productive capitit1 of  the bank,  witllin  the period  of  eight 
months, of  eight millions of  dollars, and upwards. 
At the close of  this period, the discounts on personal secu- 
rity at Philadelphia, had bcen so Ion~  the subject of  curtail- 
ment, that but a small portion of  them admitted of further re- 
duction, and, after great cfforts, a rule had been  established 
to reduce the discounts which had been granted on the stock 
of  the bank, at the rate  of  five per cent.  every sixty days. 
These latter constituted tlle bullr of  the discounted paper, and 
so  small a  reduction  aflororcled  no  material relief  against a 
great and ilnlnediate  dernand.  Even this  small reduction 
was the subject of loud, angry, and constant remonstrances 
among the borrowers,  who  claimed  the privileges and the 
favor which they  contended  were  due to  stockl~olders,  and 
sometimes succeeded in coinmui~icating  their  sympathies to 
the board.  All the f~lnded  clebt which was salable had been 
disposed of, atld the proceeds exl~austed. The  specie in the 
vaults at the close of the clay, on the 1st of April, 1819, was 
only $126,745.28, and the bank owed to the city banks, de- 
ducting balance due to  it, an  aggregate  balance  of  79,125 
dollars 99 cents. 
It is true there were in the mint $267,978.9, and in  tran- 
sit~  froin Kentucky and Ohio, overland, $250,000 ; but the 
treasury dividends were  payable on that day, to the amount 
of near $500,000,  and there remained at the close of  the day 
more than one half of the sui~  subject to draft, and the greater 
part even of  tlie sum which had been drawn during the day 
remained a charge upon the banlc in the shape of temporary 
deposits, which were  almost  iunnediately  withdrawn.  Ac- 
cordingly, 011  the 12111  of  the same month, the bank had in 
its vaults but $71,522.47, and owed to the city  banks  a ba- 
lance  of  $196,418.66 ;  exceeding  the specie in its  vaults 
$124,895.19.  It  must again be  rernnrlced, that it  had  yet 
the suin before mentioned in the rnint, as well as the suin in 
trafzsitu  from  Ohio  and  Kentucky.  This  last  sum 
($250,000)  arrived very  sea~onably,  on  the  nest day, or a 
day or two thereafter.  The  bank in this situation, the otiice 
at New York  was  little better, and the  ofice  at Boston  a 
great deal worse.  At the salne time the bank owed to Ba- 
ring,  Brothers & Co., and Thoinns  Wilson  & Go.  nearly 
$900,000,  which  it  was  bound  to  pay  immediately,  and 
was equivalent  to  a  charge  upon  its  vaults to  that 
amount.  It had, including the notes of  the offices, a circu- 
lation of six millions of  dollars to meet, to  which were to be 
added the demands of  depositers, public and plivate, at a timc 
too when the scarcity of mocey  called forth every disposable 
dollar, and thereforc created demands upon the bank for  an 
unusual portion of  the ordinary deposits and circulation. 
The  sums which were  coIlected daily  on accouilt of tile 
revenue,  in  branch  paper,  were  demandable next day in 
Philadelphia, and, at the same time, at every  office  of  the 
establishment, at the discretion of  the officers of  the goveni- 
ment.  The  revenue was principally  paid  in branch paper, 
as well  at Boston  arid New  York  as at Philadelphia, and 
while the duties were thus  paid at one  counter,  in branch 
paper, the  debentures, which  amounted  to  one  million  of 
dollars every three months, were demanded and paid  at the 
other, in specie or its equivalent-1no11ey  of  tlie place.  Many 
additional details, increasing the difficulties of  the moment, 
might be added.  The southern  offices  were remitting tar- 
dily, and the western not at all.  All the resources of the bank 
would not have sustained it in this course and mode of busi- 
ness another month ! !  Such was the prostrate state of  the 
bank of  the  nation, which  had  only  twenty-seven  months 
before  commenced  business  with  an untrammeled  active 
capital of  twenty-eight millions of dollars. 
But it would have  been fortunate for the institution  if its 
danger had ceased here.  'I'here still remained in some of  the 
trusts of  the bank  some  of  the men who had  contributed 
most to involve it in this state of  things.  As I must be brief, 
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principal instance of  the misfortune and profligacy to which I 
allude. 
In the office at Baltimore, of  which James A. Buchanan 
was president, and J. W.  MiCulloh was cashier, there were 
near  three  millions  of  dollars  discounted  or  appropriated, 
without any authority, and  without  the  knowledge of  the 
board of the office, or  that of  the parent  bank !  S. Smith, 
and Buchanan, of ud~ich  firm J. A. Buchanan was  a mem- 
ber, James W. M'Culloh,  and George Williams, (the latter a 
member of  the parent board, by the appointment of  the go- 
vernment,) had obtained, of  the parent  bank  discounts  in 
the  regular  and  accustomed  manner,  to  the  amount  of 
$1,957,700,  on a pledge of  18,290 shares stock of the bank. 
These men, without the knowledge of either board, and con- 
trary to the resolves and orders of the parent  bank, took out 
of the ofice at Baltimore, under the pretense of  securing it 
by pledging the surplus  value of  the stock, already pledged 
at  the parent bank for its par value and more, and other like 
surpluses over which  the bank  had no control, the sum of 
$1,540,000  : this formed a part  of the sum before  stated to 
have been discounted by the president and cashier of the of- 
fice, without  authority.  When this  stupendous fraud  was 
discovered, attempts were immediately  made  to  obtain  se- 
curity,  and it was obtained nominally to  the  amount  of 
$900,000.  It was probably  really  worth  $500,000.  For 
this the bank is principally indebted to the good managenlent 
of Messrs. Oliver, Hoffman, and MLKim,  of  Baltimore,  who 
were at the time members of  the parent board. 
The  losses sustained at the office at Baltimore alone,  the 
great mass of  which grew out of  this fraud and others closely 
connected with it, have been estimated at the immense sum 
of  $1,671,221.87.  The aggregate of  the losses #of the insti- 
tution,  growing  out  of  the  operations  which preceded  the 
6th  March,  1819, exceed  considerably  $3,500,000.  The 
clividends, during the same time, amount to $4,410,000.  Of 
this sum, $1,348,558.98  were received as the interest on the 
public debt held by the bank, which leaves, as the entire pro- 
fits  on all the operations of banking, the sum of $3,061,441.2, 
which is less,  by at least half  a million  of  dollars, than tlie 
losses sustained on the same business ! 
When I was invited, and consented to fill the station I now 
hold, I was alike ignorant and unapprehensive of  the situa- 
tion in which I have just described the bank (truly, I believe,) 
to have been.  I was at the moment remotely  situated from 
the scenes of its active business, and  its important transactions. 
I had held, it  is  true, shortly  before, to oblige my friends, a 
place in the board of the office  at Charleston, at which I oc- 
casionally attended, and from  what I saw there, as well  as 
from the public facts concerning the transactions of tlle bank, 
I was satisfied that there was a great want of financial talent 
in the management of  it.  But I had not  the faintest idea 
that its power had been  so  completely  prostrated, or that it 
had been thus unfortunately managed, or grossly defrauded. 
I never imagined that when it had, at so much expense and 
loss, imported so many millions of specie, they had been en- 
tirely exhausted, and were  not yet  paid  for ; nor that  the 
bank was  on the point  of  stopping  payment.  It was  not 
until the moment I was about to commence my journey  to 
Philadelphia, that I was apprized  by  a  letter from a friend, 
who  had  been  a  member  of  the preceding board, that he 
feared, in a few  months, the bank would be obliged to stop 
payment. 
This was, indeed, appalling news.  When I reached Wash- 
ington,  I  received  hourly proofs  of  the probability  of  this 
event.  In Philadelphia it  was  generally expected.  My 
memory deceives me much if  I found any one iri or  out of 
the bank, who entertained ti sanguine belief of  its being able 
to sustain its payments much longer.  On  the contrary there 
Was  (I think  it  cannot  be forgotten) a  public and general 
expectation that the nation was about to  suffer  the  calamity 
of a currency composed entirely of  irredeemable paper.  The 
evil which thus threatened the country, is not at all to he corn- 
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pared with the suspension  of  a  sound  currency  ill times of 
war and great  national  emergencies.  The  former can only 
be conceived by a  people  who have suffered under a  paper 
currency in profound peace.  What a  train of  evils does it 
produce ?  The destruction of  public and private credit, the 
national torpor, the individual ruin, the disgraceful legislatioil 
and the prostration of  the morals of  the people, of  which you 
may discover within your own territories, some exampbs,w~ill 
give you some, but yet a faint idea of the calanlity which was 
about to fall on the country. 
On the bank it must have brought inevitable ruin, for if it 
had failed, from its own mismanagement, to serve the great 
purpose for which it was just  before established-that  of  re- 
storing and preserving the soundness of  the curre~lcy-there 
is no doubt that the hostility which its great arid habitual pub- 
lic usefulness cannot  now appease, would have overwllelmed 
it.  Indeed it would have had no claim on the sympathy or 
the justice  of  the government, and would have suirered  a 
merited fate.  No exertions and no sacrifices were therefore too 
great to avert this calamity.  It was not to  be accomplished 
without sacrifices : but  they have been  sinall, and infinitely 
less than was expected. 
Thus stood the  bank  at the organization  of  the present 
administration.  I was elected and took my seat as Presidellt 
of  the board on the Gth  March, 1819.  Rut some  time of 
course was necessary  to loolr  into  the state of the bank be- 
fore measures of  relief  could be projected.  Its danger, how- 
ever, was too manifest, and too pressing  to allow much time 
for this purpose.  The principal errors  which produced  the 
danger were  fortunately of  easy discovery, and to  then1 the 
proper remedy was immediately applied.  The  southernand 
western offices were immediately directed  not  to issue  their 
notes, and the bank ceased to  purchase and collect exchange 
on the south and west.  A special meeting of  the board waa 
called, which the 11011-resident directors were  summoned to 
atter~d  for the 9th April  (the next mon~h)  and A wrrespoll- 
dellce with the secretary of  the'treasury mas conlmenced, elf- 
treating his forbearance and his aid, to which T beg  leave 
refer.  To  this officer I should be ungrateful and unjust, if I 
were not publicly to acknowledge my obligations and those of 
the bank, for the countenance and support which he afforded 
ko  both in this struggle. 
At the meeting of the directors on the 9th April, which was 
very full, the state of  the bank was submitted to them, a  se- 
lect committee appointed, to whom the subject of  its dificul- 
ties was referred, and after very mature deliberation that com- 
mittee  made  a report  which was u~tanimously  agreed  to. 
The  principal means of  relief proposed and agreed to were : 
I. To  continue  the curtailments previously ordered.  2. 
To  forbid the offices to the south and west to issue their notes 
when the exchanges were against them.  3. To  collect the 
balances due by local  banks  to the offices.  4.  To  claim of 
the government the time necessary to transfer funds from the 
offices where money was collected to those where it was to be 
disbursed, as  well  as like time  (until the difficulties of  the 
bank were removecl)  to  transfer  funds  to meet the notes of 
offices paid in the bank or other offices than those where they 
were payable  according  to  their tenor.  5.  To pay  deben- 
tures in the same money in which  the  duties, on which the 
debentures  were  secured, had  been  paid.  6.  To  obtain a 
loan in Europe for  a  sum not exceeding  $2,500,000, for a 
period not exceeding three years. 
These measures, simple and obvious as they are, and some 
of them  so strangely overlooked so long, lifted the bank in 
the short space of  seventy  days  (from  6th March to  17th 
May) from the extreme prostration which has been described, 
to a  state of  safety, and even in some degree of  powel;  en- 
abled it to cease its curtailments, except at points where it had 
an excess of capital, to defy all attacks upon it, and to sustain 
other institutions which wanted aid  and were ascertained to 
be solvent ; above all, to establish the soundness of  the cur- 
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a single season of  business  (the first)  to  give to every office 
as much capital as it could advantageously employ.  There 
are two of  the measures thus adopted, on which I will enter 
into some detail, because  they have  been  misconceived and 
misrepresented. 
1. The  curtailments.  The immense curtailments which 
had been made before the present administration of the bank 
was organized, have been stated.  The  public has been  led 
to believe tliat these curtailments were made by this adminis- 
tration, and were the fruit of  a policy which originated with 
it.  Men who sitt at  the board  and knew the contrary, or, 
which is little better, without taking the trouble to ascertain a 
fact which  was so easily within their  reach, have consented 
to propagate this slander. 
I now state, and defy contradiction, and am ready to prove 
that no curtailntcnt has been ordered from the time Itook 
my seat, until this  day. 
That any curtailments which have been made by the ad- 
ministration of  which I have been a member, were made un- 
der orders which I found in force;-that  the bank  at Phila- 
delphia continued to curtail only seventy days after I took my 
seat, that the offices of  New York and Boston were only re- 
quired to sustain themselves, according to circu~nstances,  until 
the  scattered  funds  of  the institution could be  collected  to 
give them capital ; and further that  the greatest reduction of 
the discounts of  the bank  itself, and all  the offices north of 
Philadelphia,  together, at 110  one time exceeded $400,000, 
until they were reduced by a  want of  a demand  for  money 
which was general through the nation.  When this want of 
demand for money prevented  the profitable employment of 
the funds of  the bank, the only expedient to  relieve  it  from 
the losses of  unemployed capital which existed, was promptly 
and successfully employed, by purchasing of  the government 
of  the United States, first two millions of  six per cent. stock, 
redeemable at the pleasure of the government, and afterwards 
four millions of five per cent.  stock, rdeemable in 1836, on 
terms which were  then deemed  highly advantageous to the 
bank, and which are so still, as shall be hereafter proved. 
It is  believed, that a  candid  and dispassionate investiga- 
tion of  the facts will show, that, with the sanie means, and 
"rider the  same circumstances,  no change of  proceeding or 
policy could have increased the profits of  the bank, and that, 
if the interest which has accrued  on  the heavy amount of 
suspended debt and not been  received  (and that it  has  not 
been received, is  not the fault of  the present administration, 
which did not grant the loans on which the interest accrued) 
be added to the dividends  made,  and the accumulations  re- 
served, the gains will be within less than a half  per cent. per 
annuin  of  the nominal  profits  of  the  preceding period,  in 
which, every thing was hazarded, and more actually lost than 
all that was thus nominally gained.  I should have had no 
disposition to  make these  comparisons  had  they not  been 
made necessary by false statements and representations of the 
same facts.  In looking at  these results, let  it  also be  recol- 
lected what different circumstances characterized the different 
periods. 
2.  The  other  measure  which I  mean particularly to no- 
tice is the loan which was obtained in Europe.  There was, 
at the time this loan was projected, great  embarrassment in 
all the concerns of  commerce, but the pressing difficulty was 
a real unsoundness in the bank:  circulation, which constituted 
the whole currency of  the  country.  The weakness of  the 
Bank of  the United States has been exposed.  That of  the 
state banks was probably greater, though they were not sub- 
ject to so many, and such complicated dangers.  The  revenue 
was accumulating to the credit of  the government, at various 
points, in paper, that, if  immediately pressed upon the banks 
which issued it, would not have not have been honored;  and 
yet  to  have  discredited it  suddenly would  have  forced  the 
crisis  of  the unsoundness of  all the bank circulation at a mo- 
ment when  it had no recuperative  faculty, and must have 
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country.  On the other hand to  have i~nposed  no prcssure 
upon these banks would have been to cherish and perpetuate 
and increase the evil of  an unsound currency.  The  course 
to be pursued by this bank  was  a  subject  of  great delicacy 
and difficulty. The  situation of the country was exceedingly 
alarming. 
It was not the present evil that was dreaded-the  country 
was, in its money concerns, in an  extreme state of exhaustion. 
Jt was drained of its specie in  the preceding year, before the 
first  installment  of  the Louisiana  stoclr  became  payable. 
The  sum necessary to make the payment stood to the credit 
of  the treasury in the bank, and was transferred to the credit 
of  the holders of  this stock.  The  agent of Baring, Brothers, 
& Co. had for foreign account, at one moment, $2,410,000 
at his  credit  at the bank in Philaclelphia, and on the same 
day all the specie  in the bank  and  all  its offices  did  not 
amount to as much.  It was impossible to have paid it,  and 
the bank was obliged  to  enter  into a  contract to  pay it in 
England by a given time, with ,interest.  In executing this 
contract, it employed the whole operations of  the next season 
of  business  in foreign  exchangee,  and  paid  a  very  large 
amount of  interest ; and at the time this loan was projected, 
there remained  a  large balance  lue to Baring, Brothers, & 
Co., on account of this contract.  The  country had been still 
further divested of  its  metallic  basis  in the interim,  and a 
pretense  was  only  wanting  by  too  many individuals and 
banking institutions  to  stop  payment.  To them it might 
have afforded immediate relief and profit.  But to the Bank 
of the United States it must, as already shown, have caused 
inevitable ruin.  At every hazard, it was obliged to continue 
its payments.  Its ability to  clo  so,  depended on sustaining 
the credit of the country,  and restoring the soundness of  the 
currency. 
If  its own vaults  had been  better  replenished than they 
were, it could not have relied upon them alone.  The  ability 
of this  bank  to  ~ustain  its CI-edit,  at  no time depends solely 
or principally on the specie in  its  own vaults,  but  on the 
general credit of  the country, sustained  by  the usual legal 
and moral  obligations-destroy  these practically, and all its 
power becomes feebleness.  Thus it has,  at any given  mo- 
ment, from twenty to thirty millions of dollars becoming due 
to it within ninety days, besides very large sums standing in 
, balances against other banks, and further sums in  the notes 
of other banks.  Now  suppose  at any moment that a state 
of things should arise which should destroy the general credit 
of the country, and disable debtors, who in their turn depend 
on the same means for  their ability to pay,  to comply with 
the first, and tempt them to disregard the last of these obli- 
gations, what would be then the situation of the Bank of the 
United States?  Yet that state of  things was  on the point 
of taking place, when the loan in cluestion was projected. 
The country  could  bear no further exhaustion, however 
small, until it  had a season to  recover.  But the second in- 
stallment of  the Louisiana stock  was to  be  paid in a few 
months, and the sum to be withdrawn by foreigners exceeded: 
probably all the specie in the two great cities of  Philadelphia 
and New York.  The  bank would have been bound  to pay 
it, had it received the local paper in payment of  the revenue ; 
and if it had refused it,  we have seen  the disastrous conse- 
quences  to which  it would have  led.  It was  a  payment 
which the country could not at the time bear, and the ability 
of the bank was necessarily limitedby the ability of the coun- 
try.  Hence, in a general view, the necessity and expediency 
of the loan. 
It has, I understand,  been  said that events have proved 
that the loan  was unnecessary,  regarding merely the direct 
obligations of the bank.  This is an objection which no mind 
capable of  comprehending the just policy of a national bank 
~uld  make, if the foregoing views be correct.  But it is not 
true.  Events, on the contrary, proved  it was indispensable. 
What would the situation of  the bank have been, if  in Octo- 
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this section of the Union, where it was payable,  drawn from 
its vaults '?  Although they had been by that day considerably 
strengthened, yet all the specie in the bank, and all the offices 
on this  side the  Potomac, could  not  have  met  the  draft! 
Will it be said that the government had not, at the time this 
installment was payable, a sufficient deposit to make the pay- 
ment ?  It is true, because the government, as soon as it was 
discovered that the public credit would not be made to suffer, 
disbursed the moneys which must have been and would have 
been  reserved for  this purpose ; and thus the bank and the 
community generally were  relieved  from  the foreign drain 
upon them, in  the manner in which the relief was originally 
projected. 
Again-the  burden of  this loan has  been  greatly misre- 
presented.  It has been  supposed that in consequence of the 
subsequent want of demand for money, which prevented the 
bank  from  fully employing its capitac the interest paid on 
this loan was a loss to the bank.  This might  be admitted, 
and still the loan was not the less necessary.  A  sacrifice of 
gain was expected  and intended.  But the fact  is  not so. 
Although undoubtedly there was a long period during which 
the capital of the bank was not fully employed, yet it so hap- 
pened that the specific money derived from this loan was em- 
ployed, and has not ceased to bring in six per cent. per annum 
from that day to this.  Without it the bank could  not have 
taken the government loan of  two millions of dollars, in 1820, 
which  remains yet unpaid ; nor could it have done the pro- 
fitable business  jn  foreign  exchanges which it  did in that 
year,  nor have distributed capitals  as  early  as it did to  the 
northern offices,  which infused  into them a  new life ; nor 
could it have sustained the character or  the usefulness of  a 
national bank, until it  should  have collected by  slow  and 
painful means its scattered capital.  I have said so  much of 
the loan, not only because it is an important circumstance in 
the management of the bank, but also because it is a measure 
closely connected with  the financial  history of  the country, 
011  which turned, in a great lneasurc, the preservation  of 
sound currency ; an event, however unusual it is so to con- 
sider it, probably of  more importance than any other  in thc 
history of  the country since  the late peace.  In sustaining 
the bank  a great public  purpose  was served, but it cost not 
an additional cent.  Censured though it  may be,  I proudly 
say I suggested and advised this measure, and  am well  con- 
tent to bear the responsibility of  it.  The  loan was  for  only 
two millions of  dollars, and was payable on the 5th of  July 
last.  One million thereof has been continued at 5 per cent. 
interest, and the other has  been  paid  off  at a profit which 
would defray the charge of remitting the remaining million, 
even at the present adverse rate of  exchange. 
During the  present  administration  of  the  bank, consi- 
derable sums have been drawn from  the capital, in erecting 
necessary buildings for the use of the institution :  considerable 
burdens ihich  were previously created have been discharged; 
one million of dollars have been paid on account of the bonus 
to the government for the charter ; six millions of funded debt 
have been purchased, and are now held  by the bank ; three 
millions five hundred  and fifty thousand dollars have been 
accumulated for the purpose of repairing the losses which had 
been previously sustained, and there now stands to the credit 
of profit and loss the sun] of  $245,796.7 ; and there is due to 
the bank  $1,279,520.54,  for  interest  which  accrued before 
the first of July last, on suspended debts, and which has not 
been received. 
The losses of  the institution  were estimated, at the last 
lneeting  of  the  stoclrholders,  at  three  millions  of  dollars. 
They have been found to exceed that sum.  The estimates 
of the dividend committee,  in July last, made the aggregate 
of the losses $3,743,899.  This includes all  losses  to  that 
lime, from whatever  cause.  A  very small portion  of  these 
lossess, you will discover,  has resulted from  the  business or 
lnanagement postelior to March, 1819.  It is hoped, from tho 
lapse of time and the trying circumstancec: wl~icll  haye inter 
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vened,  that  the losses  have  reached  their utmost  alnouul. 
The  greatest pains  have been taken to probe the state of  all 
t,he offices to  the bottom, as the accolnpanying  doculnents 
will show. 
The  -pester,?  debts, by which are meant those due in the 
states of Ohio and ICentucky, have been a subject of peculiar 
anxiety and attention.  To  ascertain the exact state of them, 
the board were not satisfied to rely  on  the ordinary means, 
but dispatched the cashier of  the bank,  who was understood 
to be particularly  well acquainted  with these states,  to Iook 
into the situation of  the oflices in ICentucky and Ohio, and to 
furnish an  estimate of the probable loss which would  be sus- 
tained upon them.  His reports which accompany this com- 
munication, will exhibit these results.  His estimates very far 
exceed those of the committees of the offices ; and the parent 
board and the committees of that board have been  governed 
by his estimates, in forming their opinions of the aniount of 
these losses.  A number of investigations of  particular cases 
have, in the course  of the current transactions of  the banlr, 
taken place, and, on all such occasions, his  estimates of  loss 
have appeared  to be  beyond  the probable loss,  with the ex- 
ception of the cases of some local banksat Cincinnati.  Doubts, 
however, of the sufficiency of  these estimates, founded on the 
fear  of the fraudulent disposition of some of the debtors, and 
the unjust laws of  those  states in  relation  to creditors, were 
excited-the  board, therefore, in July, 1821, set apart as an 
auxiliary fund, in addition to the contingent fund  of  three 
inillions five hundred and fifty  thousand  dollars, all excess 
over the par value of certain stock pledged and transferred to 
the bank, and all interest due and to grow due on the sus- 
pended debts at the offices  in Kentucky and Ohio, to be with 
the said ''  contingent fund" inviolably appropriated to the ex- 
tinguishment of the losses  of  the bank, unless otherwise  or- 
dered or advised  by the stockholders at a triennial meeting, 
or at a regular  meeting which should  be  called for the pur- 
pose. 
'.llhe course of  policy pursued by the bard in relation to 
debts, and particularly  the debts  due in the west- 
ern states, was not to press the debtors rigorously where they 
were willing to give the best security in their  power, and in- 
deed never to press them except with a view to security.  The 
most liberal indulgence therefore has invariably been granted 
where satisfactory security or  the best  in the  power  of  the 
debtor has been given.  On the 1st April, 1819, the sum due 
to the bank in  Ohio and Kentucky, including balances due 
by local banks,  mas  $6,351,120.80  ; on the  30th August: 
1822, the sum due, including also  real estate taken  in pay- 
ment, was $5,389,477.18, being a reduction of  $961,653.62,' 
but in the debt now due, is a considerable sum of  contingent 
interest which has been  liquidated and notes  taken for it, so 
that the reduction  will exceed one million of  dollars of  the 
principal.  Mortgages,  and other collateral security, deemed 
ample, have in many cases been obtained, in others valuable 
additional security, in others judgtnents, and suits are pend- 
ing in all, or nearly all cases in which security has not been 
obtained. 
The  office at  Cincinnati  was discontinued in  September, 
1820, and a confidential agent is  now employed in winding 
up its affairs.  The reasons  for  discontinuing  this  office  it 
would be tedious, and perhaps invidious to narrate, they shall 
be  stated to  any committee you  inay appoint.  It has been 
deemed inexpedient to discontinue any other office. 
The  several funds which may be relied upon to extinguish 
the estimated losses are  the following : 1. A contingent fund of 
actual profits which have been reserved of  three millions five 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars.  2.  Any excess beyond 
the par  value  of  37,954 shares of  the capital  stock  of  the 
bank, pledged  to  it, and standing in  its corporate name on 
the books.  Though the debts  secured by these  shares  are 
only estimated at par, they give  a claim  to the banlr which 
will cover any value beyond par which the shares may llere- 
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after bear.  3.  The  sum of $245,796.7,  now standing to tllc 
credit of  profit and loss.  4.  The  sum of  $1,279,520.54, ar- 
rears  of  interest due the bank.  It must he  remarked  that 
this last sum includes interest  a;s well  on debts estimated as 
bad and doubtful as  on those deemed good.  There is now no 
charge on the bank besides  ordinary current charges, except 
$60,000 dollars semi-annually, which  will, if  applied for the 
duration of  the  charter, extinguish  tl~e  bonus, the premium 
on  the five per cent. loan,  and  about forty per cent. of  the 
cost of  banking houses which have been erected, and of any 
that in all likelihood will behereaftererected,as wellasthecom- 
pletion of  the building in which you are assembled ; and al- 
though I have been opposed, and have even entered my dis. 
sent upon the journals, to some of  the acts of  the hoard in rc- 
lation to this building, I nevertheless do advise, ns it is so near 
completion, and is  so beautiful  a  specimen  of  architecture, 
that it be finished.  It never  again can be done  at so small 
an expense,  and  never  under  the  superintendence of  an 
agent more  skillfill, faithful,  economical, and accurate, than 
the gentleman who planned nnd has so far executed it.  The 
additional expense will be  small. 
It was expectect. by the stockholders at their last meeting, 
that the bank would have been  enabled to  have repaired the 
losses which had been sustained, and to have made a dividend 
in January,  1820.  This the  increased  estimates  of  the 
losses and the stagnation of  trade concurred to prevent, while 
the same causes have diminished the amount of the dividends 
which have since been  made.  It will be seen, however, 011 
reference  to  the accompanying  statement, that  the bank 
would have been able to have made dividends which would, 
no doubt, have been satisfactory to the stockholders  during 
the whole period of  this administration, had  it ]not been in- 
cumbered as well with the losses as  the various embarrass- 
ments which belonged, in their origin, to a previous period. 
The  expenses of  the institution very soon attracted the at- 
tention of  the present administration, but it was not practica- 
1,le to reduce the~n  im~necliately  .  An  accompanying  state- 
ment,,  however, will show that much has been done towards 
the accomplishment of  this object.  'I'he  amount is still enor- 
lnous compared  with  the  profits growing out  of  the proper 
of  banking ; that is to say the profits of  the bank, 
exclusive of  the dividends received on the funded debt which 
it holds, and which require no managetnent or expense in the 
receipt of  them. 
The  monthly statements of  the bank exhibit an analysis 
of  the state and current business of  the bank, and the seve- 
ral offices,  as perfect as the nature of the subjects will permit : 
but  if  talten  without  explanations they are  often  likely to 
mislead.  No  attempt at this  time and in this form to givc 
such explanations  in a general way would  be  admissible or 
~racticable,  but  all such  will  be  cheerfully  and  promptly 
given  in reply to every inquiry  on particular points  which 
inay be presented. 
You will probably desire to have some notices of  the con- 
dition of  the principal funds in which the capital is invested. 
This I will briefly  attempt : 
I. The discounted  paper.  The current  paper  of  this 
bank  and its ofices  is  probably as good, or better, than the 
current paper of  other banks, in the places respectively where 
it is due.  There is, however, unfortunately a heavy mass of 
suspended paper, on which interest is continually accruing, a 
great part of  which will, no doubt, in time be  recovered, but 
which adds little or nothing at  the present time, to the fund 
from which the bank is to divide.  There is one  portion of 
this which, independently of the losses already sustained by it, 
and which are included in  the estimates, I consider as very 
good and productive.  1 mean  the forfeited stock, consisting 
of  37,954 shares which may be  considered as a reduction of 
a capital quite too large, to the extent of  their par value. 
11.  The  funded  debt held by the bank.  This now con- 
sists, with  the  exception  of  a  very  inconsiderable  sum, of 
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vernnlent ; of  two inillions  of  six per cent. stock purchased 
in 1820, redeemable at the pleasure  of  the government ; of 
four millioas  of  five per cent. stoclr purchased in  1821, and 
redeemable on the 31st of  December, 1835.  The two mil- 
liona of  six per cent. stock, of  the loan  of  1820, will, in all 
lilcelihood, be speedily redeemed.  The four millions of  five 
per  cents.  are  longer  irredeemable  than  any other stock of 
the government of  the United  States, and  hence probably, 
this stock  is more valuable than other  stock of  the govern- 
ment of  the United States.  It is quoted higher in the Lon- 
don  market than the average of  the six  per  cent.  stoclrs. 
When the bank  obtained  this stock it  was deemed a great 
bargain.  It  is  now unusually depressed, from causes which 
probably cannot be  permanent, and some stocliholders who 
urged the bank to endeavor to take it at any price, begin now 
to doubt whether the institution were not better without it.  If 
it were now sold at a profitable rate, as it may be, the same 
persons, if  it rise, would  condemn the sale of  it..  Leaving 
these persons then to the indulgence of  their opinions, it may 
be remarked that the rnore the bank can retain of  this S~OCB 
the better  for  the institution.  It wants active funds but for 
two purposes : Firstly, to pay the Loan of  $1,000,000, due in 
London.  And,  secondly,  to  give  additional  capital  to  its 
offices.  All the offices  south  of  Philadelphia, I venture to 
say, have as much capital as they can use advantageously. 
I cannot stop to give  my reasons  for this opinion.  It  is 
doubtful whether more  than half  a million in addition to its 
present  funds  could be  pro$tably  employed  at the  parent 
bank :  more than an  additional million I am  satisfied, cannot, 
under  any circumstances,  be  profitably  employed  at New 
York,  (a great many crude suggestions to  the contrary not- 
withstanding :)  and I doubt whether at  this moment a dollar 
more ought to be added;  though I am  of  opinion that a mil- 
lion ought to be added to the capital of  that office at a proper 
time, making the capital $2,500,000 dollars.  Half a millioi~ 
added to the capital of  the office at Boston, making the capi- 
lal  $1,500,000  dollars, will be  enough for that office.  All 
this will be supplied by the redemption of  the two millioiis 6 
per cent. loan, and if  a little more be necessary,  it will  soon 
be  supplied  from  the suspe~~ded  debt.  I think, therefore, if 
the bank find it necessary to part with a million and a half of 
this loan, it ought to do  it  with  regret ; but it should on  no 
account part  with  more.  The  unextinguished part of  the 
premium of  this loan is about 4;  per cent., and the last Lon- 
donquotations are 95 a 96, and the exchange in favor of  Lon- 
don 10  to 10;  per cent.  It is  obvious, therefol-e, that at the 
lowest quotations  now  or  at any other time, of  this stock, it 
would  realize  the cost, in  connection with  the rate of  ex- 
change, the rise of  which against this country, is supposed to 
be the principal cause of  the depression of  this stock.  There 
is one error in relation to this  subject which it may be worth 
explaining.  It is supposed  by some, that, because the go- 
vernment  of  the  United  States  have not  been  enabled to 
convert their six per  cent.  stocks  into  fives, that  a  five per 
cent. stock is  deemed  undesirable abroad : but  the govern- 
ment  has  never offered a  stock  like  that which the  bank 
holds in exchange  for the sixes.  It has offered a stock re- 
deemable in eight or ten years.  The  stock held by the bank 
is  not  redeemable  in  less  than thirteen  years  and  three 
months.  No  stronger  proof  can  be  given  that  the  sixes 
would be exchanged for such a  stock, than the fact that it is 
quoted higher than the average of  the six per cents. in the 
London market. 
The  bank, by a resolution of the 28th day of  Novembel; 
1816, agreed to remit to the holders of the capital stock of  the 
Bank, residing in Europe, the dividends which should be de- 
clared thereon,  free  of  expense.  This was deemed a very 
disadvantageous and burthensome  engagement on the part 
of  the Bank-advice  of  eminent counsel has been taken, to 
lcnow whether the bank was bound to continue these remit- 
tances, and it has been advised that it was not  bound longer 
than it should desire todo so from its own viewsof expediency or &antage.  It was  determined therefore  to discontinue this 
agency  except  as to  those who had  made  regular  recluisi- 
tions, or who  should  do  so by a  given  day.  As to these it 
was thought better t,hilt the  bank  should make the sacrifice 
\vhich  thcse  remittances  required, than incur tile  suspicion 
of  having misled th  holders of  stock who  had made the re- 
quisition, perhaps, under  the impression, that the  regulatiou 
\vas not disadvantageous to  the  bank, and that it  would bc 
permanent ; as to all others there was no pretence of  claim. 
There is one case of  3540  shares which is  under considera- 
tion, which the bank has heretofore determined  not to be ea- 
titled to this privilege, but the parties have urged a reconside- 
ration  of  it.  If  this be  embraced, the number  of  shares on 
which the bank has determined to continue remittances will 
be 15,331) shares.  If  they be excluded, the number  will be 
11,79U ~hares. 
With  these  facts,  and  an  inspection  of  the  documents 
which  are referred to,  and ready to be  exhibited, the stoclr- 
holders will be able to  form  an opimion for themselves, with 
all the lights and information which I have, or of  which the 
subject is susceptible, of  the state of  the bank, and may offer 
their advice and express their opinions accordingly. 
LANGDON CHEVES, 
President of the Bank of the United Statcs. 
-'Bank United States, Sept. 26, 1822. 
'l'he  committee of  inspection and investigation appointed 
in  pursuance  of  a resolution  adopted at the meeting of the 
stockholders,  met  agreeably  to  adjournment.  Mr.  Cheves 
contirlued the proof  of  his  statements,  and  closed  at 12- 
when, oil  motion of  Mr.  Hamilton,  the following resolution 
was unanimously adopted : 
'L  Resolved, That, in  the opinion  of  this committee, Mr. 
Cheves  has  full4 and satisfactorily proved the facts detailed 
in  his  statement of  the past  and present  condition  of  the 
bank, submittecl by him to  the stockholders, on tlle  2d Sep- 
tember, and now in the possession of  this committee." 
I do hereby certify that the above is a correct extract iron1 
the minutes of  the cominittee of  stoclrholders of  the bank ol' 
the United States, signed by the chairman and secretary, and 
cleposited in this bank for safe keeping. 
J. ANDREWS, Assistant  &sflicr. 
Banlc  United Slates, October 17, 1822. 
M'DUFFIE'S  REPORT. 
House of  Representatives, April 13, 1830. 
Mr. M'Duffie,  from the Committee of Ways and Meana, to which the 
subject had been referred, made the following 
REPORT : 
TIhe  C'onhnzitte  oj'  Ways  aizd Means, to  whom was 1-e- 
ferred  so mzscJ~ of  the message of  the president as re- 
lates to the Ennk of  the United States, beg leave  to rs- 
port : 
That they have bestowed  upon the subject all  the atleu- 
tion demanded by its intrinsic importance, and now respect- 
fully submit the result of their deliberations to the considerrt- 
tion of  the house.  There are few subjects, having reference 
to the policy of anestablished government, so vitaIly connected 
with the health of the body politic, or in which the pecuniary 
interests of  society  are so extensively  and deeply involved. 
No one of the attributes of sovereignty carlies with it a more 
solemn responsibility, or  calls in requisition a  higher degree 
of wisdom, than  the power  of  regulating the common cur- 
rency, and thus fixing the general  standard  of  value for a 
great  commercial  community,  coillposed  of  confederakd 
states, 
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Such being, in tlie opinion of  the committee, the high anrl 
delicate trust er;clusively comnlitted to  congress by the con- 
stitution, they have proceeded to discharge the duty assigned 
to theln with  a  corresponding  sense of  its  magnitude and 
difficulty. 
The  most simple and obvious analysis of the subject, as it, 
is presented by  the  message  of  the president,  exhibits the 
following questions for the decision of the national legislature : 
1. Has congress the constitutional power  to incorporate n 
banlr, such as that of the United States  ? 
2.  Is it expedient to establish and maintain such an insti- 
tution ? 
3. Is it expedient to establish  a 'l  national  banlr, founded 
11pon the credit of the government and its revenues ?" 
I. If the concurrence of all the departments of the govern- 
~nent,  at different  periods of  our history,  under every admi- 
nistration, and during the ascendancy of both  the great po- 
litical parties into which the country was divided, soon after 
the adoption of the present  constitution, sliall be regarded as 
having the authority ascribed to such saizctions by  the com- 
mon consent of  all well regulated communities,  the consti- 
tutional power of congrcss to incorporate a bank,  may be as- 
sumed  as a postulate no longer  open to  controversy.  In a 
little more than  two  years  after  the government went into 
operation,  and at a  period  when  most of  the clistinguished 
ineinbers of the federal convention were either in the executive 
or  legislative councils, the act  incorporating the  first  bank 
of  the United States passed  both branches of  congress,  by 
large majorities, and received the deliberate sanction of Prc- 
sident Washington, who had then recently presided over the 
deliberations of the convention.  The  constitutional power of 
congress to pass the act of incorporation  was thoroughly ih- 
vestigated,  both  in the executive cabinet and in congress, 
under circ~~mstances  in  all respects  propitious  to  n  dispas- 
sionate decision.  There was at that time no organization of 
political parties, ancl the question was,  therefore, decided  by 
i,~lose  from their knowledge and experience, were pecu 
lilLrly  qllalified to decide  correctly ; and who were  entirely 
free fro111  tllc influence of  that party excitement and prejudice 
would justly impair, in the estimation of posterity, the 
autllority of  a  legislative interpretation of  the constitutional 
charter.  No persons can be more  competent to  give a  just 
Gollstructioir to the constitution, than those who had a prin- 
cipal agency in framing it ; and no administration can claim 
a  lnole perfect  exelnptioil  from  all those influences  which 
sometimes pervert the judgments even  of the most wise and 
patriotic, than that of the father of his country, during the first 
terln of his service. 
Such were tlie circunlstances uildcr which all the branches 
~ftlle  national legislature solemnly determined that the pomcl. 
of creating a national bank was vested in congress, by the con- 
stitution.  The  bank, thus created,  continued  its operations 
for twenty years-the  period for which its charter was granted 
-during  which time, public  and private  credit were  raised 
from a prostrate to a very elevated condition, and the finances 
of  the nation wcre placed upon the most solid foundation. 
When the charter  expired  in  1811, congress refused to 
renew it,  principally  owing,  as the committe  believe, to the 
then existing state of  political parties.  Soon after the bank 
was chartered, the two great parties that have since divided 
the country began  to  assume an organized existence.  Mr. 
Jefferson and Mr. Madison, the former  in the executive ca- 
binet, and the latter  in congress,  had  been  opposed  to  tlie 
establishment  of  the bank, on  constitutional grounds,  and 
being  placed at the head  of  the party most favorable  to the 
extension of  the powers of  the government, by inlplicatiou, 
the bank question came to be  rcgarded  as, in solne degree, 
the test of  political principle. 
When Mr. Jefferson came into power upon the strong tide. 
of  a great political revolution, the odium of  the alien and se- 
dition la~vs,  was, in  part, cominunicated to the Bank  of  the 
United  States ;  and  although  he  gave  his  official sanc- 
tion to an act crcatine; a new branch  of  that iwtitution  ot New Orleans, and to another to  the counterfeiting of 
its bills, yet bvhen the question of  renewing the charter came 
before congress, it  was  discussed as a  party question.  And 
tliough some of the most distinguished republicans, including 
Mr. Gallatin, then secretary of  the treasury, and Mr. Craw- 
ford, then a member of  the senate, were decidedly in favor of 
the renewal, sustaining the measure by able arguments, the 
votes in both branches of  co~lgress  were distinctly marked as 
party votes.  At  no  time, since  the coininence~nent  of  the 
government, has there  existed  a more violent  party excite- 
ment, than that which marked  the period under review.  It 
was  the  period of  the embargo,  non-intercourse,  and other 
commercial restrictions ; when  the undiscriminating opposi. 
t,ion of the leaders of tlle federal party to the measures adopted 
Ijy tlie adlniaistration, to vindicate our rights against British 
i~ggression,  had  caused the great  majority of  tl~e  American 
people  to  view  tllese leaders  as the a~ologists  of  a  nation, 
;rlready regarded in the light of  a public enemy.  When to 
11lese circumstances we add, that the stock  of  the bank was 
l~rincipnlly  held by British sul?jects, and Americans of the un- 
popular pa1 ty, the house will readily perceive how great weye 
lhe national and party prejudices, which must have been ar- 
rayed against the proposition to  renew  its  charter.  It was 
stated by Mr. Clay, in a speech  delivered in the senate, that 
sevea-tentlis  of  the  stoclr  belonged to  British  sukjects, and 
that certain  English  noblemen, and a  late lord  chancellol., 
were  among the very largest  of  the stockholders.  With all 
these difficulties to encounter, the propositioil fa  renewing tl~e 
charter was lost  only by the casting vote of  the presiclent  of 
the senate, and by a majority of  a single vote in the house of 
~epresentatives. 
In  less than three years after the expiration of the cliarter- 
the war with Great Britain having talcen place in the mean 
time-the  circulating inedium became so disordered, the pub- 
lic  finances so deranged, and the public  credit so impaired, 
that the enlightened patriot, MI..  Dallas, ~vho  then  presided 
over the treasury departi~lent,  with the sanction of  Mr. Madi- 
son, and, as it  is  believed, every member of  the cabinet, re- 
comnlended  to  congress  the  establishment  of  a  National 
Bang, as the only measure  by which the public credit could 
be  reIrived, and the fiscal  resources of  the government  re- 
deemed fj.01~1  a ruinous,  and otherwise incurable embarrass- 
~nent  ; and such had been the impressive lesson taught by a 
very  brief, but  fatal  experience,  that  the  very  institution, 
had been  so  recently deaounceci,  and rejected by thc 
republican  party,  being noiv  reconllnended  by a republicall 
ndininistration, was  carried  through  both  branches of  con- 
gress, as a republican measure, by an overwhelming inajori- 
ty of  the republican party.  It is true that  Mr. Madisoil did 
not approve and sign the bill which passed the two  houses, 
])ecause it was not such a  bill as had  been recomnlended bp 
the secretary of  tlie  treasury, and because  the bank it pro- 
posed to create, was not calculated, in the opinion of  the pre- 
sident,, to relieve the necessities of the country.  But he pre- 
inised his objections to the measure, by "  waiving the ques- 
tion of  the constitutional authority of  the legislature to estab- 
lish an  incorporated bank-,  as being precluded, in his opinion, 
I)y repeated recognitions, under  varied  circumstances, of  the 
validity  of  such  an institution  in  acts  of  the legislative, 
executive, and judicia:  branches of  the government, accom- 
panied by indications, in different modes, of  a concurrence of 
the general will  of  the nation."  Another bill was  immedi- 
ately introduced, and would, in all probability, have become a 
law, had not the news of  peace, by  doing away the pressure 
of  the emergency, induced congress  to  suspend further pro- 
ceedings 011  the sukject, until the ensuing  session.  At the 
comineilcement of  that session, Mr. Madison  invited the at- 
tention  of  congress to  the  subject ; and  Mr.  Dallas again 
urged the necessity of  establishing a bank to restore the cur- 
rency, and facilitate the  collection and  disbursement of  the 
puMic revenue ; and so deep and solemn  was the conviction 
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stitution mas the only pacticable  means of  restoring tlie c~r- 
culating medium to a state of  sounduess, that, notwithstancl- 
ing the decided  opposition of  all the  state  banks  and their 
debtors, and indeed, the whole debtor class of  tlle commuiii- 
ty,  the act, incorporating  the  present Bank of  the United 
States, was passed by considerable majorities in both branches 
of  congress, and approved by Mr. Madison. 
The brief  history of  the farmer  and present bank, forci- 
bly suggests a few practical reflections.  It is to be remarked, 
in the first place, that, since tl~e  adoption of  the constitutioi~, 
a bank has existed under the authority of the federal govern- 
ment, for thirty-three  out of  forty years, during wllich timc, 
public and private credit have  been  maintained at an eleva- 
tion  fi~lly  equal  to  what has  existed  in any nation ill the 
world:  whereas, in the two short intervals, during which no 
iiational bank existed, public and private  credit were greatly 
impaired, and in the latter instancc, the fiscal operations  ol' 
tlie go\rernmcnt were almost entirely arrested.  In  the second 
place,  it  is  worthy of  special  notice,  that, in  both  the in- 
stances  in which congress has  created  a  bank, it has beell 
clone under circumstances  calculated to give  the highest au- 
thority to the decision.  The  first  instance, as has been  al- 
ready remarked,  was in the primitive  days of  the  republic, 
~vhen  the patriots of  the revolution, and the sages of  the fc- 
cleral convention, were the leacling lnenibers both of  the ex- 
ecutive  and legislative councils ; and when General Wash- 
ington, who, at the head  of  her  armies,  had conducted  his 
country to independence, and, as the head of  the convention, 
had presided over  those  cleliberations which resulted in  tl~e 
establishment  of  the present  constitution, was  the acknow- 
ledged president of  a  people, undistracted  by party divisions. 
The  second instance was under circumstances  of  a very dif- 
ferent,  but  equally  decisive  character.  We find  the  very 
party which had so recently defeated the propositioll to renew 
the charter of  the old  bank,  severely schooled both  by ad- 
rcrsitp and experience, magnanimon~lv  sacrificing the prido 
(,l col~sistency,  and the pl.eiucliccs or party, at the slirine of 
l,atriotisln.  It may be  said, without disparagement, that aa 
asselllbly  ol higher talent and purer patriotism  has never es- 
jsted  tile  days of  the revolution, than the congress by 
the present bank was  incorporated.  If  ever a  politi- 
cal party existed, of  which  it  might be truly saicl, that "  all 
the ends they aiined were their country's,"  it was the repub- 
licall party of that clay.  They had just conducted the coun- 
try through  the perils  of  a  war, waged  in  defense  of  her 
l,igllts and honor ; and, elevating  their views far above the 
narotv and miserable ends of  party strife, sought only to ad- 
vance the permallellt happiness of  the people.  It was to thi? 
great end, that they establishecl the present bank. 
In  this review, it will be no less iilstructive than curious to 
notice some  of  the changes inade in the opinioils of  proini- 
nent a~en,  yielding to the authority of  experience.  Mr. Madi- 
son,  1vho was  the leading opponent of  the bank  created in 
1791,  recommended  and  sa~lctioned  the  bank  created  in 
1816 ; and Mr. Clay, who streiluously opposed  the renewal 
of  the charter i11  1811, as strenuously supported  the proposi- 
tion to grant thc charter in 1816. 
That may be said of  the bank charter, which can be  saicl 
of few contested questions of coilstitutional power.  Both the 
great political parties that have so long divided the country, 
have solemnly pronounced  it to be co~~stitutional,  and there 
are but very few of  the proininent men of either party,  who 
(10 not stand committed in its favor.  When, to this imposing 
array of  authorities, the coillmittee add the soleinn and una- 
niil~ous  decision of  the supreme court, in  a case which fully 
and distinctly submitted  the constitutiollal question to  their 
cognizance, may they not ask, in the language of Mr. Dallas, 
"  can it be deemed a violation of the right of private opinion 
to consider tlie constitutionality of  a national bank as a ques- 
tion for ever settled and at rest 7" 
And here tlie cominittee beg to be distinctly understood, as 
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or  of  all the departments of  the government  upon  a great 
constitutional question, the binding authority which  belongs 
to judicial precedents, in cases of  mere private right, depencl- 
ing upon the construction of the ordinary acts  of  the legisla.- 
ture.  No length of prescription, or concurrence of authority, 
can consecrate the usurpation of  powers subversive of public: 
liberty, and destructive of public happiness.  But, where tho 
power exercised is clearly conducive to the public welfare, and 
its constitutionality is  merely  doubtful, it would seem to bc 
one of  the most obvious dictates of  practical  wisdom, to  re- 
gard the decision of those who  had the best means of ascer- 
taining  the intention  of  the constitution,  and  who  were 
actuated by the most undoubted purity and disinterestedness 
of  motive, as of  sufficient authority at least to  overrule tlieo. 
retical objections, and silence individual scruples. 
The  committee will now submit a few remarks, with tile 
design of showing, that, viewing the constitutionality of  the 
bank as an original question, the arguments in its favor arc 
at least as strong as those against it. 
The  earliest, and the principal objection urged against the 
constitutionality of a national  bank, Waf,  that congress had 
not  the power to create corporations.  That congress has a, 
distinct and substantive power to create corporations, without 
reference to  the objects intrusted to  its jurisdictiou, is a pro- 
position which never has been maintained, within the know- 
ledge of the committee ; but that any one of  the powers ex- 
pressly conferred upon congress, is  subject  to the limitation, 
that it shall not be carried into effect by the agency of a cor- 
poration, is a proposition which cannot be maintained, in the 
opinion of the committee. 
If congress, under the authority to pass all law,  necessary 
and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in all or 
any of  the departmeiits  of  the government,  may rightfully 
pass a law inflicting the punishment of  death, without uny 
other authority, it is difficult  to  conceive why  it  may not 
pa35 a law, uncler  the same authority, for the more  humble 
lN,r~~s  of creating a corporation.  'l'lic  powel ol creating o 
is one of  the lo~vest  attributes, or,  more  properly 
speaking, incidents of sovereign power.  The  chartering of a 
bank, for example, does not authorize the corporation  to  do 
thing which the individuals composing it might not do 
the charter.  It is the right of every individual of the 
Union to give credit to whom he chooses, and to obtain credit, 
where he can get it.  It is not the policy of  any coinn~ercial 
country to restrict the free circulation of  credit, whether in the 
form of  promissory notes, bills of  exchange, or  bank  aotes. 
The  charter  of  the Bank of  the  United  States,  therefore, 
merely enables the corporation to do, in an  artificial capacity, 
and  with more convenience, what it would be lawful for the 
individual  corporators  to  do  without  incorporation.  Mr. 
Girard established a banlc in Philadelphia, without a charte~.. 
which was in very high credit within the sphere of its circn- 
lation ; and it cannot be doubted, that lze might have formed 
a banking copartnership with the principal capitalists in the 
other commercial cities of the Union, of which the bills would 
have had a general credit in every part  of  the country, par- 
ticularly  if  the federal  government  had provided that these 
bills should be received in discharge  of its  dues.  The  only 
luaterial particular in which the cllai ter of  the Bank of  the 
United States confers a privilege upon the corporation, appn- 
rently inconsistent with the state laws,  ia,  the exemption oi 
the individual property of  the corporators from responsibili(y 
for the debts of the corporation.  But, if the community deal 
with the bank, Icnowing that the capital subscribed  is alone 
responsible for its debts, no one can complain either of imposi- 
tion or injury ; and, in point of fact, no one ever  has com- 
plained on that score, or ever will.  The  real complaint against 
the bank, is not that it has not a sufficient basis for its credit, 
but that its credit is too extensive.  The  objection lies, there- 
fore, not against the artificial character communicated to the 
stockholders by the chalter, but  against the pecuniary ope- 
rations. of  thc bank itself.  Xow  thx  operation7 r011sist  ir 
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the use of its own capital-a  faculty not surely derived ti0111 
the government, but in the exercise of which the government 
imposes many useful restrictions for the benefit of  itself and 
of the community. 
The  committee have presented this brief analysis of  a bank 
corporation, \vit11 a view of showing that there is  nothing ill 
the nature of  the thing  which renders it unfit  to  be an in- 
strument in the hands of a government, admitted to be sove- 
reign in its appropriate sphere, for carrying into effect powere 
cxl~ressly  delegated. 
It now remains for the coinmittee to show that the Bank 
of the United States is a "  necessary and proper,'' or, in other 
words,  a natural  and appropriate, means  of  executing  the 
powers vested in the federal government.  In the discussioi~ 
of  1791,  and also  in  that  befare  the  supreme  court,  the 
powers  of  raising, collecting,  and disbursing the public re- 
venue,  of  borrowing  money  on  the  credit  of  the United 
States, and paying the public debt, were  those which were 
supposed most clearly to carry with thein the incidental right 
of incorporating a bank, to facilitate these operalions.  There 
can be no doubt, that these fiscal operations are greatly faci- 
litated by a bank, and it is confidently believed that no per- 
son has presided 'twelve  months over  the  treasury,  from its 
first organization to the present time, without coming to the 
conclusion that such institution is  exceedingly useful to the 
public finances in time of peace, but  indispensable in time of 
war.  But as this view of  the question  has  been fully un- 
folded in  former  discussions, familiar to the house, the com- 
inittee will proceed to exainine the relation  which  the bank 
of the United States bears to another of the powers of the fe- 
deral  government,  but  slightly  adverted  to  in  former  dis- 
cussions of the subject. 
The  power to "  coin  money and fix the value thereof," is 
expressly and exclusively  vested  in congress.  This grant 
was evidently intended to invest congress with the power of 
regulating the circulating medium.  Coin " was regarded. 
at the period of framing the constit.utioa, as synonymous wit11 
+r  as it was then generally believed that hank note3 
could only be nlaintained in circulation by being the true re- 
presentative of  the precious metals.  The  word  coin," there- 
fore, must be regarded as a  particular  term, standing as the 
representative of  a general idea.  No principle of sound con- 
struction will justify  a rigid adherence to the letter, in oppo- 
sition to  the plain intention  of the clause.  If, for  example: 
the gold bars of  Ricardo should be substituted for our present 
coins, by the general consent of the comme1.cia1  world, coulcl 
it be maintained that congress would not have the 'power  to 
n~alce  stth money,  and  fix  its  value,  because  it  is  not, 
iL  coined?"  This would  be sacrificing  sense to sound, and 
substance to mere form.  This clause of  the constitution  is 
analogous to that which gives congress the power  to "  esta- 
blish post  roads."  Giving to  the  word  "establish"  its re- 
stricted interpretation, as being  equivalent to "  fix," or "  pre- 
scribe," can it be doubted that congress has the power to esta- 
blish a canal  or a river as a  post  rout, as well  as a  road :2 
Roads were the  ordinary  channels  of  conveyance, and thc 
term was, therefore, used as synonymous with !'  routs," what- 
ever might  be  the channel  of  transportation,  acd, in  like 
manner,  coin," being the ordinary and most known form of 
a  circulating  medium, that  term  mas used as syiionymous 
with currency. 
An argument in  favor  of  the  view  just  talcen,  may be 
fairly deduced from the fact, that the states are expressly pro- 
hibited from "  coining money, or emitting bills of credit," and 
from "  making any thing but gold and silver n la.rvful tender 
in payment of debts."  This  strongly confirms the idea, that 
the subject of  regulating  the  circulating  medium,  whether 
consisting of coin or paper, was, at the same time that it was 
taken from the control of  the states, vested in the only depo- 
sitory  in  which  it could  be  placed,  consistently  with  the 
obviousdesign of having a common measure of valne throue;h- 
out the Union But cwll if it slioulcl be  coliceclecl lllal ilie grant ol'  powcr 
to  :! coin money and fis  the value  thereof," does not, in its 
terms, give congress tllc potvcr of regulating ally other thau 
thc  coiner1 " currency of  tile Ul~ion,  may not the power of 
regulating any substituted c~irrencj~,  and especially one which 
is tlle professed representative of coin, be fairly claimed as an 
incidental  power-as  an essential  nieans  of  carrying  into 
effect tlre plain intention of  the constitution, i11  clotllirtg con- 
grees with the principal power ?  This  power was granted in 
the same clause with that to regulate weights and measures, 
and for  similar reasons.  The  one was de! igned to insure a. 
unifornl ineasurc  of  mlue, as the other was designed to ia- 
sure a uniform measure of quantity.  The  former is decidedly 
the more important,  and belongs  essentially  to  the general 
gorerninent, according to every just conception of our system. 
A currency of  uniform valuc is  essential to what every one 
will admit to be of cardinal  importance : tl~e  equal action of 
our revenue  system  upon  the diflerent parts of  the Union. 
'rhe state of  things ~vl1ic11  existed tvhen the banlr rvas iacor- 
porated,  i'urnislled  a  most  pregnant  coininentary  on  this 
clause of  the  conslitution.  The currency  of  the  countq- 
r;ousisled  of  the paper of  locnl banlts,  vsrioi~sly  depreciated. 
:It one of  thc principal sea-porls tllc  local  currency was 20 
per cent. below par.  Now it was in vain for congress to rc- 
gulate the value of coin, whcn the actual cuncncy, professing 
lo be its  eq~iivaleut,  bore  110  fixed relalion to it.  This great 
and cssei~tial  power of  iixing the staudarcl of  value,  was, in 
i~oint  of  fact, taliell  from  congress, and exercised  by some 
hundreds  of  irresponsible  bnnkillg  corporations,  with  the 
strongest liuman inotivcs to abuse it, because their enormous 
profits resulted  from  tlte abuse.  The power of  laying and 
collecting imposts and excises. is expressly subject to the con- 
dition that they  "shall  be uniform  throughout  the United 
States ;" and it is also provided, that "  no preference shall be 
given, by any regulation of  conlinerce or revenue,  to the ports 
of one state over those of  another." Now, when it isknownthat 
llle  inediuln of Balti~nore  was 20 per  cent. belo~v 
the value of the circulating medium of Boston, is it not appa- 
rent that an impost duty, though nominally uniform, would, 
in  elfect,  make a discrimination in favor  of  Baltimore, pro- 
portioned to the depreciation of  the local currency ?  (3011- 
gress, therefore, not only had the power,  but,  as it  seeins to 
the committee, were  under  the most  solemn  constitutional 
obligation to restore the disordered currency ; and the Bank 
of the United States was not only an appropriate means for 
the  accomplishment of  that end, but, in the opinion of  the 
committee, the only safe and effectual mealis that could have 
been used.  This view  of  the subject  is  in  full accordancc 
with the opinion of Mr. Madison, as  expressed in his ineasage 
of December, 1816.  '!  But," says lte, "  for the interest of the 
community at large, as well as for  the  purpose of  the trea- 
sury, it is essential that the nation should possess a currency 
of  equal  value,  credit, and use,  wherever  it  may circulate. 
'Phe  constitution  has intrusted  congress,  exclusively, with 
tlle power  of creating and regulating a currency of  that de- 
scription, and the measures  which  were  taken, during the 
last session, in execution of the power, give every promise of 
success.  The  Bank of the United States, under auspices the 
inost favorable, cannot fail to be an important auxiliary." 
Such are the  authorities  and such the arguments which 
llave brought the committee to the conclusion, that the power 
to incorporate a bank is incidental to the powers of  collecting 
and disbursing the public revenue ; of  borrowing lnolley 011 
the credit of  the United States ; of paying the public debt ; 
and above all, of  fixing and regulating the standard of value, 
and thereby insuring, at least so  far as the medium of pay- 
lnent is concerned, the uniformity and equality of taxation. 
11.  The  next question proposed for consideration, is the es- 
pediency of  establishing an incorporated bank, with  a vien 
to promote t11e great  ends already indicated.  In discussing 
the constitutionality of  such  a  measure, some  of  the  con- 
siderations which rendcr it expedient have been  slightly un- 1 $d  13:LNli  UY 'L'IIE  UNITED S'L'A'L'ES.   BAA^  OF  THE USI'I'EU  ~TA'I'LZ.  143 
folded.  But these require a more full arid complete develop- 
ment, while others remain to be presented. 
It must be assumed as the basis of  all sound reasoning oil 
this subject, that the existence of  a paper currency, issued by 
banks deriving  their  charters  from the  state  governments, 
cannot be prohibited by congress.  Indeed  bank credit and 
bank paper are so extensively interwoven with the commer- 
cial operations of society, that, even if congress had the coa- 
stitutional  power,  it  would  be  utterly  impossible  to  pro- 
duce  so  entire a  change  in  the  moneyed  eystern  of  the 
country,  as to  abolish  the  agency of  banks  of  discount; 
without  involving  the  coinrnunity  in  all  the  distressing 
embarrassments  usually attendant on great political revolu- 
t,ions, subverting the titles to  private property.  The  sudden 
withdrawal of some hundred millions of  bank credit,  would 
be equivalent, in its effects, to the arbitrary and despotic trans- 
fer of  the property of  one portion  of  the community  to an- 
other, to the extent, probably, of  half  that amount.  What- 
ever,  therefore, may be the advantages of  a purely metallic 
currency, and whatever the objections to a circulating medium 
partly composed of  bank paper, the committee consider that 
they are precluded, by the existing state of  things, from insti- 
tuting a comparison between them, with a view to any prac- 
tical result. 
If they were not thus precluded, and it were submitted to 
them as an  original question, whether the acknowledged and 
manifold  facilities of  bank  credit  alid  bank paper, are not 
inore than counterbalanced by the distressing vicissitudes it1 
trade, incident to their use, they are by no means prepared to 
say, that they would not give a decided preference to the more 
costly and cumbersome medium. 
But the question really presented  for  their determination, 
is not between a metallic and a paper currency, but between 
it paper curency of  uniform value, and subject to the control 
of  the only power  competent to  its regulation, and a  paper 
cmrencv of  varying and fluctuating value,  and subject to no 
,;U1lllllo~l  or ailequatc control  whatever.  On this question it 
mould  seein  that there  could  scarcely exist a  difference of 
~tion  involved in  ; and that this is substantially theque, 
the expediency of  a  national bank, will satisfac- 
torily appear by  the  comparison of  a  state of  the currency 
previous to  the establishment of  the present  bank, and its 
condition for the last ten years. 
Soon  after  the expiration  of  tlle charter of  the first banlc 
of  the  United  States, an immense  number of  local banks 
sprung up under the pecuniary exigencies  produced  by tlle 
withdrawal of  so large an  amount of  bank credit, as neces- 
sarily  resulted  from  the winding up of  its  concerns-ail 
amount falling very little short of  fifteen  nill lions of  dollars. 
These banlis  being  entirely  free  from the salutary control 
which the bank  of  the United States had recently exercised 
over the local institutions, commenced  that system of  impnl- 
dent trading  and excessive issues, which  speedily involved 
the country in all the embarrassments of  a  disordered  cur- 
rency.  The extraordinary sti~~lulus  of  a heavy war expen- 
diture,  derived  principally from  loans, and a  corresponding 
multiplication  of  local  banks, chartered by the double score 
in some of  the states, hastened the catastrophe which must 
have occurred, at no distant period, without these extraordinn- 
ry causes.  The  last year of  the war presented the singular 
and mela~~choly  spectacle  of  a  nation  abounding  in  re- 
sources, a people abounding  in self-devoting patriotism, and 
agovernment reduced to  the very  brink  of  avowed  baak- 
ruptcy, solely for the want of  a  national  institution, which, 
st  the same time  that it  would have facilitated the govern- 
ment  loans  and other  treasury  operations, would  have fur- 
nished a circulating  medium of  general credit in  every part 
of  the Union.  In this  view of  the  subject, the committee 
are fully sustained by the opinion of  Mr. Dallas, then secre; 
tary  of  the  treasury,  and  by the  concurring  and  almost 
llnaninlous opinion  of  all parties  in congress ; for whatever 
(li~~~rsit!~  of  ~lpinion  prerailnd  ai.  to  the proper basis  and 01.- gn~lization  of  a banlr,  allnost  every one agreed  that  il  lla- 
tional  bank  of  soine  sort  mas  indispensably  necessary  to 
rescue the country from the greatest of  financial calamities. 
The committee will  now present a brief  exposition of  the 
state  of  the currency at the  close of  the war, of  the  injury 
which  resulted  from it, as well to the governinent as to  the 
community, and their reasons for  believing that it  could not, 
have been restored to a sound condition, and cannot now bc 
preserved  in that  condition, without the agency of  such an 
institution as the Bank of  the United States. 
The price  current appended  to this  report will  exhibit a 
scale of  depreciation in  the local currency, ranging through. 
various degrees to twenty, and even  to twenty-five per cent. 
Among the  principal  eastern cities, Washington and Balti- 
more were the points at which the depreciation was greatest. 
The  paper of  the banks in these  places, was from  20  to 22 
per cent. below  par.  At Philadelphia the depreciation mas 
considerably less, though even there it was from 17 to 18 per 
cent.  In  New  York and Charleston,  it  was from  7 to 10 
percent.  But in  the interior  of  the country, where banks 
were  established, the depreciation was  even greater than at 
Washington and Baltin~ore.  In the western  part of  Penn- 
sylvania, and particularly at Pittsburg, it  was  25 per  cent. 
These statements,  however,  of  the relative  clepreciation of 
banlr paper at various places, as compared with specie, give a 
very inadequate idea of  the enormous evils inflicted upoil the 
cominunity, by the excessive issues of bank paper.  No pro- 
position  is  better establishcd than that the value of  money, 
whether it consists of  specie or paper, is  depreciated in exact 
proportion to the increase of  its  quantity, in any given state 
of  the demand for  it.  If,  for  example, the banks in  18 16 
doubled the quantity of  the circulating medium by their ex- 
cessive issues, they produccd a general degradation of the en- 
tire mass of  the currency,  including gold and silver, propor- 
tioned to the redundancy of  the issues,  and wholly indepen- 
'ont of  the  relative  depreciation of  bank  paper  at different 
rlaces, as  cornp:xr~(l  with specie.  The  ~lorninal  money price 
"1  every article was of  course one  h~ulclrecl  per  cant. ;:Iyher 
than it would have been, but for the duplicaticn  ;  :;!ti  c;,lnn- 
tity of  the circulating medium.  Money is nothing inore nor 
less than the measure by which the relative value of  all arti- 
cles of  merchandise is  ascertained.  If, when the circulating 
medium is fifty millions, an article  should cost one dollar, it 
would certainly cost two, if, without  any increase of  the uses 
of  a circulating medium, its quantity should be increased  to 
one hundred millions.  This rise  in the price  of  commodi- 
ties, or del)reciatioa in the value of  money, as  compared with 
them, would not be owiag to the want of  credit in the bank 
bills, of  .rvhich the currency happened  to  be composed.  11 
would exist though these  bills were of  undoubted credit, and 
convertible  into specie at the  pleasure  of  the  holder, and 
would result simply from the redundancy of their quantity.  It 
is important to a just understanding of  the subject, that the 
relative depreciation of bank paper at different places, as com- 
pared with specie, should not be confounded with this general 
depreciation of  the  entire mass of  the circulating  medium, 
including specie.  Though closely allied, both in their causes 
and effects, they deserve to be separately considered. 
The  evils resulting from the relative depreciation of  banl; 
paper at different  places, are more easily traced to their causes: 
more palpable in their nature, and consequently  Inore gene- 
rally understood by the community.  Though inucl~  less ru- 
inous than the evils resulting  from the general depreciation 
of  the whole currency, they are  yet  of  sufficient magnitude 
to demand a full exposition. 
A  very serious evil, already hinted  at, tvhicll grew out of 
the relative depreciation of  bank paper, at the different points 
of  importation,  was  its  inevitable tendency  to  draw all the 
importations of  foreign merchandise  to the cities where the 
depreciation was greatest, and divert them from  those where 
the cu~  rency was coinparatively sound.  If  the Bank of  th.1 
United States had not been  established, and the governme!? 
had Iiezn left without any alteraat.ive. hilt  to  reccire the clre 
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preciated local currency, it  is dimcult to  imagine the  exteil~ 
to which the evasion of  the revenue  laws would have been 
carried.  Every state would have had an  interest to encourage 
the excessive issues of  its  banks: and increase  the degrada- 
tion of  its currency, with a view  to attract foreign commerce. 
Even  in  the condition which  the currency had  reached in 
1816, Boston  and \ew York  and  Charleston  would  have 
lo~iad  it advantageous to derive their supplies of  foreign mer- 
chandise through Baltimore;  and coinmerce would undoubt- 
cdly have taken that direction had not the currency been cor- 
rected.  To  avoid this injurious diversion of  foreign imposts. 
Massachusetts and New Yorkancl South Carolina would haw 
.been driven by all illatives of self-defenseand self-interest,  to de- 
dgrae  their respectivecurrencies at  least toa par with the curren- 
cy of  Baltimore ; and thus a rivalry in the career of deprecia- 
tion would have sprung up, to which no limit can be assigned. 
As the tendency of  this  state of  things would  have  been to 
cauee  the largest portion  of  the revenue to be collected at a 
few places, and in the most depreciated of  the local currency, 
it would have followed that a very small part of that revenue 
mould  have  been disbursed at the  points  where it  was col- 
lected.  The government  would  consequently  have  been 
compelled  to  sustain a  heavy  loss upon  the transfer of  its 
funds to the points of  expenditure.  The  annual loss which 
would have resulted from  these causes alone, cannot be esti 
inated at a less sum than two millions of  dollars. 
But the principal loss which  resulted from the relative de- 
preciation of  bad paper  at different  places, and its want ol 
general credit, was that sustained  by the community, in tlle 
great operations  of  commercial  exchange.  The extent  of 
these operations  annually may be  safely estimated  at sixty 
inillions of  dollars.  Upon this sum the loss sustained by the 
merchants,  and  planters, and farmers, and  manufacturers, 
was not probably less than an average of  ten per cent., being. 
the excess of  tlle rate of  exchange beyond its natural rate in 
sound state of  the currency, and beyond the rate to which 
it has been actually reduced by the operations of  the Bank of 
tile United States.  It will be thus perceived that an annual 
tas of  six millions of  dollars was levied from the industrious 
and productive classes, by the large moneyedcapitalists in our 
commercial cities, who were engaged in the business of broker- 
age.  A variously depreciated currency, and a fluctuating state 
of the exchanges, open a wide and abundant  harvest to the mo- 
ney brokers;  and it  is  not,  therefore, surprising,  that they 
should be opposed to an institution, which, at the same time 
that it  has relieved the community  from the enormous tas 
just stated, has deprived them of  the enormous profits which 
they derived from  speculating in the business of  exchange. 
In addition to the losses sustained  by the community,  in the 
great operations of  exchange, extensive  losses  were s*ufferecl 
throughout the interior of  the country, in all the smaller ope- 
rations of  trade, as well  as  by the failure of  the numerous 
paper  banks, puffed into a factitious credit by fraudulent arti- 
fices,  and having no substantial basis of  capital to insure thc 
redemption of  their bills. 
But no adequate conception can be formed of  the evils of a 
depreciated  currency,  without  looking  beyond  the  relative 
depreciation at different places, to the general depreciation of 
the entire  mass.  It appears  from the report of  Mr. Craw- 
ford, the  secretary of  the treasury in 1820, that  during the 
general suspension of  specie payments, by the local banks, in 
the  years  1815 and  1816, the circulating  medium of  the 
United States had reached the aggregate amount of one hun- 
dred and ten inillions of  dollars, and that, in the year  1819, 
it had  been  reduced to  forty-five millions of  dollars, being a 
reduction  of  fifty-nine  per cent. in the short period  of  four 
years.  The committee are inclined to the opinion, that the 
severe  and distressing operation  of  restoring  a  vicious cur- 
rency to a sound state, by the  calling in of  bank paper, and 
the curtailment of  bank discounts, had  carried the reduction 
of  the currency,  in  1819, to  a  point  somewhat lower than 
was consistent with the just reqr~irements  of  the community 
for a circulating medium, and that the bank discounts have 
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requirements.  It  will  be assumed, therefore, that the  circli 
lating medium of  the United States has been  fifty-five mil- 
lions of  dollars for the last ten years, taking the average. 
Even upon this assumption it will follow, that the national 
currency has  been one hundred  per  cent. more valuable for 
the last ten years, than it was in 1816.  In  other words, two 
dollars would purchase no Inore of  any commodity in 1816, 
than one dollar has been capable of  purchasiug at any time 
since 1819.  It is obvious, therefore, that the depreciation of 
t,he paper of  particular banks, at any particular time, as com- 
pared with specie, furnishes no criterion by which to ascertain 
the general  depreciation of  the whole  currency,  including 
specie, as compared wit1.1 the value of that currency at a dif- 
ferent period.  A  specie dollar, in  1816, would purchase no 
more than half  as inucli as a paper  dollar mill purchme  at* 
present. 
Having endeavored to explain, thus briefly, the general de- 
preciation  resulting  from a  redundant  currency,  the  com- 
mittee will now  proceed to point  out some of  the injurious 
consequences which have  resulted from those great changes 
in the standard of  value, which hare been  unavoidably  pro- 
duced by the correction of  the recli~ndancy. 
An individual who borrowed a sum of  money in 1816, and 
paid it in  1820, evidently returned to  the lender  double the 
value received from him ; and one wllo paid a debt in 1820, 
wlzich he had contracted in  1816, as evidently paid double 
the value he had stipulated to pay, thorrgli nominally the same 
amount in money.  It is in this may that fluctuations in the 
quantity and value of  the curreilcy interfere, in the most un- 
just and injurious manner, between debtor and creditor. 
And whcn banks have  the  power  of  suspending specie 
payments, and of  arbitrarily contracting and expanding their 
issues, without  any  general  control, they  exercise  a  more 
dangeroirs and despotic power over the property of  the ~0111- 
munity, than mas ever exercised by the most absolute govera- 
inent.  111  such a. state of things, every  man in the commu- 
nitv hold.:  his  property at thr inercv  of  monev rnnltinq  coy- 
,,Or;ttio~~e,  which  have  a  dec~ided interest  to  abuse  their 
power. 
By a course of liberal discounts and excessive  issues  for a 
i'ew years, followed by a sudden calling in of  their debts, and 
contraction  of  their  issues,  they would  have  the power of 
transferring the property of their debtors to themselves, almost 
without limit.  Ilebts contracted when their discounts were 
liberal, and the currency of course depreciated, would be  col- 
lected when their discounts were almost suspended,  and thc 
cuneacy of course unnaturally appreciated ; and in  this way 
the property  of  the community might pass  under  the ham- 
mer, from its rightfill owners to the banks, for less  than one 
half its  intrinsic value.  If the colnmittee have not  greatly 
inistaken the matter, there is more of  history than of  specu- 
lation in what they have  here presented to the consideratio11 
of  the house. 
It is impossible to form any thing like an accnrate estimate 
of  the injuries  and losses  sustained  by  the community,  in 
various ways, by the  disorders and  fluctuations of  the cur- 
rency, in the period which intervened between the expiration 
of  the old bank charter, and the establishnlent of the present 
bank.  But some tolerable r~otion  may be formed of  the losses 
sustained by the government, in its fiscal  operations, during 
the war. 
The  committee have given this part  of the subject an at- 
tentive and careful  examination, and  they cannot  estimate 
the pecuniary losses of  the government, sustained exclusively 
for the want of  a sound currency and an cficient system of 
iinance, at a sum less than  forty-six millions of  dollars.  If 
t.11~~  sliall make this apparent, the house will have somet.hing 
like a  standard  for  estimating  tlic  individual  losses  of  the 
community. 
The  government borrowed, during the short period of  the 
war,  eighty  millions  of  dollars, at an average discount  of 
fifteen per cent.,  giving certificates of  stock,  amounting to 
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of dollars, in such bank paper as could be obtained.  In  this 
statement, treasury notes are considered  as stock,  at twenty 
per  cent. discount.  Upon  the very face of  the transaction, 
tllerefore, there was a loss of twelve millions of dollars, which 
would in all probability have been saved, if the treasury had 
been aided by such an institution as the Bank of the United 
States.  But the sum of  sixty-eight millions of  dollars, re- 
ceived by the government, was in a depreciated currency, not 
more than half as valuable as that in which the stock given 
in exchange for it  has been  and  will  be  redeemed.  Here. 
then, is another loss of  thirty-four millions, resulting-, incon- 
testibly  and exclusively,  from  the depreciation  of  the cur- 
rency, and making, with the sum lost by the discount, forty- 
..is  lnilliotis of  dollars.  While, then, the government sus- 
tained this great pecuniary loss  in less than three years of 
war, anloimtiag a~~nually  to more than the current expenses 
of the government in time of  peace,  it is worth while to in- 
quire, who were the persoils who  profited  to  this  enormous 
anzount, by  the derangement of  the currency ?  It will be 
found that the whole benefit of  this speculation upon the ne- 
cessities of the government, was realized by stockjobbers and 
money brokers, the very same class  of persons who profited 
so largely by the business of commercial exchanges, in con- 
sequence of  the disorders of  the currency,  and who have the 
same interest in the recurrence of  those disorders, as lawyers 
llave in litigation, or physicians in the diseases of the human 
frame.  Having presented these general  views  of  the evils 
which existed previous to the establishment  of  the Bank of 
the United States, it remains for the committee to inquire how 
far this institution has effected a remedy of  those evils. 
The  first great question which arises under this branch of 
the inquiry is, whether or no the bank  has corrected the dis- 
orders of  the circulating  medium, by providing a paper cur- 
rency, convertible into specie  at the pleasure of  the holder, 
:~nd  of  equal value with specie at all points of  the Union ? 
'l'lle  chief  magistrate,  in that part  of  his  first  message 
which relates to the Bank of the United States, expresses the 
opinion,  tl~at it has failed in the great end of  establishing 
a uniform and sound currency."  After giving to this ol)inioi~ 
all the consideration to which it is so justly entitled, from the 
eminent station and high character of  the citizen by whom it 
is entertained, the committee are constrained to express their 
respectful but  decided  dissent  from  it.  It is true, that  the 
bank does not,  in  all cases,  redeem the bills  issued by any 
one of its branches, indiscrimiiiately at all the other branches : 
and it is  in reference to this fact, as the committee  presumc: 
that the president expresses the opinion that the institution 
has failed to establish  "a uniform and sound currency." 
It is confidently believed, that no one of  the persons ~vho 
were principally instrumental in establishing the bank, ever 
entertained an idea that it  would attempt to redeem  its bills 
at any of  its offices, other  than those  by which they should 
be respectively issued.  The  charter certainly contains no such 
requirement, and it would have been highly inexpedient if it 
had, to say nothing of  its obvious injustice.  The  inevitablc 
effect of  such a requirement, would have  been to compel the 
bank to perform  the whole  of  the conlmercial  exchanges of 
the country,  without  any compensation.  It would not  be 
more unjust to require  a rail  road  company to  transport all 
the productions  of  the country  without  compensation.  No 
institution could stand such an operation ; and it was the in- 
j~ldicious  attempt of  the first  direction of  the bank to  do it: 
that principally contributed  to the embarrassnlents of  1819. 
-4  committee was appointed  by the house of  representatives, 
in that year, to investigate the management of the bank ;  and 
in the report of  that committee, as  well  as in the discussions 
to wliich it gave rise in the house, this attempt of  the direc- 
tion to redeem the bills of  tile institution, indiscriminately, at 
a11  its  branches, was  indicated as one  of  the causes of  the 
existing embarrassment.  No one who participated in the dc- 
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its bills  indiscriminately, or  that it  was  expedient  that  ir 
should do so.  The  most that any one did, was to apologize 
lor the unwise attempt. 
But it yet remains for the coinnlittee to  show that this  in- 
discriminate redeemability of  the bills of  all the branches of 
the bank, is not  necessary to  the establishment of  a uni- 
form and sound currency." 
Human wisdom has never  effect.ed, in any other country, 
a nearer  approach to uniformity  in the currency, than that 
\vhich is made by the use of  the precious metals.  If, there- 
fore, it can be shown that the bills of  the United States Bank 
are of  equal  value with silver at all  points of  the Union, it 
would seem that the proposition is clearly made out, that the 
bank  has  accompl~shed  " the  great  end  of  establishing a 
uniform and sound currency."  It is not denied that the bills 
of  the mother bank,  and of  all its branches,  are invariably 
and promptly redeemed in  specie, whenever presented at the 
ofices  by which they have been  respectively issued, and at 
which, upon their face, they purport to be payable.  Nor is it 
denied that the bills of  the bank, and of  all the branches, are 
equal to specie in their respective spheres of circulation.  Bills, 
for example, issued by the mother  bank, are admitted to  be 
equal to silver in Pennsylvania, and all those parts of the ad- 
jacent states of  which Philadelphia is  the market.  But it is 
contended that these bills, not  being  redeemable at Charles- 
ton  and New  Orleans, are not of  equal value  with silver to 
the merchant who wishes to purchase  cotton with them, in 
those cities.  Now, if  the Philadelphia  merchant  had silver, 
instead of  bank  bills,  he certainly could not  effect  his pur- 
chases with it in Charleston or New Orleans, without having 
the silver conveyed to those places ; and it is equally certain 
that he could not have it conveyed there, without paying for 
its transportation and insurance.  These expenses constitute 
the natural rate of  exchange between those  cities, and indi- 
cate the exact sum which the merchant would give as a pre- 
mium for a bill  of  exchange, to  avoid the trouble and delap 
of transporting llis specie.  It is obvious, therefo~e,  that even 
for these distant operations of  commel.ce,  silver would  be no 
more  valuable than  the bills of  the  bank : for these would 
purchase a bill of  exchange on either of  the cities mentioned, 
pecisely as well  as silver.  If  the operation should be  re- 
versed, and the planter of Louisiana or South Carolina should 
desire to place his funds in Philadelphia, with  a view to pur- 
chase  merchandise,  he would find the bills of  the  branch 
bank in either of  those states, entirely equivalent to silver in 
effecting  his object.  Even, therefore, if  the bank had not 
reduced the rate of the exchanges, it might be safely asserted, 
that its  bills  would  be  of  equal value  wit11  silver at every 
point in the  Union, and for every purpose, whetller local or 
general. 
But  it  is impossible lo exhilit any thing like a just view 
of  the beneficial  operations of  the banlr, without  adverting 
to the great reduction it has eflected, and the steaclinesa it has 
superinduced, in the rate of  the colnnlercial exchanges of the 
country,  Though this branch of  the business  of  the bank 
has been  the  subject  of  more  complaint,perhaps, than any 
other, the committee have no hesitation in saying, it has been 
productive of  the n~ost  signal benefits to the community, and 
deserves the highest  commendation.  It has been  already 
stated that  it has saved the community from  the  immense 
losses resulting from a high and fluctuating  state of  the ex- 
changes.  It now  remains to  show its  eflect in equalizing 
the currency.  In this  respect  it has been productive of  re- 
sults more salutary than were  anticipated by the  most  san- 
guine advocates of the policy of  establishing the bank.  It has 
actually furnished  n cir.czclating naediwm  more unifor.)~~ 
than specie.  This proposition is  susceptible of  the clearest 
den~onstration. If the whole  circulating  medium were spe- 
cie, a  planter  of  Louisiana,  who  should  desire to purchase 
merchandise in Philadelphia, would be obliged to pay one per 
cent. either  for a  bill of  exchange on this la1 ter  place, or for 
the transportation and insurance of  his specie.  His specie at 
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New Orleans, where he lie had no preseilt use for 11, would 
be worth one per cent. less to lii~ll  than it would be in Phila- 
delphia, where he had  a  demand for it.  But, by the aid of 
the Bank  of the United States, one half  of  the expense of 
transportiilg specie is now saved to him.  The  bank, for one 
half of  one per cent. will give him a  draft upon the mother 
bank at Philadelphia, with whicli he can draw either the bills 
of  that bank, or specie, at his   lea sure.  In like manner, the 
bank and its branches will give  clrafts from any point of  the 
Union to  any other where  ofices  exist,  at n  per  centage 
greatly less than it would cost to transport specie, and in many 
instances at par.  IS  the merchant or planter, llowever, does 
not  choose to  purchase a  draft  from the  bank-,  but  prefers 
transmitting the  bills of  the ofice  where  he resides to any 
distant point, for  cominercial purposes, although  tllese  bills 
are not strictly redeemable at  the point to  whicli  tliey  are 
transmitted, yet, as they are receivable in payment of all dues 
to the government, persons  will be  generally found willillg 
to take them at par ; and if  they should  not, the bank will 
receive  them  frequently at par,  and always at a  discount 
lr~~leli  less than would pay the expense of  trarisportilig specie. 
The  fact that the bills of  the bank and  its branches  are in- 
discriminately  receivable  at  the  custoin  houses  and  land 
offices, in pay~neiit  of  duties, and for the public la~~ds,  has a11 
effect in giving uniformity to tlic  value ol' these Lills, which 
merits a more full sncl distinct explanation. 
For all the purposes of  tlie revenue, it gives lo tlie national 
currency  that  perfect  uniforrriity,  that  ideal  perfeclioli, to 
which a currency of  gold and silver, in so extensive a coun- 
try, could have no pretensions.  A bill iseued at Missouri is 
of  equal value with  specie at Goston, in payment of  duties ; 
and the sanle  is  true  of  all  other places,  however  distant., 
where the bank issues  bills, and the government collects its 
revenue.  When it is,  moreover, considered, that  the bank 
performs with  the  mosl scrupulous punctuality, the st.iplila 
tion to  transfer  the  funds of  the qoverulne~it  to  ally point 
they may be  wanted, free of  expense, it  must be ap- 
parent that tlie  colninittee are  correct, to the very  letter,  in 
stating that the banlc has furnished, both to the government 
and to the people, a  cz~~-re~lcy  of  ahsohctely uniform value 
i~z  all ylaccs, for  all  tl~e  pzcrposes  of  paying  the pzcblic 
'contributions, crnd  disbfcrsing the ylcblic revenue.  And, 
when it is recollected, that the governnlent annually collects 
and  disburses inore  than  twenty-three   nill lions  of  dollars, 
those who are  at all  familiar mitli  the  subject will at once 
perceive, that bills, which are of  absolut,ely uniform value for 
this  vast operation,  ]nust be vcry nearly so  for all the pur- 
poses of  general commerce. 
Upon the whole, then, it inay be confidently asserted, that 
130 country in tlle world has a  circulating medium of  greater 
uniforlnity than  the United  States ; and that no country of 
any thing like the same geographical extent, has a currency 
at. all comparable to that of  the United States on the score of 
uniformity.  The  committee have  seen the statement of  an 
intelligent  traveller,  who  has  visited almost every  part  of 
Europe, exhibiting  the great  variations  of  the currency in 
different parts of  the snlne cmpire or kingdom,  In Russia, 
the bills of  the bank of  St. Petersburgh I~ave  a very limited 
circulation.  At Riga, and throughout Courlnnd, Livournia, 
and all the sout,llern parts of  the empire, the currency is ex- 
clusively of  silver coins.  Jn Denmark, the notes of the Bank 
of  Copenhagen are current only in Zealand, the other islands, 
and Jutland, but will not pass at all in Sleswic and Holstein, 
which constitute  the best  portion  of  the  kingdom.  Since 
the congress of  Vienna, Germany is  divided into thil-ty-nine 
separate states, each  having a  distinct currency, though  re- 
presented in the Diet at Frankfort.  Out of  the territory in 
which these several currencies are issued, they are mere arti- 
cles of  mercllnndise;  which circumstance  l~as  given rise in 
every  lown  to a numerous and distinct class of  tradesmen, 
called money changers.  How far  these seprate and uncon- 
nected cllrrencies have  a  tendency to  etnbarrass columerce, may be inferred from the fact, t.1la.t  a traveller going from St, 
Petersburgh to Calais will lose, upon the unavoidable changes 
of  money, an average of  six per cent.  In France, the bills 
of  tke bank are of  such large denominations as to be adapted 
only to the greater operations of  commerce, and are  princi- 
pally confined to the bankers and extensive traders in Paris. 
The general currency is  silver; and to avoid  the  trouble  of 
carrying this to distant  parts of  the kingdom, gold pieces,  01- 
bills  of  exchange, which  are preferable, are  purchased  at a 
premium of  fronz one and a half  to four per cent.  After this 
brief  review of  the currencies of  Europe, the committee will 
barely state, as a conclasive vindication of  our currency from 
the imputation of  unsoundness, that there is no point in the 
Union, at which a bill of  the United  States Bank, issued at 
the opposite extremity of the country, is at a discount of more 
than one fourth of  one per cent. 
In confirmati011 of  the views here presented, as to the coin- 
parative uniformity of  the currency furnished  by tlie  bank., 
and, also, as to the obligation of the bank to redeem its bills 
indiscriminately at all the offices, the committee will  present 
a few brief extracts from  the speech  of  a  statesman, whose 
opinions have every title to authority on tliese important sub- 
jects.  Mr. Lowncles, in discussing the question how far the 
bank had performed the great duty for which it was created, 
used the following decided language in 1819,  when the cur- 
rency had not reached  the point  of  uniformity  it.  has now 
attained, by one half of one per cent. 
"The great object  of  the government  in  chartering the 
bank, was to provide a currency  which should have that de- 
gree of  stability and uniformity in its value, which is required 
by the interests both of our commerce and revenue.  A cur- 
rency, equally valuable at every place and every time, cannot 
be provided by human wisdom.  The nearest  approach to 
this object has been generally supposed to be afforded  by the 
einploynlent of  gold  and  silver, as the  measures  of  value. 
The 14t h  congress  did  not  aim  at  ideal  perfection ; they 
to conlbine wit11 the con\renic~~ces  of  Lank circulation 
a uniformity of  value equal to that which was possessed by 
the precious metals ; and the means which they employed to 
secure this  uniformity were  simple and effectual, by enjhn- 
ing, under a heavy penalty,  the payment of  a11  its notes  in 
coin, upon demand.  In the report, indeed,  the notes of  the 
national bank are sa,id to be norv  '  on the same footing with 
those  of  local banlrs.'  Of  tlie footing  on which  local bank 
notes stood, he should speak hereaft.er ; hut the price current 
upon his table  informed him,  that  the greatest discount on 
branch notes on the lJnitec1 States, mas tliree  fourths of  one 
per cent.  This was a  valuc ri~uch  marc iiniforn~  than that 
which coin couldbe expected to have in so estcnsive a country. 
He had been lately looking into n boolc on political economy, 
which had been published Iiere, with  high, and, in respect to 
its  clearness  and precision, wit11  j~ist  com~l~endatio~ls-tl~e 
work of Mr. Tmcy. 
" He inferred froin one of  his chapters, that the difference of 
exchange between Marseilles  an0 Paris was often  from two 
to three per cent.  If, with all the facilities afforded by the in- 
ternal improvements in which  Fmnce is so rich, with a cur- 
rency consisting almost  exclusively  of  gold  and silver, the 
variation in thevalue of  nloncy is tlircc times greater in her 
territory  than on our  continent, can  it  bc  said, that in this 
respect, the bank has not fulfilled the ob.jects of  its institution? 
Before its establishment,  the value of bank notes, even in the 
commercial states,  had  varied  twenty per  cent. fiom each 
other ; and, as none of  tliein bore  n  fixed proportion to the 
precious metals, or to any natural standard, it was impossible 
to assign any limit to t,heir del~reciation.  You 11nve required 
that the currency furnished by  the national hank should be 
every where convertible into silver,  aud it is SO.  YOU  have 
expected that it  sho~xld  be as uaiform as coin, and it is   no re 
so.  He would not detain tlie committee by reading a paper, 
which  he  had  prepared with that intention, containing the 
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Englalid, France, m~d  Holland, for he found himself occupy- 
ing much more of their time than he had expected.  But he 
believed that any melaber, who should  turn his attention to 
the sub.ject, \vould  rclnarli  its  steadiness during that period. 
He thought himself justified  in drawing from this fact a con- 
clusiol~  highly favorable to the bank." 
In reference to the great depreciation  of  the paper of  the 
local  banks,  previous  to  the establishment  of  that  of  the 
United States, he said : 
(:  Did the interests or clnty of the governlnellt of the United 
States permit  that this currelxcy  should  be received by  it? 
Some dissatisfaction was cxpressecl because the branch notes 
of tlle United States l3a1lli were at a discount of  three fourths 
of one per cent.  He read fro111  a price c~irreat  the state of the 
msrliet for bank notes, by which it appeared that notes, which 
were insisted to be in very good credit, varied from a discount 
of two and a half,  to one of  seven, fifteen, twenty-five,  and 
even thirty per  cenl,.  Was our revenue  to  be  received  in 
these notes ?  I-Iow were they to be employed ?  They might 
be expended in the district in which they were issued.  Rut 
was the expenditure of  every district to  be exactly limited to 
its revenue ?  What became of the Union if  it were so ?  Ha 
spoke of  the  thing, and riot  the name.  Our Union  might 
dissolve in icr~becility,  as well  as be  destroyed  by  violence. 
Dicl  not  union  imply,  that  the  resources  of  one state, its 
money as well as its men,  night be employed for the defense 
of  another ? 
(( But, if tlle goven~ment.  were willing to bear the loss of  a 
depreciated and unequal currency, it must neglect the plainest 
principle of  the const.it,ution  in doing so-equality  of  taxation. 
The  colnlnittee inu~t  '  well  remember, t,hat, before the esta- 
blishlnent of  the national bank, such was the unequal value 
of currency  in the diflerent  states, that  the merchants paid 
duties varying fifteen per cent from  each other, on t.he same 
articles.' " 
On the question whether the ba~~k  was bound  to redeem, 
indiscriminately, the bills of  all its branches, he said : 
(( He should not argue that the bank was not bound to pay 
its notes, indiscriminately, at all its offices.  He  believed that 
nobody now contended that it was."  %  X  *  "It 
was  no unfair  account of  the practical operation of  the sys- 
tern of  which he was  speaking, to  say, that il gave to  the 
branches  wllerc  the  exchange  was  unfavorable,  the entire 
disposilion of  the specie of  those  branclles  where  the  ex- 
* 
change was  favorable.  Upwards  of  six  ~nillioris  of  specie 
have  been  sent  to the  branch  of  New York, besides  the 
amount whidl has been paid by the subscribers ol the bank 
there ; bur, in issuing notes  whic11 the bank of  New York 
has been  obliged  to  redeem,  every  branch throughout  the 
country has  drawn upon a  fund, with whose condition, at 
the tirue, he could not be acquainted."  "  "  *  "  Such 
a system might be expected to produce inconvenient changes 
ill the distribution of  bank capital, an extreme facility of ob- 
taining loans at one time, and unexpected contractions of dis- 
countatanother."  "  "  *  "  Whenever the state of 
exchange  is  unfavorable,  whenever  the just  principles  of 
banking  require  a  reduction  of  discounts, then, under this 
system of  indiscriminate payment of  its notes, the bank has 
nothing to fear from a dmlt  of  specie, and is encouraged to 
lend to every applicant.  Wherever the exchange is favorable, 
and on the sound principles of  banking, an enlarged accom- 
modation might be given to the community-there  the flow 
of  notes  from  every state whose  exchange is  unfavorable, 
contracts or suspends all the operations of  the bank.  Thus, 
wherever discounts should  be enlarged, the tendency of  this 
system is to reduce them, and to enlarge them wherever they 
should be reduced." 
Independently of  the gross injustice of  requiring the bank 
to perform all  the exchanges  of  this  extensive confederacy 
without  any compensation,  these  enlightened  views  show 
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the digerent sectiot~s  of  the Union.  It would inevitably ren- 
der those parts of  the Union where the bank issues were pru- 
dent  and moderate, tributary to those where the issues were 
injudicious and excessive.  Tn  this way, the  very inequality 
in  the currency,  which  the bank  was designed to  correct, 
would be perpetuated by the vain atletnpt to make it perform 
impossibilities.  The power  of  annihilating space, of  trans- 
porting money or any other article to the most distant points, 
without the loss of time or the application of  labor, belongs to 
no human institution. 
But the  salutary agency of  the Bank of  the United States, 
in furnishing-ahsound  and uniform currel~cy,  is not confined 
to that portion'tyf  the curiency which coiisists of its own bills. 
One of  the lr~ost  i~nporta~~t  purposes which the banlc was de- 
signed to accomplish, and which, it is confidently believed, no 
other huinan  agency could  have effected, under our  federa- 
tive  system of  government, was  the enforcement  of  specie 
payments  on  the part  of  nuxneroas  local banks,  deriving 
their charters from the several states, and whose paper, irre- 
deemable in specie, and illimitable in its quantity, constituted 
the almost  entire currency of  the country.  Amidst a com- 
bination of  the greatest difficulties, the bank has allnost com-  - 
pletely succeeded in the performance of this arduous, delicate, 
and painful duty.  With exceptions,  too  inconsiderable  to 
merit notice, all the etitte banks iu the Unioil have resumed 
specie payments.  Their bills, in the respective spheres of their 
circulation, are of  equal value  with  gold and silver ; while, 
for all the operations of  commerce, beyond that sphere,  the 
bills  or  checlrs  of  the Bank  of  the United States are even 
more valuable than  specie.  And even  in  the very few in- 
sta~~ces  in  which  the paper  of  state  banks is  depreciated, 
those banlts are winding up  their  concerns ; and it may be 
safely said, that no citizeu of the Ul~ioll  is under the neces- 
sity  of taking depreciated  paper,  because a sound  currency 
cannot be  obtained.  North  Carolinri is  believed  to be  tlie 
only state whe~e  papel. of  the [ocal bitulrs  is  irredeernable in 
specie,  and consequently depreciated.  Even there, tlie de- 
preciation is only one or two per cent., and what is more im- 
portant, the paper of  the Bank of  the United States can be 
obtained by a11  those who  desire it, and have an equivalent 
to give for it.  The  committee are aware, that the opinion is 
entertained  by some, that  the local  banks  would, at some 
time  or  other, either  voluntarily or  by the coercion  of  the 
state legislatures, have  resumed  specie  payments.  In the 
very nature of  things this would seein to be an in~possibility. 
It must be remembered that no banks ever made such large 
dividends  as were realized by the  local  institutions, during 
the suspension of  specie  payments.  A  rich  and  abundant 
harvest of  profit was  opened to them, which the resumption 
of  specie payments must inevitably blast.  While permitted 
to give their own notes, bearing no interest, and not redeem- 
able in specie, in exchange for better notes bearing interest, it 
is obvious, that. the more paper they issued, the higher would 
be their profits.  The  most powerful motive that can operate 
upon moneyed corporations would have existed, to prevent the 
state banks from putting an end  to the very state of  things, 
from  which  their  excessive  profits  proceeded.  Their very 
nature must have been changed, therefore, before they could. 
have been induced  to co-operate, voluntarily, in the restora- 
tion of  the currency.  It is quite as improbable that the state 
legislatures wouId have compelled the banks to do their duty. 
It has already been stated that the tendency of  a depreciated 
currency to attract importations to the points  of  greatest de- 
preciation, and to lighten the relative burdens of  federal tax- 
ation, would naturally produce, among the states, a rivalry in 
the business of  excessive bank issues.  But there remains to 
be  stated  a cause,  of  more  general operation, which would 
have prevented  the interposition  of  the state legislatures to 
correct those issues. 
The banks  were, directly  and indirectly, the creditors of 
the whole  community,  and  the resumption  of  specie pay 
mentq neceesnrilv invoIved n general tullailliient ot'disconnt~, 
21 and withdra~val  of credit, ~vllich  ~voold  produce a general anti 
distressing pressi~re  upon the entire class of  debtors.  These 
constituted  the largest  portion of  the  populntio11 of  all  the 
states where  specie  payments  were  su~pended,  .~nd  banlr 
issues  excessive.  Those,  therefore, wl~o  controlled  public 
opinion in the states where  the depreciation  of  the local pa- 
per was greatest, were  interested in  the perpetuation  of  the 
evil.  Deep and deleterious, therefore, as the disease evidently 
was  in  many  of  tlle  states,  their  legislatures  could  not 
have  been  expected  to  apply  a  ren~edy,  so painful as the 
coinpulsion of  specie payments would have been, without the 
aid of  the Bank of  tlie United States.  And  here  it is wor- 
thy of  special remark, that, while  that bank  has co~npelled 
the local banks to resume specie payments, it has most mate- 
rially contributed, by its direct aid and liberal arrangements, 
1.0  enable thein to do so, and that with the  least possible em- 
barrassment to themselves, and distress to the community.  If 
the state legislatures had been ever so anxious to compel the 
banks to resume specie payments, and the banlrs ever so wil- 
ling to  make the effort, the committee  are decidedly of  tlie 
opinion  that  they could  not  have done it, unaided  by  the 
bank  of  the  United  States,  without producing a degree of 
distress incomparably greater  than has been actually expe- 
rienced.  They w~ll  conclude their reinarks on this branch of 
the subject by tlie  obvious  reflection, that if  congress, at tllc 
close of  the war, had left  it  to the states to restore the disor- 
rlered currency, this important f~inctioii  of  sovereignty would 
have been left witli those from whom the constitution has ex- 
lxessly taken it, and by  whom it  could not be beneficially or 
effectually exercised.  But another idea, of  considerable plau- 
sibility, is not without  its  advocates.  It  is said that this go- 
vernment, by malting  the resumption  and continuance  of 
specie payinelits the condition upon whicll  the state banlrs 
should receive the government deposits, might have  restored 
the  currency to a state of  uniformity.  Without  stopping to 
qive their reasons for believinc that specie pavments could not 
beell restored in this: way, and tliat, even if  they could: 
a  currency of  general credit, throughout the Union, 
would not have been provided, the committee will proceed to 
give their reasons for thiiilring that such a connection betweell 
the federal government and the state banks ~vould  be exceecl- 
ingly dangerous to  the  purity  of  both.  Whlle  there  is  n 
national banlr, bound by its charter to  perform  certain stipu- 
lated  duties, and entitled  to receive the governnlent deposits 
as a compensation  fixed by  the law creating the charter, and 
only to be forfeited by the failure to perform those duties, therc 
is nothing in the connection  at all  inconsistent  with the iu- 
dependence of  the bank, and the purity of  the government. 
The  country has a deep interest that  the bank should main- 
tain specie payments, and the govrrnnient an atlditional i11- 
terest that it shobld keep the public funds safely, and transfer 
them, free of  expense, wherever they niay be  wanted.  The 
government, therefore, has  IIO power over the bank, but the 
salutary power of  enforcing a con~pliar~ce  witli  llie terms ol' 
its charter.  Every thing is  fixed by  the law,  and nothing 
left to  arbitrary discretion.  It is  true,  that the secretary of 
the treasury, with  the sanction  of  congress, wou~ld  have thc 
power to prevent the bank from using its power unjustly and 
oppressively, and to punish  any attempt,  on the part of  the 
directors, to bring the pecuniary  influence  of  the institutioi~ 
to bear upon the politics of  the country, by withdrawing the 
governinent  deposits  froin the  offending branches.  But this 
power would not  be  lightly exercised  by the treasury, as its 
exercise would necessarily be subject to  be  reviewed  by con- 
gress.  It is, in  its nature, a salutary corrective, creating no 
undue dependence on the part of  the banlr. 
But the state of  things would be widely difrerent,  if  thsrc 
was no national bank, and it was left to the discretion of the 
secretary of  the treasury, to select the local banlrs  in  which 
the  government  deposits  should be  made.  All  the  state 
banlrs would, in that case be competitors for the favors of the 
Rre.asurv : ancl  no onr. who \vill  tlr~lv  considrr tl~c.  nnture 01' this sort of patronage, can  fail LO perceive, that, in the hanils 
of an ambitious man, not  possessed of perfect purity and un- 
bending integrity, it  would be  imminently dangerous to the 
public liberty.  The  state banks would enter the lists of  po- 
litical controversy,  with  a  view  to  obtain  this  patronage ; 
and  very little sagacity is required  to  foresee,  that, if  there 
should ever happen to  be an administration  disposed  to use 
its patronage to perpetuate its power, the public funds would 
be put in jeopardy  by being deposited in banks unworthy of' 
confidence, and the most extensive corruption brought to bear 
up011 the elections throughout the Union.  A state of  things 
more adverse to the government-n  power  more  liable to bc 
abused-can  scarcely be  imagined.  If  five millions of  dol- 
lars were annually placed in the hands of  the secretary of  tllc 
treasury, to be distributed  at liis  discretion, for the purposes 
of  internal  improvement, it  would  not  invest him with  n 
more dangerous and corrupting power. 
In connection with this branch of  the subject, the commit- 
tee  will  briefly examine  the grounds  of  complaint,  some- 
times  made against the Bank of  the United  States.  It is 
alledged  that  this banlr, avails itself  of  the  government de- 
posits, consisting  in  some  places  principally of  local paper, 
makes  heavy and oppressive  drafts on  the local banks for 
specie, and thus compels  them  to  curtail  their discounts, to 
the great injury of  the community.  Jn the first place it is to 
be remarked, that one  of  the highest duties of  the bank-- 
the great object for which it was establ~shed-was  to prevent 
r he  excessive  issues  of  local paper ; and this duty can only 
be  performed, by  enforcing  upon the  state  banks the  pay- 
ment of  specie for any excess in  their issues.  But the com- 
n~iuee  are indiiced to believe, that this complaint is prin~~ipally 
owing, so far as it now exists, to the fact, that the operations 
of  tl~e  federal treasury are illistalcen for the operations of  the 
hank, because the bank is the agent by  whom those  opera- 
t ions are performed.  l'llis institution  receives  the  go17ern- 
;writ drposit.; in tlic l~nper  of  the local l~anl\s,  certainlv in no 
spirit of  hostility to those banks.  On the contrary, it tends 
to give them credit, and is designed to have that ef't'ect.  But 
the  Bank of  the United  States is not only bound to pay in 
specie, or its own bills, what it receives for the government, in 
local paper, but to transfer the funds to any  part of the Union, 
where they may be required for  disbursement.  Let it be as- 
sumed, that the government collects annually, at the custom 
house  in Charleston, one million  of  dollars  in  local  bank 
notes, and disburses  in  South  Carolina  only  one  hundred 
thousand,  it would  result  from  this,  that  the government 
lvould  have  nine  hundred  thousand  dollars  of  local bank 
paper deposited in the  Charleston branch, which  the bank 
would be  bound by its charter, and for the national  benefit, 
to transfer perhaps to  Washington or  Norfolk.  As this pa- 
per would not answer the purpose of the government at those 
places, the bank  would  be,  of  course, compelled  to provide 
specie, or bills that will command specie at those places.  It  is 
obvious, then, that  it  is  the inequality in the collection ancl 
disbursement of  the revenue, that produces the evil in ques- 
tion.  If  all the revenue collected  in Charleston  were  dis- 
bursed in the state, no drafts  would  be made  upnn the local 
banks for specie.  The  Bank  of  the  United  States, so far 
from being justly obnoxioud to any complaint  on  this score, 
has greatly mitigated the action of  the treasury upon the lo- 
cal  banks, by means of  the liberal  arrangements  which its 
large capital and numerous branches have enabled it to make 
with them.  The degree  in  which that  institution  has re- 
duced the rate of  exchange, may be  fairly assunled  as that 
in which it has mitigated the action of  the treasury upon the 
state banks.  If, for example, there existed no national bank, 
and the deposits of  the revenue collected in Charleston were 
made in one of  tl~e  local banks, what would be  the effect of 
transferring,  annually,  nine  hundred  thousand  dollars to 
Washington  and  Norfolk?  The local  banks,  having  no 
branches  at  either of  those  places, instead  of  transmitting 
drafts. as is now generally done, would be compelled to trans- init specie.  The bank  in which  the  government  depos~ts 
were made, would consequently be under the necessity of de- 
manding specie from all the other banks, in a manner, and to 
an extent, much more oppressive than any tiling that can be 
imputed to the Bank of the United States.  If, to avoid ~hcse 
specie drafts, the local banks should purchase bills on Wash- 
ington  or  Norfolk, they would  probably cost  five or six per 
cent. even  in a  tolerable state of  the currency, which would 
be a  loss to the banks almost to the full  extent of  the pre- 
mium. 
Although the expediency of  renewing  the  charter of  tlie 
present bank  is  not  a  question  now  submitted  for the de- 
cision of  congress, the committee  consider it  so far  involved 
in the matter  referred to  them, as to render it  their duty to 
present some considerations bearing on that question, in ad- 
dition to what  they have  said on  the general expediency of 
maintaining such  an institution.  If  a national bank, simi- 
lar  to the presnt,  be  a  necessary and propek agent for  the 
accomplishinent of  the great  purposes  heretofore  indicated, 
the only remaining questicn would  seem to be, whether the 
charter of  the present stoclrholders should  be renewed, or n 
new set of  stockholders incorporated. 
In considering  this  question, congress  will  of  course be 
governed, in sorne degree, by  the terms on which the present 
stocltholders will agree to accept  a  renewal  of  their charter. 
But, as the committee  have satisfactory reasons for believing 
that terms eminently adpantageous to  tlie government call 
be obtained, they will proceed to some other inquiries.  What 
then would  be  the effect  of  refusing  to  renew  the present 
charter ?  And, in the first place,  what are the inducements 
for pursuing that course ? 
It is  somet.imes alledged that the present stockholders arc 
large capitalists, and,  as  the  stock of the bank is some  twenty per 
cent. above par, that a renewal of  the charter would be equi- 
valent to agrant to them of twenty per cent. upon their capital. 
Tt is true. that a  small proportion  of the capital of  thc colr: 
,x~ll~  llelongs  to  very wealthy men.  Sornetliiug more tha~r 
ttvo ln~llions  of  that  owned in the United States belongs to 
persolls  llolding  llpwards of  one  hundred  tl~ousal~d  d01:ars 
each.  It is also true that foreigners own seven millions, or one- 
fifthof  the capital.  But, 011  the other hit~d,  it is to be remarked 
 hat  the government, in  trust for  the people  of  the United 
States,  holds seven millions ; and that persons  owning less 
tllal~  five thousand dollars  each, hold four millions six hun- 
dred and eighty-two thousand;  and that persons owning be- 
tiireen  five and ten thousand  dollars  each,  hold upwards of 
three millions.  It is alsoworthy of  remark, that a very con- 
siderable  portioil of  the stoclc-very  nearly six millions---is 
Ileld by trustees and guardians, for the usc of  females and or- 
phan  children, and  charitable  and  other  institutions.  Of 
r11e  twenty-eight millions of  the stock:  which is owned by in- 
dividuals, only three  millions four  hundred  and fifty-threc 
thousand  is now  held by  the original  subscribers.  All the 
rest has been purchased at the market prices-a  large portion 
of  it probably when those  prices  were  higher than  at pre- 
sent.  Most of  the investments made by wills, and deeds, ancl 
decrees in  equity for the use  of  females and minors, are be- 
lieved to have been made when the stock  was greatly above 
13ar.  From  this  brief  analysis,  it will appear  that there is 
nothing  in thc  character  or  situation  of  the stockholders, 
which should make it desirable to deprive them of the advan- 
tage which they have fairly gained, hy an application of their 
capital to  purposes highly beneficial, as the colnmittee  have 
attempted  to  show to  the  government  and people  of  the 
United States.  If foreigners own seven millions of  the stock 
of  the bank, our own government owns as much ;  if wealthy 
Inen own more than two millions, men  in moderate circum- 
stances own between seven and eight millions ; and widowe, 
orphans, and institutions devoted to charitable and other pur- 
poses, own nearly six millions. 
But the objection that the stock is owned by men of  lnrgc 
'.itpita1 woi~lit  applv with  eclual. if  not  qreater forcc.  to an! bank that could be organized.  In the very nature of tliiugs, 
men who have large surplus capitals are the principal subscri- 
bers  at the first  organization  of  a  bank.  Farmers and 
planters, merchants and manufacturers, having an  active em- 
ployment for  their  capitals, do  not choose to  be the first ad- 
venturers in a bank project.  Accordingly, when the present 
bank went into operation, it is believed that most of  the capi- 
tal was owned  by large capitalists, and under a  much  morc 
unequal  distribution  than  exists  at  present.  The large 
amount of  stock now held  in trust  for females and minors, 
has  been  principally,  if  not  entirely, purchased  since  the 
bank went into operation ; and the same remark is generally 
applicable to that stock  in tlie hands of  small holders.  It is 
only when the character of  a  bank is  fully established, and 
when  its stock assumes  a  steady value,  that  these  descrip- 
tions of  persons make investments in it. 
It is morally certain, therefore, that, if  another distinct in- 
stitution were created, on the expiration of  the present char- 
ter, there would be a much greater  portion of  its capital sub- 
scribed by men of  large fortunes, than is now owned by pel-- 
sons of  this  description, of  the  stock of  the  United  States 
Bank.  Indeed, it  might  be  confidently predicted, that  the 
large capitalists  who  now  hold  stock in  that bank, would, 
from their local position, and other advantages, be the first to 
forestall the subscriptions  to the new  bank, while the small 
stockholders scattered  over  the  country, wduld  be probably 
excluded, and the females and minors, and others  interested 
in trust  investments made  by decrees in equity,  ~vould  be 
almost necessarily excluded, as the sanction of  a court could 
scarcely be obtained, alter the  passage of  the new act of  in- 
corporation, in time to authorize a subscription. 
To  destroy the existing bank, therefore, after it has rendered 
such signal services to the country, merely  with a view to in- 
corporate  another, would  be  an act  rather  of  cruelty and 
caprice, than of  justice and wisdom, as it regard3 the present 
~tnckholrler~.  It ic: no light matter to depreciat,e the property 
of  individuals, honestly obtained,  and usefiilly employed, to 
the extent  of  five  millions  six hiundretl  thousand  dollars, 
arld  the  property of  the  g-overiimel~t,  to  the extent of  one 
million four l~undred  thousand dollars, purely  for the sake of 
change.  It would indicate a fondness for experiment, which 
a wise government  will  not indulge  up011  slight considera- 
tions. 
But the great injury which would result fiom the refusal of 
congress to renew the charter of  the present bank, would, be- 
yond all cluestion, bc that which would result to the commu- 
nity at large.  It would be dillicult to  eslinrate the extent of 
the distress  wlricli  \vould  naturally  and riecessarily result 
from the sudden  withclrawal  of  more than forty millions of 
cxedit, which the co~ii~i~ruiity  now enjoy from 111e  bauk.  But 
this would  not  be  lflc  full  extent  of  Lhe  ol)erntion,  The 
Bank of tl~e  United States, in winding up its co~~cerns,  would 
no1 only withdraw its own paper frotn circulation, iuid call in 
its debts, but woulcl uliavoidnl~ly  nlalce such heavy drafts on 
the local inslitutio~~s  for specie, as very greatly to curtail their 
discounts.  The  pressure  upon  the active, industrious, and 
enterprising classes, who depend  most  upon  the facilities of 
bank credit, would be  tremendous.  A vast amowit of  pro- 
perty would  change hands at half its value, passing  under 
the hammer, from tliemerchants, nianufacturers, and fanners, 
to the large mo~ieycd  capitalists, ~110  always stand ready to 
avail themselves  of  the peciuiiary  embarrassinents of  the 
community.  The largest, stocliholders of  the present  bank, 
the very persoils whose present lawful gains it would be  the 
object of  some to cut on; liaving a large surplus rnoliey capi- 
tal thrown upon  their  hands, would be the first to speculate 
upon the distresses of  the comn~unity,  and build up princely 
fortunes upon the ruins of the industrious and active classes. 
On the other hand, the females and minors, and persons in 
moderate circu~nstances,  who  hold stock  in  the institution, 
would sustain an injury, in 110  degree mitigated by the gene- 
ral distress of  thc co~rirnunily. 
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A very grave  and  soleinn question  will  be  presented  to 
congress, when they come to dccide upon  the expediency oi 
renewing the charter of  the present bank.  That institution 
has succeeded in carrying the country through the  painful 
process necessary to  cure a  deep  seated  disease in  the na- 
tio~~al  currency.  The nation,  after  having  suffered the 
almost convulsive  agonies of  this necessary remedy,  is now 
restored to perfect health.  In  this  state of  things  it will be 
for congress to decide, whether it is the part of  wisdom to ex- 
pose the country to a degree of  suffering almost equal to that 
wllicll  it  has  already suffered, for the purpose  of  bringing 
back that very derangcment of  the currency which has been 
remedied by a process as necessary as it was distressing. 
If the Bank of  the United  States were destroyed, and the 
local institutions left without its restraining influence, the cur- 
rency would almost certainly relapse into a state of  unsound- 
ness.  Thc  very pressure  which  the present bank, in wind- 
ing up its concerns, would  make upon the local  institutions, 
would compel thern either to curtail their discounts when most 
needed, or to suspend  specie  payments.  It is not difficult to 
predict which of  these  alternatives they would adopt, under 
the circumstances in which they would be placed.  The  im- 
perious wants of  a  suffering community would  call for  dis- 
counts, in language which  could not be disregarded.  The 
public  necessities would  demand, and public  opinion would 
sanction, the suspei~sion,  or at least a~t  evasion, of specie pay- 
nlents. 
But, even if  this desperate resort could be avoided in a pe- 
riod of  peace and  general  prosperitjr, neither  reason nor ex- 
periellce will permit us to  doubt, that a  state of  war would 
speedily bring about all the evils which so fatally affected the 
credit of  tlie government, arid the national currency, during 
the late war with Great Britain.  We  should be agairl d~iven 
to the same miserable  round  of  financial expedient, which, 
in liltle niore than two years, brought  a wealthy community 
ali~~ost  to the very  brink of' a declared national  bankruptcy, 
and placed  tlie governmeill  colnplet el y a( the ~nercy  of specn- 
lating stockjobbers. 
The  conlinittee  feel warranted, by tlre past  experience  of 
the country, in expressing it as tllcir deliberate  opinion, that, 
in  a  period  of  war, the financial  resources of  the country 
could not be drawn into efficieilt operation without tlle aid of 
a national bank, and  the local banks would certainly re- 
sort to a suspension of specie payments.  The  maxim is emi- 
nently true in modern times, that inoney is the sinew of  mi- 
litary power.  In this  view  of  the subject, it does appear to 
the committee, that no one of  the institutions of  the country, 
not excepting the army or  navy, is of  rnore vital i~nporlance 
&an a  national bank.  It lias  this  decided  advantage over, 
the  army and navy, while  they are of  scarcely any value 
except in war, the bank is not less useful than either of them 
in war, and is also eminently useful in peace.  It has another 
advantage still greater.  If,  like the army or  navy, it should 
cost  the nation   nill lions annually to sustain  it, the expedi- 
ency of  the expenditure  might  be  doubted.  But, when it 
actually saves to  the government  and to  the country, as the 
wmmittee have heretofore attempted  to sllom, Inore  nill lions 
annually, than  arc expended  in supporling both  the-  army 
and navy, it  would  seem  that, if  there was one measure of 
national policy,  upon which  all  the political parties of  the 
country should be brougllt to unite, by the in~pressive  lessons 
of  experience, it is that of  maintaining a national bank. 
It is due  to the persons who for  the last ten  years  have 
been  concerned in  the adnlinistration of  the bank, to state, 
that they have performed the delicate and dificult trust com- 
mitted to them, in such a inmner as at the same time to ac- 
colnplish the great national ends for which it was established, 
and promote the permanent interest of  the stockholders, with 
the least  practicable  pressure upon  the local banks.  As far 
as the committee are enabled to form an  opinion from careful 
inquiry, the bank has been liberal and indulgent in its deal- 
illgs with these ins~itutions,  and, with scarcely an exception, now stands in the most nmicablc re la tin^^  to tliem.  Someof 
those institutions have borne tl~e  111ost disinterested ancl une- 
quivocal testiinoiiy in favor of  lllc bank. 
It is but strict justice also to  relnarlc, that tlie  direction of 
the mother banlc appears to have abstained, with scrupulo~ls 
care, from bringing the power  and influence of  the bank to 
bear upon political questions, and to have selected, for the di- 
rection of  the various branches, business men, in no way con- 
nected  with  pnrty politics.  The committee  advert  to this 
part of  the condact of  the directors, not only wit11  a  view to 
its  coinmendation, but  for  the purpose  of  expressing  their 
strong and decided convictioil that the usef~ilness  and stability 
of  such an institution will  materirllly depend upon a steady 
and undeviating a~11ierel:ce to tlie  policy of  ertclucling part.y 
politics  and political  partizans  fro111  all  pnrlicipation in  its 
management.  It is gratifying to coiiclride tllis branch of the 
subject by stating, that the affairs of  the present bank-,  under 
the able, efficient, and faithf~il  guidance of  its two last presi- 
dents and their associates, have been brought from a state of 
great einbarrassment into a condition of the highest prosperi- 
ty.  Having succeeded  in restoring the paper  of  the  local 
banks to a sound state, its rcsources are now such as to justi- 
fy the directors in extending the iss~~e  and circulation  of  its 
paper so as to satisfy the wants of  the community, both as it 
~egards  bank  accolnmodations  and  a  circulating  medium. 
Upon tlie soundest principles of  ballking, the vcry ample re- 
sources of  the institution would justify the directors in grant- 
ing  accominodations  to  a  much greater  extent  than  they 
have yet done ; and tliougli they have increased the circula- 
tion of  their paper froni four and a  half  to fourteen millions, 
since January, 1823, they are ready and willing to increase it 
still further, by discoantirlg bills of  euchangc, and c~ther  busi- 
ness paper.  Jt is believed that the discounts ancl iss~~es  of the 
institution  are now actually liinitecl by the  want of  applica- 
tions resting upon these, lhe only substantial and safe fbunda- 
tions of  bank- credit and circr~li~tioii. 
111.  Haring said tl~n.: nlucl~  on the con~tit.utionalit  y and 
expediency of  an iiicorpol.ated i~alioi~al  Ijank, tile only ques- 
tion which reimaitls to be examined by tl~e  colnmittee is  the 
expediency of  establishing a  national hanlr, founded upon 
the credit of  the government and its reveriuc~." 
It is presunied to have been the intention of  the president, 
in  suggesting the inquiry as to a  bank  founded  upon  the 
credit ancl rcvenlies  of  the government, to be understood as 
having allusion to a bank  of  discount aiid deposit.  Such a 
bank, it is talcen for granted, wor~lil  have b~.;tnches  established 
in  various parts of  the Uriion, siniilnr  to  those  now  esta- 
blished  by the Bank of  tile United  States, and co-extensive 
wit11 then).  The  grcat ol~jcct,  of  fi~niiul~ing  a  national cur- 
rellcy could not  be accoml~lislied,  will1  a11 approach to  uni- 
formity, without the agcncy of  such l~ranchcs  ; ant1 itnother 
object, second only in  imporlance to the one just  s(atec1, the 
extension of  the coinnleicial  f~icilities  of  bank:  accorn~noda- 
tions  to the different pnrts of  the Union, could not be at all 
affected without such agency.  If  here shoulcl be  sirrlply a 
great  ceiitral  banlc  established  at the seat of  government, 
without branches  to connect its  operations wit11 the various 
points  of  the commerce of  the  IJnion, tile  proinise to  pay 
specie  for  its  notes, wllenever  presented,  would  be  almost 
purely  nominal.  Of  wliat  consecpence  would  it  be  to  a 
merchant  or planter  of  Louisiana,  or  a  manufacturer or 
farmer of  Maine, that he coulcl obtain specie for bills of  the 
national bank, on presentiug  tlleni  nt tlie  city of  Washing- 
ton-a  place wllolly unconnecl.ed  eitl~er  with  Louisiana or 
Maine by  any sort  of  coininercial  intercourse,  and where, 
consequently,  these  bills  woultl  never  come in the regular 
course  of  trade?  A pronlise to pay  specie at a place so re- 
mote fiom tl~e  place of circixlation, and where the bills would 
never come but at. a great expense, and for the sole purpose of 
being presented for payment, \rrould neither give credit to the 
notes, nor operate ac an effective clirclr up011  excessive issues. 
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the place of  issue, I\ ould not be because tliey were redeema- 
ble at the pleakure of  the holder--for  such would not  be the 
fact ; but principally because of  the ultiniate responsibility of 
the governn~ent,  and of  their being receivable in payment of 
all  dues to the treasury.  They would rest, therefore, upon 
almost precisely the same basis of  credit  as the paper money 
of  our revolution, the assignats of  revolutionary France, and 
the treasury notes of  the late war.  These were receivable in 
discharge of  debts due to the treasury, and government was 
of course ulti~nately  responsible for their  payment ; yet  the 
two  former  depreciated  almost  to  nothing, and the latter, 
though bearing interest, sunk to twenty per cent. below par. 
But  the  notes  of  a  central  govern~iient bank,  without 
branches, woulcl be subject to depreciation from a cause which 
constitutes  a  conclusive  objection  to  such  an institution. 
The?-e  z~jozeld  be nothing to limit excessive issues but the 
cliscl-etio~a  and pl-zcde~lce  of  the government or of  the di- 
rection.  Human wisdom  has never  devised  any adequate 
security against the excessive issues, and, consequently,  the 
depreciation  of  bank  paper,  but  its  actual,  and  easy, and 
prompt  convertibility  into  specie,  at the  pleasure  of  the 
holder.  Experience has shown, that where the paper of  a 
bank  is  by any means habitually circulated at places remote 
from the point where it is issued, and not connected  with it 
by  a regular conllnercinl intercourse, there will not exist that 
easy and prompt  convertibjlity which  is so essential  to  the 
credit of  bnnlc paper.  When l~nnlc  bills are confined to their 
appropriate  sphere  of  circulation, n redundant issue  is  cer- 
tainly and immediately  followed by a run upon the bank for 
specie.  This  tioiely adnionition is as useful to the bank  as 
it is to tl~e  coinmunity : for it enables the directors to avoid, 
with unfailing certainty, an excess equally injurious to  both, 
and  which no  huinaii sagacity could  anticipate or  prevent 
by calculation merely.  Whatever, tl,leiefore, in  a system  of 
bank  circulation,  1~re1~ei?t,s  the  reflux  of  redundant  issues, 
necessarily destroys the only adequate security against theee 
injurious and ruinous excesses. 
But a government bank, without branches, would  be ob- 
noxious to another objection which could not be obviated.  Its 
loans would  be confined to  the District of  Columbia ; or, if 
extended to the various parts  of  the Union-to  say nothing 
of the inconvenience to which it would expose those at a dis- 
tance, who obtained accommodations-they  would  be  una- 
voidably  granted  without  any knowledge  of  tl~e  circum- 
stances of  the  persons upon  whose  credit  the government 
would  depend  for  repayment.  It would in hct be,  for  all 
useful purposes, a mere district bank. 
These views of  the subject have brought the comniittee to 
the conclusion, that, if  a  government bank should be  esta- 
blished, it would have at least as many branches as the Bank 
of the United States, and  probably a much  greater number. 
Few administrations would have the firmness to resist an ap- 
plication to establish a  branch, coming from  any quarter of 
the Union, however injudicious the  location might be, upon 
correct principles of  commerce and banking. 
The  Bank of the Uniled States now employs five hundred 
agents, in the various parts  of  the Union  where  its  offices 
are established.  From this fact some idea may be formed of 
the very  great addition which would be made to  the patron- 
age  of  the  executive  governulent  by the establishment  of 
such a bank as the one under consideration. 
But the patronage resulting from  the appoirit~nent-the 
annual appointn~er~t-of those  agents,  great  as it  would 
doubtless be, would be insignificant and harmless when com- 
pared with that which would  result from the dispensation of 
bank accommodations to the standing amount of at least fifty 
millions of  dollars !  The mind almost instinctively shrinks 
from the contemplation of  an idea  so ominous to the purity 
of  the government and the liberties of  the people.  No go- 
vernment,  of  which  the  committec have  any knowledge, 
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with a patronage at once so prodigious in its influence and scr 
dangerous in its character.  In the most desperate financial 
extremities,  110  otlier  E:uropean  government  has ever ven- 
tured upon an experiirlent so perilous.  If  the whole patron- 
age  of  the  English  monarchy  were  concentraled  in  the 
hands of  the  American  executive, it  lnay be  well  doubted 
whether the public liberty would be so much endangered by 
it  as it would  by this vast pecuniary inachine, which would 
place  in  the  hands of  every administration fifty millions of 
dollars, as a fund for rewarding political partizans. 
Without assuming  that r~  corrupt use  would  be made of 
this new species of  government patronage, a  very slight ac- 
quaintance with the praclice of  all political parties, whatever 
may be  their professions, will  be  suficient to  satisfy any re- 
flecting inincl,  that all  the cvil  consequences of  corruption 
would  flow  from  its  exercise.  Have nol ollr  political con- 
tests  too  freclrlently degenerated into  a  selfish scramble  for 
the offices of  llie counlry '!  Are there not those who sincerely 
and  honestly  believe  that  these  offices  are  legitimate  ob- 
jects of politi~tl  warfare, and the rightful reward of  the victo- 
rious party ?  And disintel.ested and patriotic  as the great 
body of  every political party is  adrnitted to be, thc fact is no 
less true than it is lainentable, that the most devoted and ac- 
tive  partizans are very  often mere  soldiers of  fortune, who 
watch the  political signs, and  enlist, at the eleventh  hour, 
under the banners of  the party most lilcely to prove  success- 
ful.  Such  being, more or less, the colnposition of all political 
parties, what would be the probable use rnade of  fifty millions 
of  bank patronage, by a  political pa~ty  who coascientiously 
held the doclrine that all the ofices in thc gift ool'  the execu- 
tive  should bc divided a~nong  the partiza~~s  of  a snccessful 
political leader ?  Would not the same principle be even more 
applicable to bank loztns ?  And wonld not the treasury of the 
United States, under the sanctifying influence of  party delu- 
sion  and  party infat~~ation,  be  literally plundered by merce- 
nary  retainers,  bankrupts  in  fortunes, and adventiirera  in 
politics ? 
Even if  the  admir~istration  should be  ever  so  much dis- 
posed to restrain the abuse of  this patronage, it would be ut- 
terly impracticable to  exercise any efficient control  over the 
great number of  bank  directors who would be scattered over 
the Union, and who, upon  all  the  known  principles of  hu- 
man nature, it  may be  confidently predicted, would  princi- 
pally consist of  busy and officious political partizans. 
Such would  be  the depositaries-acting,  not  under the 
public  eye,  but  under  the protecting  mystery of  a sort of 
concealment  and secrecy deemed indispensable  in  banking 
operations-to  whom,  not  only  the whole  treasury of  the 
Union would be  confided, to  be squandered, perhaps, in pro- 
fligate  favoritism, but the  tremendous power of  putting the 
whole property of the nation under mortgage, for the redemp- 
tion of  the  bills issued at their discretion.  To  say nothing 
of  the utter  insecurity of  the  public revenues under such a 
system, a new species of  legislative power, unknown to  the 
constitution, would be cornmitied  to these irresponsible bank 
directors, of  which no hunian sagacity can predict the conse- 
quences. 
A just analysis of  the operation  of  granting loans by this 
government bank, in exchange for notes of  private individu- 
als, will show, that it involves the exercise, on the part of  the 
directors of  the twofold power of  appropriating the public re- 
venue  in  the  most  dangerous of  all  forms-discretionary 
loans-and  of pledging the responsibility of  the government 
to  an unlimited extent, for  the payment of  the debts at the 
same time created against it.  These are among the highest 
functions of  legislative power, and have been expressly and 
exclusively vested in congress.  Unless, therefore, it be as- 
sumed, that congress may rightfully transfer the powers with 
which it is invested to these bank directors, it will be difficult 
to find any warrant, either in the letter or spirit of  the consti- 
tution, for the  creation of  this  tremendous  engine of  pecu- 
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niary influence.  11 nlay, iudeed, be doubted, whether all the 
branches of  the legislative authority united have any consti- 
tutional power to lend the public  revenue, either  to individu- 
als, corporations, or states, without  reference to the objects to 
which it shall be applied.  But whatever  may be the power 
of  congress on this subject, it appears  to the com~nittee  to be 
inexpedient,  in  every view  of  the cluestion, that the govern- 
ment should be converted into a great money lender.  There 
is no species of  trade in which it would  be wise  for  the go- 
vernment to embark ; but of all the variety of pursuits known 
to human enterprise, that of  lending  money by the govern- 
ment to the citizens  of  the country mould  be  fraught will1 
the most pernicious consequences. 
In  the first place, it is a business to wliidi, in tlie very na- 
lure of  things, no government is adapted, and, least of  all, n 
popular  government.  There is  no employment of  capital 
that  requires  a more vigilant  and  skillful superintendence. 
Nothing but the active motive of  individual interest can sup- 
ply the watchfulness necessary to  secure a banking  institu- 
tion against the  grossest  frauds and impositions.  In pecu- 
niary transactions, few men  are to be found  who will  serve 
others, in cases involving the exercise of  discretionary powers, 
with the same fidelity that they would serve themselves; and, 
when we consider the strong nzotives, both of  private friend- 
ship and political attachment, which would operate 011  the di- 
rectors of  a government bank, to bestow  its  favors without 
iinparliality or prudence, it requires but litlle sagacity to fore- 
see that enormous losses woulcl be annually sustained by the 
insolvency of the governnlent clebtors. 
All governments have fo~~ncl  it expedient to place the pub- 
lic treasury under  the gunrrliaasliip of  a high and conficlen- 
tial officer, aided, in the enforceinerlt of a rigid responsibility, 
by a system of  checks and counterchecks, operating upon all 
the subordinate officers concerned in collecting and disbursing 
the public revenue.  Such is our own syste~u.  No discretion 
is vested in the chief oflicer ol  tlle treasury, mucli less in those 
that are suborcliuate, in  tile  appi.opriatiotl of  a single dollar 
of  the public money.  '(No  woney can  be  drawn from the 
treasury but in consequence of  appropriations made by law." 
How far these wise and provident safeguards, and this consti- 
tutional barrier, would be prostrated, by placing riot only the 
public revenue,  but the public credit, at the disposal of  some 
hundreds of  bank directors in  various parts of  the Union, is 
a very grave question for the consideration of the house. 
Our own experience has demonstrated the great danger of 
having large  masses  of  the communily indebted to  the go- 
vernment.  It was  a deep conviction of  this danger that in- 
duced congress to  abolish  the  system of  credit sales in  the 
disposition of  public lands.  Congress has been compelled to 
yield  to the pressing importunities of  the purchasers of  these 
lands; by granting them  not only repeated indulgencies, but 
by the  remitting  some  millions  of  the debt.  What then, 
would be the situation of  the government, with a debt of fifty 
millions diffused throughout  the country, and due to it from 
tlie most  active,  enterprising, and influential classes of  the 
community?  Nothing that has happened can be more cer- 
tain  than that every unf~vorable  vicissitude  in trade, every 
period of  colrirnercial distress and embarrassment, would give 
rise to importunate and ~lamorous  calls for  indulgence, and 
for an  inj~ldicious  extension of  discounts, which no adminis- 
tration woulcl  have  the firmness to resist.  Every one who 
has witnesscd the urgency  and unani~nity  with  which  the 
represento,tives of  the states indebted  for public lands, have 
pressed the claims of  their citizens for indulgence and remis- 
sion, must  be  satisfied, that if  the citizens  of  all  the states 
should become  indebted much more  largely for bank loans, 
the government  would  have  scarcely any faculty  of  resist- 
ance, when  appeals  for  indulgence  should  come  from  all 
qunrters of  the Union, sustained by the strong plea of  public 
distress and embarrassment. 
The  policy of extending indulgelice to  the public debtors, 
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in the natilral course of  things, become the fdvorite of  those 
who aspired to popular favor.  Political parties would come to 
he divided upon the question of  observing towards the public 
debtors  a  strict  banlring  policy, indispensable  to the main- 
tenance of  specie payments on the one hand, or a liberal go- 
verninerlt policy, necessarily involving a suspension of  specie 
payments on the other.  And when it is considered that the 
whole class of  debtors, always the most numerous and active 
portion of  the community, would be naturally in favor of in- 
creasing bank issues, and extendir~g  bank indulgences, it can 
scarcely be doubted that specie payments would be suspended 
in the first great pecuniary exigency, growing out of  the eni- 
barrassments in our commerce, or deficiencies in our revenue. 
The  governmei~t  t.he~.efore,  ~rrliicl~  is under the most sacred 
obligations to consti.ain all die banks lo maintain specie pay- 
ments, with a view to  the  ~tniforinity  and soundness of  the 
currency, wo~lld,  by its own example, perpetuate the great na- 
tional  evil  of  a  fluct~~ntii~g  and tlepreciated cil.culating me- 
dium. 
These evils which would  be so highly probable in time of 
peace, would  be almost certain  in  the  event of  war.  Tile 
temptation to supply the federal treasury, by the easy process 
of  bank issues, lather than resort to the unpopular process of 
internal taxation, would be too fascinating to be resisted.  We 
should thus experience, what every nation has experienced in 
like circumstsnces, the manifold evils of  a mere  paper  cur- 
rency, having no relation to any standard of' intrinsic value. 
In these  views  the  corninittee are  fully  sustained  by  the 
opinion of  Mr. Lowndes, espressed in 1819.  These are his 
words : ('  That the destruction of  the (United States)  Bank 
would be followed by the establishment of  paper  money, he 
firmly believed ; he might almost say he knew."  It was an 
extremity from which  the house  n~ould  recoil, if  now pro- 
posed;  but  if  the  resolutions  on the  table  were  passed,  it 
would very soon be proposed.  'l'hf: subject was too large for 
an  incidental discussion.  Gentlemen thougllt the amount of 
governnient paper might  be  limited,, and depreciation  pre- 
vented, by the rate of interest which should be exacted.  In- 
adequate every where, the security was particularly ineffectual 
in the United States. 
But the inevitable tendency of  a governinent bank  to  in- 
volve the country in a paper system, is  not, in the opinion of 
the committee,  the greatest  ol3jection to  it.  The powerful, 
and in the hands of  a bad administration, the irresistible and 
corrupting influence which it would exercise over the elections 
of the country, constitutes  an objection more imposing than 
.dl others united.  No matter by what ineans an administra- 
tion might get into power with  s~ich  a tremendous engine it1 
their hands, it would be  almost i~npossible  to displace then1 
without some iniraculous dispensation of  Providence. 
Deeply inlpressed with the conviction, that the weak point 
of  a free government is the absorbing tendency of  executive 
patronage,  and  sincerely believing that  the proposed  bank 
would invest that branch of  the government with  a weight 
of  moneyed influence,  more dangerous in its  character and 
more powerful in its operation than the entire mass of its pre- 
sent patronage, the committee  have  felt that they were  iin- 
periously called upon by the highest considerations of  public 
-duty, to express the views they have presented,  with a frank- 
ness and freedom  demanded by the occasion.  It is  at the 
same time due to their own  feelings, that they should state, 
unequivocally,  their fconviction, that the suggestion of  the 
chief magistrate, which they have thus freely examined, pro- 
ceeded from motives of  the most disinterested patriotism, and 
was exclusively designed to promote the welfare of  the coun- 
try.  This is not the mere formal and heartless homage some- 
times offered up to official  station either from  courtesy or  in- 
terest, but a  tribute which  is  eminently due, and cheerfully 
rendered, to the exalted  character of  the distinguished  indi- 
vidual on whoin it is bestowed. A 
STATISTICAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW 
OT  THE 
MONEYED INSTlTUTIONS  OF  NEW  YORK, 
UNITED STATES : 
Showing the amount of  each share, and the  product of each institution,  from the 1st of 
January, 1830, to the 1st of January, 1831.  Compiled from oficial aources, private 
correspondence, and peraonal investigation. NEW  YORK. 
NEW  YORK CITY. 
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America,  - 
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Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.,  - 
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New York,  -  - 
Phenix,  - 
North River, 
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10  Chemical,  '- 
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Dry Dock,  - 
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There are sixteen bank8 in this city, whoae aggregate capital is  -  -  18,130,000 
And these have made &vidends for  1,033,200 
Of these, the  Hudson and  Delaware makes no dividend, inconsequence of appropriating their means to the great work of 
completing the canal between the  two rivers, which promises a great advantape to the city.  The Greenwich has just 
now commenced ;  ao that the dividend haa accrued u  on a capital of $17,930,080-making  an  interest on  the dollar  of 
5.7875 cents :  as the paper discounted will average dda  s' notes, and 6 per cent. discount deducted, there must have 
been discounted during the year paper to the amount o?  -  -  -  103,769,952 
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Jan.  31 
Jan.  29 
Jan.  31 
Jan.  31 
June  0 
June  3 
May  3 
May  4 
Jan.  39 
Jan.  4 
Jan.  3 
Jan.  3t 
May  3 
May  36 
Jan.  2 
July  31  175,000 
July  21  100,000 
July  31  140,000 
July  31  143,500 
Dec.  0 
Dec.  3  84,000 
Nov.  3  75,000 
Nov.  4  76,000 
July  3t  35,000 
July  4  40,000 
July  36  31,200 
July  0  17,500 
Nov.  3  60,000 
Nov.  39  42,000 
July  0  14,000 
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DELAWARE AND HUDSON CANAL COMPANY 
THERE  is probably no  improvement of  equal magnitude 
and utility in  this country, in  relation to  which so little is 
known by the community in general, and perhaps, it maybe 
added, the stockholders themselves, as the canal and railroad 
of  the Delaware  and Hudson  Canal Company.  This im- 
provement,  extending  from  one of  the finest  rivers  in the 
country, one hundred and twenty-four miles into the interior, 
and terminating in one of  the best coal  fields in Pennsylva- 
nia, was in operation from the middle of  April to the 16th  of 
December last, when  the canal closed : in  that time  forty- 
three thousand two  hundred tons of  coal were, through this 
new avenue, added to the usual supply of the New York and 
eastern market.  Yet many of  the consumers of  the article 
are ignorant of  the locality of  the work, and comparatively 
few are correctly  informed of  its  real character, the leading 
and primary object  of  its construction, or  the consequences 
likely to flow from it, either in relation to the public generapy, 
or the stockholders in particular. 
The  Delaware and Hudson canal commences  at Kings- 
ton, on the Hudson river, ninety miles above New ITork,  and 
extends, in a  southwest direction, through Ulster,  Sullivan, 
and Orange counties,  in that state, following  the valleys of 
the Rondout, Neversink, and Delaware, to  the mouth of  the 
Lackawaxen river, in Pike county, Pennsylvania, thence up 
that river to the junction  of the Dyberry and west branch of 
the Lackawaxen, at Honesdale, in Wayne county, Pennsyl- 
vania'.  The  work has been constructed in every part in the 
best manner ; the locks and culverts on the first sixty miles 
are built  of  stone, laid in the best  hydraulic cement mortar, 
a1.d  the acqueductu  are either entirely  of stone and cement, 
or wooden trunks, supported by stone piers and abutments of 
the best masonry.  On the uppper forty-eight miles of canal, 
the locks  are similar in every  respect, except  that the walls 
are  of  dry masonry, with wooden  chambers to make them 
water tight, which can be repaired and renewed without dis- 
turbing the stone work of  the lock, and at a  season of  the 
year when the canal is closed by the frost.  The  canal is one 
hundred and eight miles in length, fed by the waters of  the 
Rondout, Neversink, Mongaup, Delaware, and Lackawaxen 
rivers, all large and permanent streams, affording an abun- 
dant supply of  water at all times.  The  locks are on an  im- 
proved plan, and will pass a boat, including the filling of the 
lock, in less than four minutes.  The  canal is thirty-six feet 
wide at the surface, and four feet deep.. The  locks are seventy- 
six feet long between the gates, nine feet wide, and from eight 
to eleven feet lift. 
A  railroad of  sixteen iniles connects  the company's coal 
mines  at Carbondale with the canal.  This road in its cha- 
racter  is  new  in this country, having  five  inclined  planes, 
worked by stationary steam engines, either of which will pass 
seven and a  half  tons of  coal half a  mile in eight minutes, 
and return the empty wagons. 
This improvement in  its whole length, has been critically 
examined  by experienced  and competent  judges, and with 
all its appendages, of  aqueducts,  culverts, waste weirs, slope 
walls and feeders, has  been  pronounced  not  inferior to any 
in the country.  The  railroad and canal were both in opera 
tion from the middle of  April to  the 15th of  December last, 
and during that time nothing occurred on either of  them to 
interrupt  the regular course  of  business  for  more  than six 
days altogether. 
During the month  of  November,  heavy rains raised  the 
Laclrawaxen and Delaware rivers,  and other  streams  with 
which the company's works are connected, much beyond any 
swell that had taken  place for many years.  The flood was inoreover sudden as well as great.  Kilt along the u~hole  line 
of  the improvement, the damage done by this extraordinary 
and sudden freshet did  not exceed fifteen dollars.  No better 
evidence co~1ld  be asked or given of  the stability of  the work. 
These improvements have been made under charters from 
the states of  Pennsylvania and New Yorlr, which are as libe- 
ral and comprehensive in their provisions as could be desired. 
No restriction or limitation is iinposed upon dividends, except 
as regards  the railway,  wl~erc  the tolls are required  to be so 
regulated  as not to yield inore than twelve  per  cent. on the 
capital expencled  in constriicti11g it.  The company is  per- 
initted to hold five thousancl acres of  coal land, and to carry 
on the coal business wirhout limitation or restriction as to the 
amount of  capital used therein. 
The  company are the proprieto1.s in fee of  between  thee 
aild four thousand acres of  coal land, selected ill  especial\,re- 
ference to its own operations and  the qliality and quantity of 
the article, and therefore  undoubtedly the most  vall~able  in 
that section of  the country.  Unless the price at which coal 
lands have been selling near the head of  the Schuylkill na- 
vigation  be  entirely  fictitious,  rlle  Delaware  and  Hudson 
Canal Company possess, in thcir coal lands alone, a property 
of  immense value.  They also ow11 the sites of tlie town of 
Bolton, at the eastern termination of  the canal.  Port Jarvis, 
at the point where the canal reaches the valley of  tlie  Dela- 
ware river, a moiety of  Honesdale, at the head or west end of 
the canal, and Carbondale, at the mines.  No il~considerable 
amount of  money will be realized  from the sales of  lots  in 
these places, especially the last two. 
The capital of  the company employed  in  it.  canal and 
coal operations is about $2,300,000, whiclt is invested as fol- 
lows, na~nely  : 
124 miles of  canal and railroad. 
3500 acres of  coal lands, town plots, and banking house. 
275 railroad wagons. 
130 canal boats, and other movable property. 
$1,500,000 of this capital is supplied by a stock subscribed 
at the original formation of  the company, which  is  all paid 
UP. 
$500,000  is a  loan  from the state  of  New  York,  at five 
per cent. and $300,000  at 4;  per cent. interest,  payable  in 
twenty years from the dates of  the loans respectively. 
The  primary and leading object in the construction of this 
work is the transportation of coal froin the Laclrawanna coal 
field  to  the Hudson river.  Aside  from  this  consideration, 
there mould not have been n  suficient induceinent for  such 
an improvement, although it  is not to be doubted, 11ut that a 
large amouiit of  miecellaneons business will be done upon it. 
The  country througli which  it passes, particularly  that part 
of  it  in Pennsylvania, is new, and susceptible of  much in- 
crease in population and business.  Its progress in improve- 
ment 11as hitherto been retarded for want of  an outlet to mar- 
ket,  which this  canal  and railway now furnisll.  A  great 
and  clecided  revolution  must  soon  take place both  in  the 
course  and amount  of  trade  throughout  the country pene- 
trated by these  improvements.  Of  the rapidity and extent 
of  this change, some notion nlay be formed by the fact, that 
the village of  Carbondale,  (the  mines,) which according to 
the late census contains a population of  upwards of  six hun- 
dred persons, was, three years ago, a solitary spot in the wil- 
derness,  marked by a  single  log  hut.  At  the same titne 
Honesdale  (the head of  the canal) was covered  by a  dense 
forest, wllich  has clisappeared, and given place to a pleasant 
and  thriving  village, enlivened  by t,he bustle and  lluin  of 
business, and but little inferior  in population to Carbondale. 
The  railroad approaches within twenty-two miles of  the Sus- 
quellanna river, with which it will  probably at a fuh~re  day 
Ile  connected, along the valley of  the Lackawanna.  The 
company 01~11  the mines, railway, and canill, and are autho- 
rized  to  carry on the coal  trade, and use  as  much capital therein as they Inay deem necessary.  Unquestionably they 
will prosecute the business to  the  full extent of  the demand 
for the article.  Their profit or  dividends will depend on the 
suln per  ton which it  will  cost thein  to  bring the article  to 
market, the price which they can obtain for it, and the quun- 
they they can sell.  The capacity of  the  railway is  equal 
to the delivery of  five hundred tons per day of twelve hoors, 
and that of  the canal to  six hundred  thousand tons per an- 
nun].  Tlre power of  the riilway may be increased with fa- 
cility, and at a small expense. 
From  the  landing  on  the  Hudson  to  New  York,  the 
transportation  coat  during  the last  season  fifty  cents per 
ton.  Bct  the  experiments  made  by  the  company  with 
the Lackawanna steam towing boat, render  it certain, that. 
the  expense  of  this  part  of  the operation  lnay be  reduced 
to  twenty-five  cents  per  ton.  Let us however assume the 
coat  of  the  article  to  the company  at $3  per  ton  at  the 
landing on  the Hudson.  Any one  who may feel  suffi- 
cient  interest  in  the matter  to  inquire of  the officers and 
agents of  the company,  will  find  that this  assumption ex- 
ceeds the real cost. 
Taking the quantity of  coal  to  be delivered  this year at 
only eighty thousand tons, and the price at the very reduced 
rate of  $5 per  ton at Kingston, the net  profit  to  the  com- 
pany will be 
$2  per ton-  or on 80,000 tons,  -  $160,000 
Receivable tolls on other bl~sinoss,  -  25,000 
$185,000 
Interest on loans,  -  38,500 
Estimated expense of  repairs (  30,000  .  68,500 
and superintendence,  \ 
Leaving for dividend  on  $1,500,000  -  $116,500 
Whic.h is equal to a dividend of  7 per  cent.  105,000 
Leaving a  s~~rplus  of  -  -  $11,500 
The  operations  of  the company  may be  extended  to 
the delivery of  one hundred and fifty thousand tons of  coal 
the  next year, without the least  dificulty, and the cost  of 
mining,  railroad  transportation,  and  freight,  may  be  re- 
duced  fifty  cents  per  ton, making the net cost of  the cod 
at Kingston,  two  dollars  and fifty cents  instead  of  three 
dollars, the present wst.  But to  assume  only one  half  of 
that saving, and  the cost  at Kingston, at two  dollars and 
seventy-five  cents, and the selling  price  four  dollars  and 
seventy-five cents, with only an increase of  twenty thousand 
tons to the quantity for the year  1832, the result will be  as 
follows : there will be a profit of 
$2 per ton, which on 100,000 tons will be  $200,000 
Receivable tolls  on other business,  30,000 
230,000 
Repairs, superintendence, and interest on loans,  68,500 
1,eaving for dividend  on $1,500,000  stock  161,500 
Equal to ten per cent.  150,000 
--- 
And a surplus of  $11,500 
The  canal terminates on  the Hudson, ninety miles above 
New  York,  and  sixty  below  the  city  of  Albany.  The 
whole  of  the  population  in  the  towns  and  counties  bor- 
dering  on  the  North  river,  may therefore  be  considered 
as  the  peculiar  and  exclusive  market  of  this  company. 
No  other  coal of  which  we have  any knowledge, can pos- 
sibly  maintain or  attempt  a  competition  with  that of  the 
Delaware  and Hudson  Canal Company, in  this  section of 
country.  This will  bc  conceded at once, by  every candid 
man : and it is equally certain, that the quantity required for 
this market, will be very considerable.  Their winters are long 
and severe.  The  forest which  once skirted  this noble river 
has almost entirely disappeared.  In the North river towns, 
wood  is  thefefore  an expensive article ; in Albany  it  costs 192  UNITED STATES. 
about the same price as in Philadelphia.  It is hauled twelve 
miles, to Kingstoll landing, for the New Yorli market.  To 
the quantity required by the Northriver market, may safely be 
added no inconsiderable aniount for the population bordering 
on the Erie and Champlain canals ; so that in fact the mar- 
ket open to this company; and secured to it exclusively by the 
termination of  the canal on the North river, will be co-exten- 
sive with  the inland navigation  of the state of  New York. 
The  article has already found its way to Utica, 
UNITED STATES. NEW YORK. 
NEW YORK CITY.  Time and rate  Am't of 
of  dividend.  Dividend. 
Other znstitutwm.  ---  I 
NEW YORK. 
New YorkLombard, for  the sole purpose of  making  advances on 
goods, 1819,  - 
New York Exchange,  -  2000  10  200,000 Jan.  3 July  3  12,000 
Nsw  York Tontine Coffee House,  commenced  1794, cost  $40,000, 
shares originally 200, original number of nominees 203, now living 
120, divides this yew,  -  1830  531  3720 
New York High School, inco~orated  1825,  -  4 per ct.  2000 
New York Gas Ligh: Co.,  capital by charter S1,000,000,  aid in, 
New  York Sugar Refining  Co., capital by charter 815!,000,  shares 
200,  aid in,  -  $15  11,250  2 
New #ark  Life  ~nsurance  and-  rust-CO., insure  lies,  grant  an-  3 
nuities, and receiw money in trust, incorporated 1830,  -  d  d 
New  York and Schuylkill Co., to  supply the city with coal,  -  5 
-7  ---  ---  7 
32,650  2,383,750  33,420 
3 
RECAPITULATION.  ? 
These companies have an aggregate capital of  -  -  $2,363,750 
And have made dividends to the amount of  -  63,420 
upon a capital of  8883,750, making an interest of  7.731 cents.  - 
7  er cent., makln 
During the year, three of these, whoae capitals amount to $1,500,000, have made none ;  so that the dividend has arisen 
BROOKLYN, opp?site tonew  York Long Island Bank ~omrnenced  1824, with a capital of $300,000 ;  divide8 this year 
21,00(1 
Its lividenda  from %e commencement to this  ear, is 49  cent.;  amounting to  1  147,UOG 
Long Island hire Insurance Company has 600Bshares, at $17 each, makiig 8102,000..  ~ividid,  1836,4 percent., t  $4,080  -.1 
,  .. 
Gi 
There are in this city twenty fire  companies, whose aggregate capital is  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -. 
Andthesehavemadedividendsfor  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  S7,800,OM, 
489,750 
Durlng the year,  two of these, whose capital amounts to  $750,000, have  made none, so that the dividend hap arisen upon a capital of 
$7,05O,O~alung  an interest of 6.805 cents.  The Washington commenced in 1814, and has made a uniform semiannual dividend of 
44 per cent -making  in all 144 per cent., amounting to  -  -  -  -  -  ------  720,000 
From 1623 to this year, induslve, the dividends of  the  Eagle is 69t Pr  cent., making $347,%Globe,  52 per cent., $520,000--Franklin, 
44;  per cent., $133,000-North  River, 64 per cent., $124,000-Makmg  in all  -  -  -  -  -  $1,224,500 













































NEW PORK CITY. 
Fire Insurance Companies. 
i'nited States,  - 
Giobe.  -i  -  - 
Eagle. chartered 1806, withliberty to increase its capital to $1,000,000 
Waahincrtfin,  - 
Franklin.  -  - 
Jefferson,  -  - 
Howard,  -  - 
Fnlton,  -  - 
iMutual,  -  - 
Merchants',  -  - 
Traders',  -  - 
Manhattan,  -  - 
Mercantile,  -  - 
Atna,  - 
Sorth  River,  - 
Firemen's,  -  - 
Equitable,  -  - 
Phaenix,  -  - 
Contribution,  - 
Farmers' Fire and Loan,  -  - 
Ant't of 





















Time and rate 
















































June  0 
June  3t 
Jan.  4 
Feb.  4b 
Jan.  4 
Apl.  St 
Jan.  0 
Jan.  3 
May  31 
May  31 
June  44 
May  0 
May  31 
Mar.  4 
Mar.  39 
Jan.  4 
May  0 
May  31 
Jan.  0 
Dec.  34 
Dec.  3t 
July  4 
Aug.  46 
July  4 
Ang.  38 
July  4 
July  31 
Nov.  31 
31July  31 
Nov.  31. 
Dec.  35 
July  31 
Nov.  36 
Sept.  4 
Se t.  31 
JU!~  4 
Nov.  0 
Nov.  31 
July  0 NEW  YORK. 
r. 
PROGRESS OF  STOCKS IN  THE CITY OF  NEW YORK. 
The author commenced his work in 1819 ;  he now presents the following expose of each subsequent year : 
BANKS IN NEW PORK CITY. 
Eaci~ 
year  .4mnt  !  Amount of  1 
Amount  of 
as it  Of  dividend  per cent.  paper 
was.  capital.  declared.  discounted.  ----  - 
MARINE TNSURANCE.  FIRE INSURANCE COS.  E 
In the previous estimates, reference is had especially to productive capital in determinin  the rate  er cent.  For example, bank  ca- 
pital productive is %17,930,000,  makin  5.7875 cents;  but in the above, the capital to t%e whole iividend declared and the rate per 




BankofAlbnny,  - 
State Bank, 
Mechanics'  and Farmers', 
Commercial, 
Canal Bank, 








There are 5 banka in this city, whose entire capital is  -  -  1,576,600 
Ind  these have made dividends for  301,248 
One bank, however, in May last, divided its surplus funds with its May dividend, making 50 per cent.-giving  this bank 
an ordinary dividend each time of  4 per cent., it will make the dividend  -  97,928 
The Canal Bank has just now commenced, so that the dividend has arisen upon a capital of  - 
Making an interest of  -  1,276,600  -  cents  7.674 
But the whole capital to the whole dividend makes an interest for  -  23.608 
B  the fore  oing rule, reserving the above extra dividend, there must have becn paper discounted to the amount of  -  9,792,801 
















May  4 
Mar.  4 
May  50 
Sept.  3* 
Sept.  4 
Nov.  4 
Mar.  36  Sept.  31 
None. NEW YORK. 
No. of  Dollars  Amount of  Tzme  and rate of  Amount of  ( Shares. /  each.  I  Capital.  I  dividend.  1  drvidend. 
Insurance.  --  --  ---- - 
Albany,  -  300,000 Mar.  4  Se t  44  25500 
Merchants'.  1  1%::1  ;PI  i5O,OOO!Jan.  4 llug 4 I  ?OOCO 
--- 
Albany Water Works Company, 
RECAPITULATIOK. 
There are in this city two Insurance Companies, whose capitals amount to  -  5.50;OOO 
And these have made dividends for  -  45,5010 
Making an interest of  8.272 cents. 
NEW-  YORK. 
TROY. 
Banks. 
Far~ners'  Bank, chartered for $350,000 paid in, 
Bank of Troy, chartered for $550,000 paid in,  - 
Merchants' and Rlechanics',  - 
- 
Insurance Company. 
?'he  Rensselaer  and  Saratoga Insurance Co., of  which  the business is 
transacted at  Troy,  - 
u 
RECAPITULATION.  2 
This beautiful and flourishing city contains three banks, whose capitals amount to  -  -  S1,01E,000  5 
And these have made dividknds for  -  -  I-  61.846  & 
The  last mentioned commenced this year, and makes no dividend, so that the dividend has arisen upon acapital of  ? 
$718,000, making an interest of  8.612 cents on the dollar.  By the foregoing rule, there must have been paper 
discounted to the amount of  6,183,996 
One insurance com  any, whose capital is  -  250,000 
Amount of dividend:  -  -  -  22,500 
The  Savinws Bank has a capital of about  -  65,000 
I: divides ?n  October 2lper cent.  -  1625 
An~ount  of 
Capital.  -- 
278,000 
440,000 
300,000  -- 
1,018,000 
250,000 
KO.  of 
Shares.  -- 
6950 
22000 
6000  -- 
34590 
10000 
IPinw and rate 
qf  dividend. 
-.--- 
June  4  Dec.  4 
March  4-i  Sept.  46 
Feb.  0  Aug.  0  I 
Jan.  44IJuly  4k 
Doll'a. 





Am'nt  of 
dividend.  - 
22,240 
39,600  --- 
61,840 
c  z 
22,500  2 Insurance Companies. 
CONNECTICUT.  8 
0 
New Haven Insurance Co.,  -  7-51  50,000 Jan.  0 July  Fi 
Ocean  do.  -  I  --  1 
501  60,OOOlJan.  3IJuly  3,600  - 
3200  110,000  9 
2 
4 
REC-4PITULATION.  5 
NEW HAVEN. 
Banks. 
New Haven Bank, 
Mechanics' Bank,  - 
- 
There are in'this city two banks, whose aggregate capital is  - 
And these have made dividends for  -  -  $  84b,OOO  $ 
27,200  u? 
The Mechanics' Bank has 180 on a share paid in, which makes the capital  400,000  0 
This  bank is largely concerned in the Farmington canal, neither of which makes a dividend this year-so  thatthe  dividend  5 
above has arisen upon a capital of  -  340.000  < 
Making an  interest of 8 cents.  By the foregoin  rule, there must have been paper discounted for  -  -  2,720,016 
There aretwo marine insurance companies in tfis city, whose capitals are  -  110,000  tq 
The one is silent, and one with a capital of  -  60,000 
Makes a dividend cf  -  3,600 
CONNECTICUT. 
No.  qf 
Shares. 
1700 
5000  -- 
6700 
There are four banks in this city, whose capital is  .  .  $ 2,859,000 
And these have made dividends to the amount of  .  159,540 
The lant mentioned bank commenced operation this  ear, and makes no dividend-so  that the dividend above has arisen 
upon a ca itd of  11,609,000, malting an ivterest of 6.114  cents on the dollar.  4  the foregoing rule, paper  has been 
&countex  for  .  .  15295,964 
2 
There are in this city three insurance companies, whose capitals amount to  F-  500,000 
Am'nt of 




27,200  --  C1 
Time and late 
of  dividend. 
Jan.  4 July  4 
Jan.  0 July  0  i 
Doll's. Amount of 
Am'nt 
















RECAPITULATION.  ? 
HARTFORD. 
Banks. 
United States Branch,  - 
Ph~nix, 
Hartford,  - 
Connecticut River,  - 
--- 
Insurance C~mpaniee. 
Hartford Fire,  -  -4  - 
Capital.  ----- 
340,000 
500,000  -- 
840,000 
Amount of 

















31090  - 
3000 
Doll's. 






Etna,  -  2000 
Protection,  -  3000  1-<& 
Time and rate 
of  dividend. 
100 
50 
Jan.  31 
March  3 
June  3 
Jan.  0 
June  0 
June  0 
June  0 
July  3h 
Sept.  3 
Dec.  3 
July  0 
Dec.  0 
Dec.  0 
Dec.  0 CONNECTICUT. 
. . 
RECAPITULATION. 
There are in this cit  two banks, with a capital of  .  .  S 247,687  $ 
And these have ma& dividends for  15,452  c 
Making an  interest of 6,338 cents on the-dollar.'  By tGe foregoing rke, p&ier  mu& hare been dicountid to thk amount of  1,545,180 
NEW LONDON. 
Banks. 
New London Bank,  . 
UnionBank,  .  - 
Marine Insurance. 





1000  - 
3363  - 
500 
NEWPORT.  1x0.  of  I  Doll's IAmount of  I  Time  and rate   amount of 
Doll's 




Bank of Rhode Island, 
Rhode Island Union ~ank, 
Newport Bank, 
MerchantaJ ~ank,' 
New England commercial ~ank, 
Time  and rate 
of dividend. 
Jan. and Jul  $4 
March and Apt.  6 





















There are five banks in thie city, with a capital of  .  .  $595,000 
And these have made dividends for  .  19,450 
One of which, whose capital is t100,000, hi  madinone, io  that ihe dividend das aris'en froi  a capkal of  $495,006, making 
an interest of 3.919  cente on the dollar.  By the foregoing rule, paper must have been discounted to the amount of  .  1,939,964 
There are no marine or fire insurance companies in thia c~ty. 













None this year. 
Jan.  21 July  3 
Jan.  3  July  3 
April  3  Oct.  3  I  Jan.  31 July  31 




5,250  -- 
595,000  19,450 RHODE  ISLAND. 
PROVIDENCE. 
Bankr. 
United States Branch,  . 
Exchange Bank,  . 
Union Bank. 
Mechanics' ~ank,  . 
Rlechanics' and Manufacturers',  . 
Bank of North America,  . 
High street Bank, 
Roger Williams1 ~ak,  '. 
Providence Bank,  . 














6000  - 
61,666  - 
RECAPITULATION. 
Insurance. 
WashinP  Marine  nsurance Company,  . 
There are eleven banks in this city, whose capitals amount to  .  .  84,324,950 
And these have made dividends for  .  276,662 
















1200  - 
BOSTON.  No. of  Dollars  Amuunt of  1Sm  and rate of  Amount of  /  Sh'ares. I  each.  /  Capital.  1  diddmd.  1  diddend. 
A~nount  of 











300,000  -- 
4,324,950 
United States  Branch, 
American, 
Massachusetts,  - 
New England,  - 
State Bank, 
Washington, 








~ocmbian,  1 
Franklin,  - 
Tremont,  - 
North Bank, 
Suffolk.  - 




Jan.  31 
Jan.  3 
Jan.  3 
Jan.  31 
Jan.  3 
Jan.  3 
Feb.  34 
March  3 
A ril  3 
day  31 
May  3 
260,000 
200,000 

































There are in this city 18 banks,  whoee aggregate capitals are  -  -  13,900,000 
And these have made dividends for  695,500 
Making an interest of  5.0036 cents. 
















































































New E'ngland,  - 
Atlantic, 1830-a  new  Company, of  which one half the capital 
has been paid in,  - 
In this city the insurance companies are  diverse;  the above are considered  marine, although all take risks either way.  The follow- 
ing are denominated as fire insurance companies:  : 




S  * 
21  --, 





fire  and Marine Imrance Companies. 
Atlas, 
Boston, 
Bo  Iston,  - 
o umbian,  c i' 




Manufacturers',  - 
Mercantile, 
Massachusetts Hospital,  - 
Suffolk;  - 
United States, 
Washing-ton, 
Merchants',  -  .- 
No.  of  Dollars  Amount of  I  Shes.  1 each.  (  capital.  1 
Time and rate of 
dieidend.  I 
4 per cent. 
10  do. 
3  do. 
10  do. 
3  do. 
6  do; 
8  do. 
3  do.  1 
None. 
f per ::oent- 
4  do. 
4  do. 
3  do. 











There are in this cit  considered as definitely marine, three companies, \vhose capitals amount to  .  .  1,150,000 
And these have ma& dividends for  .  2  49,000 
There are 15 companies  called  fire and marine insurance companies, XI-hose  capital,  ainount to  .  .  4,600,000 
And these have made dividends for  .  245.000 
Total insurance capital, 
Total insurance dividend, 
Making an interest of  .  .  5.113 cents. MASSACHUSETTS. 
SALEM. 
Banks. 
No. of  Dollars  Am't of  Time and rate  Am't.  of  I shure..  (  each.  /  capital.  /  ef dividend.  ( dividend.  --  --  - 





Asiatic.  - - 
Zw~ance  Cmnpanies. 
Salem Marine,  - 
Union Marine,  - 
Commercial, 
Oriental,  - 
Mercantile, 
200;000  April  0  - Oct.  $006 
200,000  1 *pril  0  /  Oct.  iil  5,250 
RECAPITULATION. 
200 000  June  4  Dec. 
~OO:OOO  A  ril  o  1 OC~ 
~OO,OOO  Jay  3  NO;. 
200,000  April  0  /  Oct. 
150,000  none.  -- 
850,000  t 
There are in this city six banks, whose total capital is  - 
And these have made dividends for making an interest of 4.172 cents.  By the foregoing rule, there must have been 
paper discounted for 
The Savings Bank in  this city inOctober last had a capital of about  - 
from about 1650 depositors, and their dividends are 4 per cent., amounting to  - 
There are  in  this city five insurance companies, whoae aggregate capitals are  8860,000,and  these have made dividends 
for 848,000.  Durin  the  ear, one of  these, whose capital is 9150,000, has made none, so that the dividend has ari~en 
upon a capital of t750,d  making an  interest of 6.857 cents. 
PORTLAND. 
Banks. 
Insurance Companies.  I  z 
Cuinberland Marine Insurance Co.,  I  I,OOP/  100  1  100,0001  Twelve per ct.  '/  6)UW  % 
~3  Of  this there has been paid in $50,000. 
Mutual Fire Insurance.  The stock of this company consists of cash received for premiums, which are low, and a lien on all property 
insured to assess upon in case of lossabove the amount of cash in hand..  On the 1st of October last the amount of risk was $409,005;  p 
a.mount of cash in hand, 51,470.  cj 
z 
United States Branch, 
Cumberland, 
Bank of  Portland,  . 
Casco Bank, 
Carla1 Bank, 
Merchants' Bank,  .  .  .. 
RECAPITULATION.  ?= 
There are in this city six banks, including the United State3 Branch, which has no fixed capital assigned to it.  The five 
banks have an aggregate capital of  .  .  $1,050,000 
And these have made dividends for  .  39,000 















April  0  Oct.  3 
April  3  /  Oci.  3 
April  3  Oct.  3 





150,0001 April  11  Oct.  23  6,000 There are in this city six banks, \*-hose aggregate capitals amount to  .  $775,000  And these have made dividends for  .  23,100 
The Branch Bank comes under the head df  ~hilahel~hia.  ~urin~  thi  year, ihree danks,  ;hose  c&itals  are  .  365,000  have made no dividend ;  so that the above has arisen upon a capital of  .  .  410,000  Making an interest of 5.633 cents. 
B  the foregoin  rule, there must have been  aper discounted for  ,  .  2,310,056 





United States Branch,  . 
New Hampshire Union,  . 
New Hampshire,  . 
Portsmouth, 
Rockingham, 




There are four banks, with a capital of  .  .  $1,262,925 








2000  - 
8680 
~- 
Making an interest of 6 cents. 
B  the foregoing rule, there must have been  aper discounted for  .  7,577,492 
&ere  is a Mutual Insurance Company  at gewark, the  capital of  which is made u  'from l;remiul$s  and deposits, amounting to 
$&,o0oi of which nearly $20,000 is in shares of stock of $5 each, on which a divienkis made of 4 per cent. annually. 










Trento~  Banking and Insurance Co.,  . 
State Bank at Newark,  . 
Newark Banking and Insurance Co.,  . 
State Bank at  Elizabethtown,  - 
Insurance Companies. 
Mechanics'  Fire Insurance Co.  (Newark.)  . 
thereon, amounting to $7,100. 
Doll's 







;Morris Canal and Banking Company, chartered in 1824, for 150  ears, with banking privile  es for 31 years.  Capital, $2,  00,000, half 
of which  is for banking  urposes.  This canal connect8 witK  the Lehigh canal on the klaware,  at Easton; thence through the 
flourishing  arts of  New !ersey,  connecting the iron regions of Dover to Newark.  The latter  part has been in operation since 
September Past, and the whole will be in operation next spring.  The canal appropriation is $1,000,000.  This canal passes through 
Philipsburgh, New Villa  e, Broadway, Washington, Andersontown, Hackettstown in the county of Warren, the Valley of the Mus- 
conneteong, by ~axton's%alls,  Old Andover, Stanho e, to Brooklyn in Sussex count  which IS called the summit, from thence to 
Drakesville. Suckasunny Plains, Dover, Rockaway, $owerville, Boonton, and ~ontviQe,  in the county of  Morris, which  contain 
from 40 to 60 forges and rolling mills, and from thence to Mead's Basin, Little Falls, Paterson, Bloomfield, and Newark, where  it 
discharges itself into the Passaic river.  The counties of Bergen and Essex, contiguous to the canal, contain many cotton and woolen 
factories;  and this canal will also introduceto the city of New York an immensequantity of  Lehigh coal. 
A?.  of 

















Time and rate 
of  diwidend. 
Jan.  2tlJuly  2h 
Jan.  0  July  0 
Jan.  3  IJuly  3 
Jan.  0 IJuly  0 
Jan.  3 '!July  3 























Time and rate 
qf  dividend.  -- 
6 per cent. 
April  3 
Jan.  3 
April  3 
31. 
Oct.  3 
July  3 
Oct.  3 
Sept. 31 PENNSYLVANIA. 
PHILIDELPHIA.  (No.  of  IDo1l's.l  Amount of I  Time  and rate  [Amount  of 
(shares1 each  (  capital.  I  of  dividend.  jdividend. 
RECAPITULATION: 
There are in this city thirteen banks, with an aggregate capital of  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
And  these have made dividends for  .  ....  .  .  .  . 
l'he Bank of Penn Township has $135,000  paid in, so tiat the dividend has arisen upon a capital of  . 
Making an interest of 6.497 cents.  By the foregoing rule there must have heen paper discounted for  . 
The United States Bank divides this year 7 per cent., which, added to its former dividends, is 70.10 cents from th;  comm~nceme~lt.  ~rom 
the capital deduct the  different branches mentioned  in  tliis  report,  will  leave  to  be  used  in all other places an aggregate capital of 
The  dividend on thia, at 7 per cent  is  .  .  .  .  . 
Paper discounted on this, per rule, ys  .  .  .  ... 
Stephen Girard's bank,  in  this city, is one of ereat usefulnes:,  and  deservedly  popular: but being an individual establishment, is not 
noticed in this report. 
American.  -  -  5000  100  500 000  A  1.  4  Oct.  4  40000 
Pennsylvania,  -  ~OO:OOO dar.  5  se  t. 
Pennsylvania Life and Fire, 
Franklin, (a new conlpany,)  -  -  1  1  4000  igil  500,000  200,000 IJan  Apl.  0  3 IJury  Oct.  8 /  $:::: 
PENNSYLVANIA. 
PHILADELPHIA.  No. of  Doll's.  Amount of  Time and rate  Am't of 
Shares.  each.  Capital.  of dividend.  diridend 
Marine Insurance. 
RECAPITULATION. 
North America,  -  - 
Pennsylvania,  -  - 
Delaware,  -  - 
United States,  - 
Atlantic,  -  - 
Philadelphia,  - 
Mutual,  -  - 
Union,  - 
Phoenix,  -  - 
- 
---  - 
- 
Fire Insurance. 
There are in this city nine marine insurance companies with an aggregate capital of  - 
And these have made dividends for  -  -  $3,280,000 
makine an interest of 9.3109 cents. 
305,400 
There a;  also four fire insurance companies, with an aggregate capital of  -  -  1,600,000 
And these have made dividends for  -  90,000 
One of these, being s  new company, makes no  dividend ;  so  that the dividend above has arisen upon  -  -  1,400,000 





































Jan.  3  July  3 
S/Aug.  6 
June  4 
June  6 
Jan.  10 
6 
Dec.  4 
Dec.  6 
July  6 
Dec.  5 
Jan.  5 
Jan.  0 
June  4 
July  5  30000 
July  3  9000 
Dec.  4  38400 
305,400 URYLAND. 
BALTIMORE.  I NO.  of  lDoll's )Amount ojj  Time and rate  1 Amount of 
Banks. 
shares.  each.  Capital.  of  dividend.  dividend. 
RECAPITULATION. 
United States Branch,  - 
Bank of  Maryland, 
Union Bank of  Maryland, 
Bank of  Baltimore, 
Commercial and Farmers',  . i 
Farmers' and Mechanics', 
Franklin,  . 
Marine,  . 
Mechanics'  .  j 
There are in this city ten banks, with an aggregate capital of  .  .  $6,888,691 
And these have made dividends for  .  .  362,118.96 
Being an interest of 5.256 cents. 











There are in thia city four marine insurance companies, with an aggregate capital of  .  .  $1,200,000  2 
And these have made dividends for  .  127,000  !, 
Of  these the Maryland has $150,000, paid in, dn which its di;idend;s  made; so tiat  the hividedd has arisen ;"on  a ' 












Baltimore,  . 
Neptune,  . 
American,  . 
- 
Maryland,  . 
Fire Insurance. 
Making an interest of  14.941 cents. 
One of  the firc insurance conlpanies makes no dividend;  so that the dividend of this stock is 12&  per cent.  The  Baltimore Equitable 
is a mutual company, and excessive1  uaeful : each insurer deposits a certain sum, which is returned at the expiration of the policy, 









Baltimore,  .  10,000  50  500,000  None this year. 
Firemen's,  .  21,000  20  420,000 Jan.  641July 64  52,500 
--  --  -- 
31,000  920.000  52.500 
No.  of 






















Jan.  31 Joly  31 
Mar.  2 [Sept 2 
This year 2h 
June  3  Dec.  3 
May  3 
April 28 
April  3$ 
April  3 
Nov.  3 
Oct.  21 
Oct.  38 
Oct.  3 
Am't of 















June  2k  Dec.  3 
1  Time and  rate 
of  dividend. 
Feb.  31 Aug.  5 
Feb.  12  Aug.  9  I  9  Aug.  6 
20 per cent. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
1%.  of  Dollars~  Amount of  Time  and  rate of  Amount of  I  ,Thares.  1 each.  1  Capital.  I  dioidend.  )  dividend. 
Banks. 
U~iited  States Branch,  - 
Bank  of the  Metropolis,  - 
Banlr of  Washington,  - 
Patriotic Bank,  -  -  F 
Farmers' and  Mechanics' Bank of Georgetown,  - 
Union Bank  of Georgetown, Alexandria,  - 
Bank of  Potomac,  - 
Mechanics' Bank,  - 
Bank  of Alexandria: 
Farmers' Bank  of Alexandria,  - 
20,000  25  500,000 Jan.  3  July  3  (  30,000 
?:ll:d  i  5OO,OO&May  2h1Nov.  2&  25,OW 
37:2001  10  372i000 ~a;.  2  Sept.  14;880 
2,500~  BOO/  5OO,OOO/Jan.  2  buly  %  1  20,000  ,  6,200!  50,  310,000 Mar.  2  Sept.  12,400  --  I  -  164,4301 
Insurance Con~panies.  --I 
Franklin Insurance Co.,  Washington,  -  5,000' 
Marine Insurance Co., Alexandria,  12,5001 
Fire  Insurance  Go., Alexandria,  -  5,OOOj 
--8 
1  22,500; 
RECAPITULATIOK. 
Tllere are in this district nine banks, with an aggregate capital of  - 
The United States Branch comes under the parent bank, at Philadelphia: 
The above banks have made dividends for  -  -  -  - 
Miking an  interest of 4.794 cents. 
By the foregoing rule, there must have been paper discounted for  - 
There are in this d~strict  two marine insurance companies, with a capital of  -  - 
And these have made dividends for  -  -  ---- 
Making an interest of 6.666 cents. 
One hre company, with a capital of  -  -  ----- 
And has made dividend for  ____*_-- 
Being an  interest of 3 cents. 
-- 
3,895,250 
25  125,000 May  5  xo~c'ov. 
20  250,000  5 per cent. 
25  250,000  3  do.  -- 
625,000\ 
RICHMOPTD.  1;  Ab.  of  Dollars Amo~tnt  Time  and  rate  of  Amount $ 
,Shares.  1  each.  1  Capital.  I  dividend.  I dizidend. 
Banks. 
United States Branch,  - 
Branch of  Bank  of Virginia,  - 
Branch of Farmers' Bank of Virginia,  - 
Tllere are three pernlanent hanks in this city, wlloae aggregate capital is  -  -  -  --.  .  $0 rl- -  C 
And these have made dividends for  -  -  -  -  .  -  ------ 
-,.I I,J,~O 
151,025  5  BIaking an interest of 5.99335 cents.  By the foregoing rule there must have been paper discounted to the amount of  -  -  -  l5,lM.452:  I+ 
In  this city is located the Rank of Virginia, whose capital is distributed as follosvs, viz. :  Richmond,  -  -  $1,030,000 
g  Norfolk,  -  -  460.000  fi 
.J 1  Petersbure.  -  -  ~00:000  - 
Frederi~kibur~,  -  300'000 
Lynchburg,  -  -  300,boo 
Dansville.  -  -  150.000 
-  ,~--  --  2,140,000 
? 
Deducting therefrom Richmond and Norfolk, will leave for the other branches an aggregate capital of  -  ---  m 
The dividend on this at 55  per cent.,  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  ---  -  1,250,000  p 
68,750  Paperdiscountedbytheforegoingrule,  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  6,874.972  In this city ie also located the Farmers' Bank of  Virginia, whose capital is distributed as follows, viz.: 
Richmond,  -  -  $487,500 
Norfolk,  -  487,500 
Petersburg,  -  243,750 
Fredericksburg,  -  143,750 
Dansville,  -  50,007 
Lynchburg,  -  -  !243,750 
Winchester,  -  243,750  --  2.008,ooo 
Taking therefrom Richmond and Norfolk, will leave to be used in other branches an aggregate capitol of  -  -  - 
---  -  1.025,OM)  The dividend on this at 5 per cent. will be  -  -  -  -  -  ---- 
The paper discounted by the foregoing rule,  -  -  ---.  --. 
51 50 
-  5.124:964  2  In this city there are no marine or fire companies except agencies.  9 SOUTH CAROLINA. 





United States Branch,  - 
Branch of Bank of Virginia, 
Branch Farmers' Bank of Virginia,  - 
- 
Marine  Insurance. 
One company 
u 
Union Insurance Company,  - 
Fire  and Marine,  - 
Of this company $5 per share has been paid, on which the dividend has been paid-since  which a further installment  # 
of  $1 per share has been paid.  c 
The Dismal Swamp Canal Company has 1440 shares of 5250 each--capital  -  360,000  a 
Of this stock, individuals hold  -  96,000 
ic  "  state of  Virginia,  -  64,000 
"  Ii  United States,  -  200,000  't, 
The amount expended u  to December, 1828, was  -  730,412  $?, 
The tolls received up to &e same period have been expended in theprosecution of-the work.  The tolliaverage now - 
about $2,000 per month, and are expected toincreaae considerably in a short time. 
RECAPITULATION. 
There are three banks in this cit  whose aggregate capitals are  -  1,460,000 
And these have made dividends t?r  85,300 
making an interest of  5.821 cents. 
B  the foregoing rule, there must have bee*aper  discounted for  -  -  9,240,816 





460,000  -- 
1,460,000 
400,000 
p  South Carolina Rail Road and Canal Company-6000 shares, each 8100--capital,  S600,OOO.  This company has filled up 
its stock entire, and the work is  nearly completed.  It will be of vast commercial importance. 
So. of 















United States Branch,  - 
StateBank,  - 
Bank of South Carolina,  - 
Union Bank,  - 









??me and rate of 
dividend. - 
Jan.  34  July  31 
Jan.  2a July  21 
Jan.  3  July  2& 







Xo.  of 






There are in this city five banks, whose collective capital is  -  94,975,000  dnd  these have made dividends for  -  - 
Making an interest of 6.3711 cents.  317,000 
By the forewoina rule, there must have been paper discounted for  -  -  34,341,632  There are aso  this city two insurance companies, whose capitals are  I 
And these have made dividends for  -  750,000 
making  -  50,000  2  -  6.666 cents. 
0 
Amount of 




Z  85,300 
n 
3 
6000  2 
Time  and rate of 
dieidend.  -- 
Jan.  31 July  31 
Jan.  2 I  July  2 
er cent 
Jan6'  '3  ~uli  34 
Jan.  3dl~uly  3h 
AT 





70000 SORTH CAROLIXA. 
I -Vo.  of'  IDollars~  Amount of  I  Time  and rate of  1  Amount of 
Banks.  dinidend.  /  dividend.  --- 
I  3i,000J  :  ~,~OO,OOO( 
RECAPITULATION. 
Yrate  Bank  at Raleigh-with  branches  at Newbern, Salisbury, Wil- 
mington, andTarborol,  - 
Bank of Cape Fear-located  at Wilmington, with a branch at Fayette- 
ville, and agencies at Salem and Hillsboro',  - 
Bank of  Newbern-with  agencies at Raleigh, Milton, Charlotte, and 
Halifax,  - 
United States Eranch Bank, at Fayetteville,  - 
There are in this state four banks, including the United States Branch, with an aggregate capital of  -  -  $3,700,000 
9nd these have made dividends for  -  99,000 
During the year two of these, whose capitals amount to $1,600,000, have made none; so that the dividend has arisen 
17nnn n rnnital of  -  -  2,lllO.OGO  - -  --  -- -  -- 
>faking aL-i;t&est  of 4.714 cents. 
B  the foregoing rule there must have been paper discounted to the amount of  -  -  9,E99,96i; 
TK~  Newbern and Cape Fear banks pay a tax to the state of one per cent. ont1leir capita<  ~histatc  &nk  charrers 




5000  -- 
1'11e;e  are no marine insurance companies in  this state. 
GEORGIA. 
I  1001  1,600,000 
1  800,000  I 
1001  800,000 
100  500,000  -- 
AUGUSTA. 
Banks. 
Sank of dugosta,  - 
3Icrchants' and Planters' Bank,  - 
Augusta Insurance and Banking Co.,  - 
1,400,000 
June  2  I Dec.  2  64000 
June  0  Dec.  0 
June  0  Dec.  0 
Jan.  31  1 July  34  31UU  I- 
RECAPITULATION.  c  Z  - 
There are in this city three institutions, xvhose capitals amount to  -  -  %1,100,GCb  2 
And these have made dividends for  -  60,000  =, 
The Merchants' and Planters' Bank has  aid in 5150,000.  The Augusta Insurance and Banking Company has also 
paid in 5110,000, which makes no divilend, owing to previous losses.  This institution is now doing a good buai-  x 
ness, and the stock sells at par ; so that the dividend has arisen upon a capital of  -  750,000 
>Taking an interest of  8 cents.  2 
By the foregoing rule, there must have been paper discounted for  5,999,963  3 
In addition to the above, the State Bank has a branch in this city and other principal places  in the state,  nh~ch  xvill be found under 
I he head of Savannah. GEORGIA.  LC cx 
CK 
SAVANXAH.  Time  and  ate of  Amoutlt of 
dividend.  dzvidend: 
Banks.  --- 
United States Branch,  -  no fixed. 
State Bank of Georgia,  -  15,000  1,500,000 April  34  Oct.  105,000 
Planters' Rank,  -  I  000  500,OOOune  3 ec  :'I  300 
Marine Fire Insurance Bank,  -  4,000  400,000 June  $1  Dec.  $1  9,000  -. 
-  -2 
RECAPITULATION.  3 
z 
There are in this city four banks, including the United States Branch, which has no fixed capital assigned.  The  x 
a  gre-ate  capital af  the others is  -  -  $2,600,000  2 
Anfthe~e  hhave  made dividends for  -  146,600 
Of these the Planters' Bank has paid in $560,000; the Marine has paid in$290,000 ;  and on these sums the dividend 
has been made.  So that the dividend haa arisen upon a capital of  -  ?,340,000  2 
Malting an interest of 6.265 cents. 
By the forewoing rule, there must have been paper discounted for  -  l1,661,14S  $ 
The State 8ank located here has branches in other parts of the state, all of which are included in the one amount above. 
The Marine Bank answers all the purposes of a marine and fire insurance company. 
C 
d 
i  - 
I 
.z  .  . 
LOUISIANA. 
There are in this city five banks, including the United States Branch, whose capitals amount to  -  tr  -  10,000,000 
And these have made dividends for  -  542,500  I+ 
During the year, one of these, whose capital amounts to 2,600,000, and ha3 only 1,250,000 paid in, so that the dividend  P 
has arisen upon  -  6,550,000  2 
Making an interest of  8.037 cents. 
By the foregoing rule, there must have been paper discounted for  -  54,249,968 ' 
NEW  ORLEANS. 
Banks. 
United States Branch, 
Louisiana State Bank, 
Bank of  Louisiana,  - 
Bank of  Orleans,  - 
Consolidation of  the Planters of  Loukana, 






























diddend  - 





Time and rate 
of  dividend. 
Jan.  36 
Feb.  46 
Feb.  4 
July  31 
Aug.  41 
Aug.  4 
Jan.  4  July  4 
none. NEW ORLE-4h-S. 
Insurance Companies. 
RECAPITPLATIOK. 
Louisiana State Insurance Company,  - 
Louisiana Insurance Company,  - 
3Iississippi Marine and Fire, 
Orleans Insurance Companj , 
RIerchantsl,  - 
Orleaxi Naviqation Company,  - 
l'lleie  are in  this city six insurance companies, whose capitals are  -  2:4OU,C'OO 
And these have made dividends for  -  135;OOO 
Two of  these, whose nominal capitals amount to 1,300,000, have nlade none ; and three others have but ten per cent. 
paid in, and on that the dividend has been made.  So  that the dividend has arisen upon a capital of  290,000 
Makin..  an interest of  46.551 cents. 
The wEole chartered capitals of  the productive capitals amount to  -  1,100,000 
And the dividend, if declared u  on that, would be 12.252 cents. 
The Louisiana State Insurance &ampany has made dividends for the last eighteen months to the amount of 225  per 
cent.  on the capital  paid  in which if  declared  upon the amount of  chartered  capital will be  228  per  cent.  for 
eighteen months, or 7a per cent. each time, amoulltinp for eighteen months to the sum of  -  -  90,000 
The Ponchartrain Rail Road Company is by charter 15@000.  with liberty to increase to 250.000.  Sharee 100.  The ob- 
ject not yet completed, and shares not all taken up. 
GRAND RECAPITULATION OF STOCKS 
IN  NEW YORK AND TWENTY-FOUR  OTHER CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES. 








200  1000 
1000  1000 






.  - 
I  Enti~e Alnount of 
stockcapi-  capital 
tal.  silent. 
NEW YORK CITY.  -_  - 
Banks,  16,130,000  200,000 
Marine Insurance Companies,  .  3,050;OOO  450,000 
Fire Insurance Companies,  .  750,000 




Jan.  501July  125 
none. 
Amt. capi- 
fa1  paying 
dividend.  . 
17,930,000 
2,600,OUO 
7,050,000  479,7511i  G.EO5  1 
883,750  83,420  7.731  '  I  I 
NEW LONDON. 
~mh,  .  1  247,~iI  247,581)  15,4521 6.338  1  1.545100 
' Insurance Companies,  I  100,000  100.000 
70,000 
BROOKLYN. 
Hanks,  I 
i0'7:OOO 
300>_  1  300,000 
Fire Iilsurance Companies,  .  102.000 
XI 
-2  ALBANY. 
Jan.  25 
-4pl.  25 
Jan.  0 
Jan.  10 
I  ?I000  7.  I  2:099~9/8 
4,050  4. 
301,245 23.608  9,792,801 










Blnks,  61,640 









300,000  6,183.996 
250,000 
G5,OOO 
250,000  I  65,000 GRAND RECAPI'TULATIOIS. 
Entire  dmaunt of  Amt. capi-  Amount  Rate  Whole 
stock capi-  capital  tal paying  dividend  per  ct.  amt. dis- 
tal.  silent.  dividend.  declared.  cents.  counted. 
KEWPCIRT.  ----  ---- 




I  BOSTON. 
L;aoks.  .  13,900,000 
Insurance Coolpanies.  1,150,000  250,000 
Fire and %Iarine,  .  4,600,000i  300,000 
PORTLAND. 
Banks,  .  1,050,000  1,050,000  39,000  3.7142  3,919,968 
Insurance Companies,  /  IOLIJOO~  50J00~  50,004  6,00~12.  .  1 
DISTRICT OF COLLMBIA. 
Banks,  3,895,250  1  3,895,250  186,702  4.792  18,670,184 
Marine Insurance Companies,  .  375,000  375,000  25,000  6.666 
Fire Insurartce Companies,  .  .  1.  250,000  I  250,000  7,500  3. 
RICHAIOND. 
Banks,  . 
Eranches Bank of  Virginia, 
Do.  Planters'  .  1,025,000 
NORFOLK. 
hl~k3,  .  .  . 
I::<zmnce Companies, 
GRAND RECAPITULATION. 
Canal Company,  . 
CHARLESTON. 
Bank6 
Insurance  companies,'  : 
Railroad Company, 
SdVANNAH. 




Banks,  .  . 
arme Insurance Companies,  .  3.  ire Insurance Companies, 
PHILADELPHIA. 
Banks, 
Branches of  the  U.  States Bank not mentioned in  this report, 
Marine Insurance Companies,  . 
Fire Insurance Companies, 
NEW  ORLEANS. 
Banks, 
Insurance Companies,  . 
Entire  Amozlnt of  Amt. cap&  Amount  Rate  Whole 
stock capi-  capital  tal payin  diaidend  per ct.  amount 
tal.  I  "lent.  I dividencif ldeClared.  I cents.  /  diwounted. GRAND RECAPITULATION. 
Thus the whole dividend  to the total amount of  productive capital of  every sort in the above different  cities of the Vniied 




'  99,000 
27,200 
Rate 

























1>3,  1:3Y2 
-- 
$659,309:92'7 










Morris Canal and Banking Company,  . 
Entire 
stock capi- 










2,000:000  -- 
Amount of  Amt. capital 
capital  paying 
silent.  dzv&nd.  I-- 











Capital sifent,'  . 
60,000/  3,600 
I 




Capital payine dividend,  .  3139,243,353 --- 
Amount of  ditidend,  $8,320,912 
Total amount of  paper discounted, 
60,500 
10,600 
700,OOOi  48,000 
1,262,925!  75,775 
200,000i  14,000 ELEMENTS OF EXCHANGE. 
I.-BILLS  OF EXCHANGE. 
A  BILL of  exchange is a written order for the4ayment of 
a certain suin of  lnoney at an appointed time.  It is a mer- 
cantile contract, in which four persons are mostly concerned, 
viz. 
1.-The  drawer, who receives the value, and is also called 
the nz,alcer and seller of  the bill. 
2.--His  debtor in a  distant place, upon whom  the bill  is 
drawa, and who is called the drawee.  He is also called the 
acceptor, when he accepts the bill, which is all engagement to 
pay it wlm  due. 
3.-The  person who gives value for the bill, who is called 
the buyer, taker, and remitter. 
$.-The  person  to whom it is ordered to  be paid, who 1s 
called  the prryee, and who may, by  indorsement,  pass it to 
any other person. 
Most mercantile payments are made  in bills of  exchange, 
which generally pass from hand to hand, until due, like any 
other circulating nledilim ; and the person who at any time 
has s  bill in his possession, is called the holder. 
name  When the holder of  a bill disposes of it he writes hi- 
on thc  back, which  is  called  indorsing ;  and the  payee 
should be the first indorser.  If the bill be  indorsed in favor 
of  any particular person, it  is called a special indorsement, 
and the person to whom it is thus made payable is  called the 
indorsee, wlio ~nlljt  also  indorsc the bill if  he negotiates it. 
,4ny perttori inay  indorse a bill, and  every indot.sei  (as  well 232  ELEMENTS OF  EXCHANGE. 
as the acceptor or  payee)  is  a security for  the bill, arid may 
therefore be sued for  payment. 
The  term of  a bill varies, according  to the agreement be- 
tween the  parties, or  the custom  of  countries.  Some bills 
are drawn  at sight ; others at a certain number of  days or 
months after sight or after date ; and some at usance, which 
is the customary or usual term between different pldces. 
Days  of  grace are a  certain number of  days granted to 
the acceptor after the term of  a bill is expired.  In the British 
dominions three days are allowed. 
In reckosing when a bill, payable after date, beconies due, 
the day on which it is dated is not included ; and if  it be a 
bill  payable  after sight, the day of  presentment  is not  in- 
cluded.  When the  term  is  expressed in months, calendar 
months are understood ; and when a  month  is  longer than 
the succeeding, it is a rule not to go, in tlie computation, into 
a third month.  Thus,  if a bill  be dated the 28th, 29th, 30th, 
or 31st of January, and payable one month after date, the term 
equally expires  on  the  last day of  February, to  which the 
days of  grace must, of  course, be  addecl ; and, therefore the 
bill becomes due on the 3d of  March. 
No bill of  exchange drown in Great Britain or Ireland can 
be negotiated, presented for  payment, or  in ally way admit- 
ted as good ill these countries, that is not ~vritten  on a proper 
stamp ; and any person  drawing, accepting, or payillg such 
a bill, is liable to a penalty. 
LAWS OF EXCHANGE. 
The  following laws  have  been  selected fro111 the first le- 
gal authorities, and lilrewise examined and approved by se- 
veral  experienced  merchants,  bankers,  and  notaries ; and 
though these laws apply chiefly to the Britisl~  dominions, yet 
they do  not  diKer  essentially from the regulations  of  other 
colnmercial  countries, with respect to accepting indorsing, 
paying, protesting, and recovering, bills. 
ACCIS1"I'INC;  BILLS. 
iVhen a bill is presented lor acceptauce, it is generally left 
i~ntil  the next day, and the coinnlon way of  accepting is, for 
the drawee  to write his  name at the bottom, or  across the 
body of  tlie  bill, with  the  word  accepted.  An acceptance 
however, in a slighter way, has been heretofore deemed bind- 
ing ; thus, had tlie drawee written  his name upon  any part 
of  the  bill, or  the initials of  his  name,  of  the day of  the 
month, or merely the word accepted, he  was considered lia- 
ble; but, by an act  of  parliament, passed  in 1819, it  was 
declared,  :'that  no  person  shall  bc  bound  or  charged as 
acceptor of  an inland or  foreign  bill of  exchange, otherwise 
than by an acceptance of  such bill of exchange written there- 
on, or on sonle oEe part  of  such bill, if  the same shall con- 
sist of  more than one part." 
When two or more persous are in partnership, the accept- 
rtnce of  one  binds  all  the others, if  thc bill  concerns their 
joint trade ; but  if  it  should  be made  known to the person 
who recives the bill, that it  concerris the acceptor only in a 
clistinct interest, he alone, as acceptor, can be sued. 
A clerk, or servant, may accept a bill for his master, when 
he has authority for  that purpose, or  if  he usually transacts 
business of tl~is  nature for him ; and his acceptance binds the 
master. 
But if  the bill be  drawn lioininally on the servant, direct- 
ing liim to place  it  to tlic account of  his  master, and if  the 
servant should accept it generally, withonl specifying that he 
does it for his master's accotul~t,  the acceptance binds the ser- 
vant only, and not his employer. 
Whcn a bill is drawn for the account of a third person, and 
is accepted as  such,  and he fails without making provision 
for its payment, the acceptor must discharge the bill, and can 
have no recourse against the drawer. 
A bill nlay be accepted to be paid at a longer period than is 
lnenlioned in the bill, or to ~oy  a,  part of the sum only :  such 
an acceptance  is  binding  011  him who  makes it ; but  the 
30 liolcier is rtt liberty to take it as it is offered, or to  act as if  ac- 
ceptance had been entirely refused. 
l'he acceptance may direct payment to be made at a place 
diff'crent from that mentioned in tlie bill, as at the house of  a 
ball lie^ ; in which  case,  if  the holder should neglect to  de- 
mand  payment within  a  reasonable time,  and tlle  banker 
should afterwards fail, the liolder must sustain the loss. 
When a bill lias been  once accepted, the acceptance  can- 
not be revolted, though the drawer shoulcl be found to have 
failed before the date of  the acceptance. 
IhTDORSING RILLS. 
Bills payable to bearer  are transferred by simple delivery, 
and without any indorsement ; but in order to transfer a bill 
payable to order, tlie l~older  inust express his order of paying 
to aiiotlrer person, which is always done by an indorsement. 
An i~~dorse~nent  rntiy be  blanlr  or  special.  A  bltrnlc  in- 
dorsement cor~sists  orily of  the inclorser's namc, and the bill 
then be;omes  transferable by simple delivery ; a  special in- 
dorseme?at  orders the money to he  paicl  to some pnrlicular 
person, or to his order : a blank  inclorseinent may always be 
filled up witli any person's naine, so as to rnakc it special. 
An indorsement may take plitce  at any time after the bill 
is issued, evcn after tlie day of  payment is elapsed. 
A person wlio receives a bill with a blanlr iriilorsernent may 
take it as indorsee, negotiate it agiiio, or demand payment 011 
his own account, or  he may reccive tlie  money as agent, or 
for tl~e  account of tlle indorser ; and the latter, notwithstand- 
ing his indor~einent,  iilrty still  appear as holder in an action 
against the d~awer  or acceptor. 
A special indorsc~r~ent  iieetl not contaiu the words, lo ord~~., 
and the bill is  negotiable ; it may also be  restrictive, giving 
authority to  the indorsee,  to  receive  the inoney for the  in- 
dorse~,  but riot transfer the bill agai~i  to anotl~er. 
An inclorseineiit for  pa1.t  of  the moncy only is not  ~alid, 
except witli regard to hiiri who mrtltes it ; the drawer nnd  ac- 
ceptor arc ~iot  l)oi~i~d  by it. 
When the  l~oltlcr  of  n bill dies, l~is  cxacul.ors nlny indol.se 
if,; but, by so doing, they beconle  answeraMc to theil. inclor- 
see personally, and not as exccutors. 
PAYING RILLS. 
Bills shoultl 11e  presentecl for paynlent, as well as for ac- 
ceptance, during the usual hours of  business, which are gene- 
rally considered to be fro111 nine o'clock in the lnornii~g  till 
six in the evening.  The  conlmoii  node of  payment alllong 
inerchant,~  is by a clraft on a banker for the exact amouilt of 
tlie bill, and signecl by the drawee;  bur  any paper whatever 
may be  refused, except  Bank of Eilglalld notes : alld  the 
Bank receives no other. 
PROTESTING BILLS. 
Whcn acceptailce or ptyinent has been rcfused, the holder 
of  the bill should give regular ancl iininetliate notice to all the 
parties to whom he intends to resort for payment ; and if, on 
accolmt of  unnecessary delay, a  loss should be  incurred by 
the failure  of  anjr of  the parties, the holder ~r,ust  bear  the 
loss. 
With respect  to the inanner in which notices of  non-ac- 
ceptnnce or non-payment are to be given,  a  difference exists 
between inland and foreign bills. 
For foreign bills a protest is indispensably necessary :  thus 
a  public notary is  to  appear with the bill,  and to  deinand 
either acceptance or payment;  ancl on being refused, he is to 
draw up an instrument, called a protest, expressing that ac- 
ceptance or  payment  has been  demanded ancl refused, and 
that the holder of  the bill intends to  recover  any dainages 
which he inay sustain in consequence.  This instrument is 
admitted, in foreign countries, as a legal proof  of  the fact. 
'J'he  protest 011  a  foreign bill should be made in time to be 
sent off  on the nest post clay to tlie place where it was drawn 
or  negotiat.ed ; and if it I,e  for non-ptiyn ~e~l  t,  tl~c  ltill  I~II  1s1 1~ 
sen1 wit11 the protesl. As to inland  bills, a protest is  1101 absolutely necessary to 
entitle the holder to  recover  tho amount of  the bill  froin the 
drawer or  indorsee : it is sufficient that he give notice, by let-. 
ter or  otherwise,  that  acceptance or  paymcnt  has  been  re- 
fused,  and  that  he  does  not  mean  to  give  credit  to  the 
drawee. 
According to the practice of  the London merchants, a pro- 
test is hardly ever made for non-acceptance of an inland bill ; 
it is only noted, and, if not  paid when it becomes due, it is 
then protested  for non-payment.  Notice,  however, must be 
given of  the non-acceptance and noting, otherwise the holder 
takes the risk upon himself: and if  the protest for  non-pay- 
inent shoulcl be omitted, the holder cannot, recover either da- 
mages or interest, but lnerely the amount of  the bill. 
If  the person who is to accept has absconded,or cannot be 
found at the place rncntioned in thc bill, protest is to be made 
in the same inanrler as if  acceptance had been refused. 
When an original bill is  lost, and another cannot be  had 
of  the drawer, a  protcst may be  inacle on  a. copy ; but if  a 
bill left for acceptance be lost, the person with whoin  it  was 
left must bind himself  to  payment, or else a protest may be 
rnade out immediately. 
It is customary,  as a precaution  against accident  or  ~nis- 
carriage, to draw three  copies of  a  foreign bill,  and to send 
them by different posts.  They arc denominated the cfirst, 
second, and third of  exchange ;  and  when any one of them 
is paid, the rest become void, and of  no  value. 
When the acceptor of  a bill becomes insolvent, or absconds 
before the term of  payment is expired, the holder may cause 
a notary to  demand better  security,  and, on that being re- 
fused, to protcst the bill for want of  it.  In  such cases, how- 
ever, tlie most general pmctice is  to wait the regular time till 
the bill  becomes due. 
The. damages incurred  by non-acceptance and non-pay- 
~nent,  besides  interest,  consist usually  of  the exchange, re- 
,exchange, commission, and post,age, togethtr with  the  ex- 
penses of  protest and interest.  The excllange is reclroiied 
according to the  course  at sight,  from the place where  the 
protest is  made to the place where the bill is  to  be paid by 
the drawer ; and if  it be  not paid  there, the re-exchange is 
then reckoned  from the same place  to that where the bill  is 
paid, and also double commission.  The  interest commences 
from the day when the demand was made. 
After a bill .has been protested  it is sometimes accepted by 
a third person, to save the reputation of  the drawer, or of  an 
indorser ; such an acceptance is called  an  acceptance supra 
protest.  The  acceptor then must appear in person, with wit- 
nesses, before a notary, and declare that he accepts it for the 
honor  of  such  a  person, and subscribe  the bill  thus-dc- 
cepted, sz~p-a  protest, in honor of, &c. 
The  same may happen when the person on whom a bill is 
drawn, having doubts about the drawer, protests it, but after- 
wards accepts it for the honor of  one of  the indorsers ; in this 
case the protest must be sent to the said indorser without de- 
lay. 
The  person for whose honor a  bill was accepted, must re- 
imburse the acceptor the amount of the bill, commission, and 
other charges, even though the acceptance should have taken 
place without his knowledge.  If such a person  approves of 
the acceptance, the bill may be paid without any further pro- 
test ; but if  he should return no answer, or express  his dis- 
approbation of  the acceptance, the bill must be formally pro- 
tested for non-payment against him to whom the bill was di- 
rected ; and,  on  his  persisting  to  refuse  payment, the  ac- 
ceptor may safely pay it  for  his  account, as he can recover 
the amount. 
RECOVERING BILLS. 
The  drawer,  acceptor, and  every  indorser  of  a  bill,  are 
equally liable  to the payment. of  it ; and though the holder 
can have hnt one satisfaction, yet, until  sucll sntisfac,tion is 
actually had, he may sue any of  them, or all of them, either ELEMENTS OF KSCEIANCE.  239 
;!I.  tl~e  sainc  ~iine  or  ill  s!~cccssion, nnil  oblai~i  judg~l~ent 
ngaillst them a11 till satisfaction be inadc.  l'roccedings  cannot 
be staid in ally action, but on payrnent of the debt and of the 
costs,  not only in that action, but in all the others in which 
juclgmcnt has ilot Ixen obtained ; and though the principal 
surn should be paid by one of  the parties, still costs  ]nay be 
recovereci in the several  actions against the others. 
When acceptance is  refused, and the bill  is returned  by 
protest, an  action may be commenced immediately against the 
drawer, tllougt~  the regular time of  payment  bc not arrived. 
His debt., iu such a  case, is considered as contracted the ino- 
went  tlie bill is drawn : thils, if  before the bill  is  returned, 
the drawer  sl~ould  bcco~nc  a bankrupt,  tlie debt was  con- 
tracted before tllc coinmissioi-~  of  bankruptcy toolc place. 
Nothing will  discllargc an intlorscr from his  eng2gernent 
but the absolute paymcnt of  the illoney ;  not even a judgment 
recovered against thc dmmer: or any previous indorser, or an 
execution against any of  them, unless the money he paid in 
consequence. 
'Fhc  holder  of  a  bill,  in  order  to  entitle  himself  to  re- 
cover  against  an indorser,  needs  not  show  that  he  has 
iuade a  previous  attempt  to recover  from  the drawcr, and 
this holds  good  with  regard  to  inland  as  well  as  foreign 
bills. 
If  any bill  happens to  Le  lost  within the time limited for 
paymcnt, the drawer is to  give allother of  the same tenor 
wit11  the first, ; the person, however, to  whom this new bill 
is  cleliverccl,  inust  give  sccurity to  indemnify  thc drawer 
against all persons wliatsoevcr, in case thc lost bill sllould be 
found. 
When a pcrson has indorsed a bill, and it is rc-indorsed to 
him, he cannot  main(ain nu  action  against thc pcrson  1.0 
whom he intlol.setl it. 
T-Te  that ltns ncccptcd arid clnly paid a hill, witllout having 
in  hi.!  11ai1d.:  iIIIY  cff~cls  ol rll~  clra\vor,  nlny  recover  in 
an nclior!  fo~  liloliey paicl  arid  lait1 ottt  Sol  tl~e  uec  of  the 
drawer. 
111 an action against thc acceptor of  IL  bill, it  is il general 
rulc that the drawer's  handwriting  is  ailmitted, bccausc the 
acceptor is always supposed to be  acquaintecl with the hand- 
writing of  the person whose bill he accepts.  But if the same 
bill has been indorsecl, the llandwrititig of  the iildorscr or in- 
dorsers must be proved ; in case of a blank indorsement, how- 
ever, the hantlwriti~~g  of  the first indorser is  sufficient.  'l'he 
same takes  place  in  an action  by an il~dorser  against  the 
drawer. 
Proof of  the signature of  a servant is suflicier~t  to bind the 
master, wllcll  it is proved  that the  servant has authority  to 
draw, accept, or  indorse bills  in his  inastcr's  name ; and  a 
subseclacnt assent is consiclercd as evidencc of sucll autl~ority. 
A general custonl of tl~e  servant's signature nllcl  ll~c  payment 
of  thc lrlastcr is liltcwisc n suficicnt proof  ol tllc general au 
thority ; and tl~is  will continue to  bincl the niaster uulil  his 
deterrninatioll to the contrary call be generally known. 
PIEOMISSORY NOTES. 
Promissory notes  are,  in gcncml,  considered iu tl~e  sanle 
light as inland bills of  exchange ; thc resemblance betweell 
their1 is greatest when a pro~nissory  note is indorsetl ;  fbr such 
an indorsement is m order to thc inaker of  the note to  pay 
the sum mentioned in it to a third  person.  Thus  thc first in- 
dorser of  the note  corresponds to the drawer of  the l~ill,  al~d 
the nlaker to tlic acceptor ; and in that scnsc all the laws re- 
lating  to  bills  of  ex~hiingc  may be ctpplielt  to  promissory 
notes;  and they  have  the  sanie  allowai~ce  of  tl~rce  days 
grace for paymcnt. 
When the form of  a bill or pro~riissory  note  is illcontesta- 
bly  good, the law is tlle sarrlc for  Loth ; yet a  not13 iilay be 
valid in soine cases when a  bill of  excllange is r~ot  so ; thus 
a prolnissory uote call  be  made payable  out of  a pal ticular 
fhd,  then within the power  of  tho drawer ; neilllsr is it nc- 240  ELE~IENTS  OF  EXCHANGE. 
cessary that the  time of  payn~eilt  oi'  a note should  be  abso- 
lutely fixed ; thus, notes  have been  held to  be  good  which 
were payable at a certaill person's  death, or after such a ship 
should  be paid off;  in short, at the period of  an event  phy- 
sically or morally certain ; but  should  the payment depend 
on a contingency  which  may never  happen, as  if  it  were 
payable when such person should marry, the note cannot be 
accounted good. 
BONDS. 
A bond for money is a  higher  security than a bill of  ex- 
change or a promissory note, as it binds  the giver, his heirs, 
and lands,  in  the  first  instance;  whereas bills  and  notes 
attach only  on personals ; and,  in case of  death,  a  bond, 
as a specialty under seal, is paid before simple contract debts, 
which bills and notes are considered to be. 
A bond may be  transferred by a deed  of  assignment, bat 
not by indorsement, and therefore it is not deemed a negotia- 
ble security, like a bill of  exchange or a promissory note.  In 
foreign countries, however, bills  of  exchange only are bind- 
ing, as before noticed. 
BILLS, BONDS,  AND NOTES,  HOW VOID. 
It  should be observed that the foregoing laws apply only to 
debts  legally contracted.  For  no  bill, note, or bond, made 
by a bankrupt, or by an insane person, can be valid ;  neither 
by a minor, nor a married woman, except in a few particular 
cases.  Neither is  any bill, note,  or bond binding  when the 
whole,  or any part of  thc consideration shall be  for  money, 
or other valuablc  thing, won  by gaming or  betting, or  lent 
knowingly for such purposes ; or for  money lcnt on usury ; 
that is at more than the legal interest, which is five per  cent. 
per annum. 
ehould not, witllili a  reasonable time,  deinalid  pay~nent,  Ile 
,nust bear the loss in case the banker or drawer should fail in 
the interim : but what shall be deemed a reasonable time has 
not been precisely fixed, as it must depend on situation ; and, 
therefore, whenever it becomes a question of  law, it is left to 
the jury, or court, to decide according to the circuinstances of 
the case.  The  general practice  is to present checks for pay- 
ment on the day they are received  or dated, and during  the 
hours of  banking business, which are from nine  o'clock  in 
the nlorning to five in the afternoon. 
If  a check on a banker be refused payment, he who gave it 
is bound  to  ~nalte  it good ; and if  it be  lost, he must also 
make it  good, on  receiving a  satisfactory security  that the 
lost draft will not appear against him. 
As a precaution against loss, it is customary to write across 
a draft, as soon as received, the firm of  the house into which 
it is to be paid ; by which may be  understood that it will not 
be  paid to any other house or person without proper  inquiry. 
This  practice is also useful in clearing. 
Clearing is a method adopted by London bankers for  ex- 
changing drafts and bills on each other's  houses, as they be- 
come due, and settling the differences.  This important ope- 
ration  is  performed  daily, at an office  called  the Clearing 
House,  with  great correctness  and dispatch, and with  such 
method, that bills and drafts to the amouut of  $5,000,000  on 
an  average are canceled at each clearing, with less than one 
twentieth part of  that sum in Bank of  England notes. 
Clearing,  though  of  modern  adoption  in England, has 
been long practiced in other countries, particularly in settling 
bills  of  exchange,  and other  documents  of  credit, at the 
great fairs on the continent.  The invention of  this method 
is ascribed to the Florentines, but the practice has been greatly 
improved by the London bankers. 
DRAFTS ON BANKERS. 
Drafts and  checks  on  bai~kcra  are  gene~.alIy  received by 
tnerchants as ready  cash ; and if  the party receiving  lhern PRINCIPLES OF EXCHANGE. 
INLAND EXCI-IANGE. 
By inland exchange is understood the act of remitting bills 
to places in the  same country ; by which  means debts  are 
dis~harged  more conveniently than by cash remittances. 
Suppose for example,  A,  of  London,  is creditor  to B, of 
Edinburgh, &I00 ; and C, of  London, debtor to Dl of Edin- 
burgh, &I00 ; both these debts may be discharged by means 
of one bill.  Thus, A draws for this sum on 13, and sells his 
bill to C, who remits it  to  Dl  and the  latter  receives  the 
amount when due from B.  Here, by a transfer of claims, the 
London  debtor  pays  the  London  creditor, and  the Edin- 
burgh  debtor  the  Edinburgh  creditor,  and no  money  is 
sent from one place  to  the other.  Tlle  same would  take 
place if  Dl of  Edinburgh,  drew on C,  of  London, and sold 
,his  bill to B, of  Edinburgh, who should send it to A, of  Lon- 
don ; thc effect,  in  either casc,  being merely  a  transfer  of 
debtors and creditors." 
By the  foregoing exan~plc,  it  appears tlirtt reciprocal  and 
equal debts, due between two places, nlay be dis~l~arged  with- 
out remitting specie ; ancl it may be  supposed, tl~at  such an 
operation is of  eclual converiicnce to all partiee; concerned : but 
when the debts are uleclual the aclvatltage must be diflerent, 
as  the obligation of remittance is no longer mutual, because the 
debtor place  must pay its  balance  either by sending cash or 
bills ; and as the latter nlode  is  generally preferred, an in- 
creased demand for bills must be the consequence, which en- 
hances their price, as it would that of any other article of sale 
or purchase. 
This is the plain principle of  exchange, and is  constantly 
exemplified in the premium paid for  inland bills on London, 
*  I11  this operation A is the drawer and seller, B  the drauee and  accept% 
C, the buycr and remiltcr, and D,  thepayee, if his name be ~nentioned  in tl~e 
bill, and he is the l~older  when he receives the bill from  A.  Whcn D, or any 
other holdcr preseuts the bill for acreptancc or ~)ayl~lcnt,  he iscalled the prc- 
scnlcr. 
which  is  the grand emporium  of  coinnlerce  that furnishes 
most other places in the kingdom  with foreign merchandise ; 
and being also the seat of  government, to which the revenue 
is  transmitted, and  the  residence of  numerous  landlords, 
whose rents must  bc remitted  to  them from the country,  it 
hns generally a large balance of  debt in its favor ; and as this 
balance is usually paid in bills, adenland for them is created, 
and therefore a prelniuin is tlie consequence. 
The  premiu~n  on inland bills is mostly co~n~nuted  for time ; 
that is, for a certain number of  days. after date or after sight, 
which variee according to circumstances.  Thus, the general 
term for bills from Edinburgh on London is forty days'date, 
which is valued at about +  per cent., and is called the par 
date.  A similar premium, or  date,  is allowed .for  bills on 
London drawn in all other distant parts of Great Britain ;  but 
bills at  sight, on any of  those places, may be generally had 
in IJondon without any premium.  Thus, the  inland  ex- 
change is constantly in  favor of  the capital ; and the date 
term varies according to the greater or less demand for bills. 
FOREIGN EXC:HANGE. 
The  principle of  foreign exchange is the same as that of 
inland,  with  respect to  settling  accounts  by  a  transfer  of 
claims, and also by the premium or price of bills being regu- 
lated by  the proportion  which exists  between  the demand 
and supply : but the lnanner of  paying the premium for fo- 
reign bills differs, and the operation is  more complex, owing 
to the denominations of  money not being the satne : for, in 
this case, the valrie of  bills  is  estimated  by the comparative 
rate of  moneys ; and the date is, besides, talien into conside- 
ration. 
In foreign  exdlange  one place  always gives  another a 
fixed sum or piece of money for  a variable price;  the former 
is called the certain price, and the latter the uncertain price, 
hat is, the ,C  sterling for  a  variable number of  francs ; and 
to  Spain  the  .~tnce~-tniw  for the  certain, tllat is,  a  variable number of  pence sterling for  the dollar of exchange.  The 
uncertain price, as quoted at, any time, is called the rate, or 
cozcrse of  exchange. 
When the demand in London  for bills on Paris is great, a 
smaller  number of  francs is  given for  the pound  ~terling  ; 
and the contrary: and when  there is  a demand for bills on 
Spain, a greater number of  pence sterling  must be given for 
the dollar ; and the contrary. 
Again, if  the  course  of  exchange between  London and 
Paris be twenty-four francs for the pound sterling-, and if  this 
number of  francs contains the  same quantity of  pure  silver 
as twenty shillings sterling, then the exchange is considered 
at par ;  but  if  Paris should  give  a  higher  price,  the ex- 
change is said to be against France and in favor of England. 
This is the general mode  of judging whether the exchange 
is favorable or  unfavorable, though it  is not always that on 
which merchants act, or  speculate.  But before any further 
explanation  is  given  of  the  course  of  exchange, or  the 
causes of its  fluctuations, it may be necessary  to  state  more 
fully what is to be understood  by the par  of  exchange, a 
subject on which there has been much  difference of opinion. 
PAR OF EXCHANGE. 
The  par of exchange may be considered under two general 
heads, viz. the intrinsic par and the commercial par, each 
of  which admits of  subordinate divisions and distinctions. 
The intrinsic par  is  the  value  of  the  money  of  one 
country compared with that of  another, with respect  both to 
weight and fineness. 
The commercial par is  the  comparative value  of  the 
moneys of  different countries, according  to  the weight,%ne- 
ness, and market prices of  the metals. 
Thus two sums of  different countries are intrinsically at 
par when they contain an equal  quantity of  the  same kind 
of  pure metal ; and t1~0  sums of  different countries are com- 
merciully at par when they call  pt~rchase  nn equal quanti- 
ty of  the same kind of  pure metal. 
This latter equivalence is  variously denominated.  It has 
been called by different authors the current, the momentary, 
the  rational, ~nd  the cventual par ;  and though  each  of 
these terms seems to convey a correct  idea of  its fluctuating 
and ephemeral  nature, yet  the  word  commercial is  here 
adopted  as being  equally  appropriate,  and  perhaps  more 
generally understood. 
There are other  pars  occasionally noticed  by merchants, 
such as the nominal  or  cstinzate par,  which, though  not 
accurate,  is commonly referred  to ; the  monetary  par, in 
which the current value, fixed  by authority, is  considered ; 
the proportional par, which is  the equality of  two sums of 
different countries, compared with the rate of  exchange of  a 
third place,  and which  is  also  called  the arbitrated price 
and the political par.  There is, besides, a ni,edium par, 
sometimes reckoned ; that is, a mean taken between the pars 
of  gold and silver coins. 
The  intrinsic par of exchange is, in effect, the par of coins, 
or the metallic par; for though the moneys of  exchange are, 
for tb;  most  part,  imaginary, their value  is  ascertained  by 
that  of  the coins  which  they  represent, or  to which  they 
have a known relation, or established proportion. 
An  approximate  or average par, may, however, be  com- 
puted from the relative  proportions  between gold and silver, 
as taken from the mint regulations of  the places in question ; 
and it  may be further  observed, that  the mint  proportions 
are considered the best  constituted when deduced  from  the 
market prices of  the precious  metqls, taken from an  average 
of  several years. 
Here  the  important  question  comes  to  be  considered, 
"  Whether the  par  of  exchange should be  computed  from 
gold or from silver coins '2"  Messrs. Locke, Harris, and other 
authors of  the last  century, agree, that.  cL the equality of  sil- 
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stitute  tllc  par  of  cxclinngr, between  any  t\vo  coantrics ;" 
1~111  Lord  L4iverpool,  in his '' T~.eatise  032  the  C'oilzs of'  the 
Realm,"  maintains, that the proper measure of  value should 
be of  that metal in mhich the principal  payments are made, 
and therefore, that in  sonie coui~tries  the par should be com- 
puted from  gold, an11 in others  from  silver, according to the 
kind  of  money  in which  bills  of  exchange  are paid.  In 
Englaud, however,  gold  has  been  made  the standard  of 
value, by a law of  1816, which enact3 that no payment  in 
silver, above two pounds, is a legal tender. 
A differeilck of  opinion has  also existed  as to the correct- 
ness of establishing a par between gold coins and silver coins, 
as  these  two  metals  are liable to  contii~ual  fluctuation in 
their  relative prices.  It is however obvious, that the intrin- 
sic par of  exchange can be deterlnilled  only between places 
which pay their bills in the same Irintl of  metal.  It should 
be even remarked, that the value of  tlie  same  metal differs 
considerably indifferent countries, which must be always the 
case between two places, where one possesses mines, and sup- 
plies the other with materials of  coinage, as  between  Spain 
and France, or between  Portugal gild England.  The dif- 
ference in such cases is  estimated, in ordinary times, accord- 
ing to the expenses of  transporting the precious rnetals; and 
thus,  from the intrinsic par,  and the various  charges and 
prices, the com~nercial  equivalence  is computed. 
In determining  the  intrinsic  par  of  exchange,  anothel 
question  occurs ; namely, whether  the computation  should 
be  made from nzint rcg~~lations,  or from assays  ?  The  ob- 
jection  to  the first is, that all  lnii~ts  do  not keep  strictly  to 
their own laws ; and to  the second, that there can be no as- 
surance that the coins to be assayed are proper average speci- 
mens.  The latter is, perhaps,  the least  objectionable, and 
therefore  a  calculation  from  accredited  assays is generally 
preferred.  In the present ~vorlr  (.he ~om~uti~tions  are made 
according to both methods. 
COURSE OF EXCHANt;E. 
The  course of exchange is the variable price of  the motley 
of one country which is given for a fixed sum of  the money 
of  another country ; the latter is called the  certain, and the 
former the uncertaiu price, as before stated. 
When London merchants want  to draw or  remit foreign 
bills, they meet upon the Royal Exchange, where this kind 
of  business must be transacted.  They  are distinguished into 
two  classes, called d~uzocrs  and remitters ;  the  former are 
also called  sellers of  bills, and the latter bz~yers  or  takers, 
and like buyers or sellers  of  all other articles, their interests 
are opposite.  The  ~narket  is constantly attended by exchange 
brokers, who generally bring  the parties  together, and settle 
the price  of  exchange for the day, when they  have learned 
how the market stands with respect to the wants or offers of 
buyers and sellers.  It should be observed, that the prices of 
bullion and exchange reciprocally determine, or at  least influ- 
ence each other. 
When the marliet price of  foreign bills is above par, the es- 
change is said to be  favorable to the place that gives the cer- 
tain for the uncertain, and the contrary ; thus, if  the par be- 
tween  London  and  Hamburgh be  computed  nt thirty-five 
shillings Flemish for  one  pound  sterling, and the course of 
exchange is at thirty-six  shillings, the exchange is said to be 
in favor  of  London, and against Hamburgh ; and  the con- 
trary of  course takes place if  the price be under par. 
It should however be recollected, that when the exchange 
is favorable to a place, it is only so to the buyers  and remit- 
ters of  bills, but it is unfavorable to the drawers and sellers. 
Thus  the interest of  the remitter is  identified with that of 
the place where he purchases the bill, and the interest of  the 
drawer with that of the place where his funds are established, 
and on which he draws. 
It is natural to inquire why such prices are considered  fa- 
vorable or  unfqvorable,  if  the drawers and remitters, whose 
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usual answer is, that when the exchange is  against a place, 
it becomes the interest of  remitters to  pay their foreign debts 
in  specie  or bullion instead  of  bills ; and the exportation of 
the precious metals is often considered a national clisadvan- 
tage. 
The fluctuations  of  exchange are  occasioned by various 
circurnstances, both  political and co~~imercial.  The  princi- 
pal cause is generally stated to be the balance of  trade:  that 
is, the  difference  between  the commercial  exports and im- 
ports  of  any one  country with  respect  to  another.  Expe- 
perience  however  shows,  hat  the  exchange inay be unfa- 
vorable to a country when the balance of  trade is greatly in 
its favor ; for the demand for bills must chiefly depend on the 
balance  of  such  debts as come  into imlnediate liquidation : 
that is to say, on the balance  of  payn~arzts. 
Besides,  it  does not follow that large  exports are alwajrs 
successful, or quick in their returns ; and even should it  be 
the case, the  balance of  payments  may be still unfavorable 
from political causes : such as foreign loans, subsidies, expe- 
ditions, or colonial establishments.  Rich countries are often 
liable to have the exchange turned against them, by the sums 
which  they may ].lave to remit to less opulent  states on  ac- 
count of  their importations of  luxuries. . 
When any alterations take place in the coin or currency of 
a country, the exchange will of  course  vary,  so as to  keep 
pace or correspond with such alteration.  This, however, can- 
not be considered a change in the price  of  bills but  in the 
money in which they are bought or sold. 
In times of  peace t.he course of  exchange seldom remains 
long unfavorable to any country, at least beyond the expenses 
that might be incurred by the transportation of  the precious 
i~~etals  ; for bullion  is  considered the universal  currency of 
merchants, and exchange gives it circulation, and thus tends 
to maintain the  level of  money throughout  the cominercial 
world. 
DESCRIPTION OF BRITISH STOCKS, 
I.IJLLALLD  l1lO.M 
VARIOUS  AUl'HENTIC SOURCES, 
AND  IIEUULED  10  Tllk 
AlONEY  OF  'I'HE  UNI'I'ED  STATES. DESCRTPTION  OF'  BR.TTISH  STOCKS. 
NAVY  Five per  cent. Annuities : prodrlced from about 50 
lnillions of  stock, partly formed on navy bills,  converted, in 
1784, into stock bearing  interest at 5  per cent. ; whence the 
name.  $222,222,222.22 
Four  per cent.  Consolidated  Annuities : produced  from 
about the same quantity of  stock as the last, bearing interest 
at 4  per cent.,  as the title  indicates.  These annuities  are 
called consols, or  consolidated, from  the  stock  having  been 
formed by the consolidation of  several debts of  gavel-nment. 
Three per  cent.  Reduced  Annuities:  produced  by about 
170  n~illions  of  stock,  forlned from several debts, that origi- 
nally  bore  higher rate  of  interest ; but  which,  on various 
conditions, has been  reduced to the rate which the name of 
the stock expresses.  $755,555,555.55 
Three per  cent.  Consolidated  Annuities :  produced  by 
about 400 millions of  stock, in part forlned by the consolida- 
tion of  several  stocks, bearing interest at 3 per cent.  IS.  B. 
When the word consols is  indefinitely used, it is always un- 
derstood to mean these annuities.  $1,777,777,777.77 
Three per cent. Imperial Annuities : produced by about 8 
l~lillions  of stock created by loans to the emperor of Germany, 
with security for the interest's being  paid by the government 
of this country, when the emperor should  fail in his engage- 
ment.  $35,555,555.55 
Five per cent. Irish Annuities: produced by about two mil- 
liolls of  stock,  formed  by loans  for the use  of  Ireland hefore 
the union.  $8,888,888.88 25'2  DESCRIPTION OF  BRITISH STOCKS,  DESCRIPTION OF BRITISH 8TOCKS.  253 
Bank Stock is a  capital  of  nearly  twelve  millions, 
$59,333,333.33, 
from which the company of the Bank of  England has accom- 
modctted government with various loans, and with which they 
carry on the banking business, purchase  bullion, &c.  The 
dividends  on bank  stock are now ten per cent. ; so that the 
profits  of  the company are nea14y $1,200,000  per annum. 
$5,333,333.33 
India Stock  fornls  the  trading capital of  the East India 
Company.  This  stock, (six millions,)  $40,000,000.00, 
produces a dividend of  10f per cent. per annum. 
$4,200,000.00. 
South Sen Stock  Annuities consist of  a  capital of  nearly 
twenty nlillions,  $88,888,888.88, 
or they are proclucecl  from  it.  'Fhe  greater part. of  this was 
lent to  government, for which the  Soutll  Sen Company re- 
ceive 3  per  cent. but  frotn the increase of  ot1lc.r  profits, the 
dividends to the proprietors :\re 3;  per cent. 
$3,111,111.11 
The  terminable annuities are : 
Bank Long  Annuities : so callecl,  frorn  the annual pay- 
ments being,  from their  origin, made payable  at the bank, 
and  from their  being  granted for a  greater  length of  time 
than other terminable annuities.  Tliese annuities extend to 
tile beginning  of  the year 1860, and the  annual payments 
are about 1,100,000 pouncls.  $4,888,888.88 
Trnperial Short  Annuities : formed in  the same manner, 
and  upon the same conditions as tlie Imperial Three per cent. 
Annuities.  They extend to >'lay, 1819, and amount to up- 
wards of  $320,000  per annum.  $1,422,222.22 
Besides the pcr~nanent  loans  to  government, which have 
the perpetual and terminable annuities, various sums 
have been raised fro111  tiroe to time as temporary  loan^, which 
are called Exchequer bills, from their being made paphle  at 
the treasury of  the exchequer. 
Exchequer bills are issued  for  different hundreds or tho~r 
sands of  pounds, and bear  an interest of  S+d.  per cent. per 
diem, from  the day of  their  date, to the  tiwe when they are 
advertised to be paid 0% 
Navy bills are merely bills of exchange, drawn at 90 days' 
date, and ale given by the coinmissioners of  the navy for the 
amount of  supplies for the use of  that department ; and the 
interest upon these, amounts to 3d. per cent. per diem. 
Omnium is a term denoting the different stocks formed by 
a loan, while any part of  the loan remains unpaid.  For ex- 
ample, suppose 20 millions of  money are to be raised, and for 
every $2100 in money, are to be  given $100  stock in the 3 
per cents., S50  stock in the 4 per cents., and 6s. 3d. per cent. 
in the  long  annuities ; then, if  any person  engages to  ad- 
vance &10,000 in money, upon paying the iirst  installinent 
(for tlie  rnoncy is  usually advanced at the rate of  about 10 
' 
per cent. per inontli, until the whole  is paid)  he will receive 
receipts which  separately contain an engagement to transfer 
to the person  possessing them,  6;10,000 stock  in the 3 per 
cents., $5,000  stock in the 4 per  cents., and $31  10s. stock 
in  the long  annuities, upon the whole of  the installments 
being paid,  at or before  the appointed  time.  While these 
three receipts are sold togcther, and before the  \vhole of  the 
installments have been paid, they arc called Omnium, as they 
nre made up of  all, or of  several of  the stoclrs. 
Scrip is a term given  to each of  the receipts of  the omni- 
urn,  when they are  sold  separately ; thus in the  foregoing 
supposition,  if  the  receipt  cont~ining  the  engagement  to 
transfer the f,l0,000  in the 3 per  cents., be sold ~vithout  the 
other two receipts, this could  bt:  called  a  sale of  scrip.  Tm- 
mediately  upon  the  whole of  the  installments  upon  any 
scrips  being paid, the trctnsfer of  the  stock is made  to  the 
person who buys it, anrl  herc is lisllnlly n  discollnt  nllowcd 
for prompt, payment. 
The  priers of  the stoclis, kc.,  arc, exhibitetl in tlie lists that 
are pubii~hed  in  this 111nnner.--The  value of' any perpelilal 
annuity, tllua : Three per  cent.  Consols, 636, 649, 644, signifies that the 
value of  $100  stock of  these  annuities, sold on the day tl~is 
price was given; was %63 2s. 6d. in money at tbe beginning 
of the market, that this  stoclr  rose  to  $64  15s., and left oti 
S64 10s. 
The  value of  any termillable annuity, thus : 
Bank  Long Annuities,  16$-16i  : signifying,  that any 
annual psyment  of  these  annuities wag  worth 16;  years' 
purchase at the beginning,  and left  oti at 16;  years'  pur- 
chase at the end of  the market. 
Exchequer bills 2, 4 premium ; or India bonds, 1  or 2 dis- 
count.  This signifies, that every  %I00 in  exchequer bills, 
bore premium of  2s. at the beginning, and  advanced to  4s. 
in the end of  that day ; and that every $100  in India bonds 
sold at first at Is. premium, and afterwards sold at 2 discount. 
The  value of  Olnnium is expressed thus : 
Omnium  3;  premium, 54  discount:  and  signifies that 
every &I00  of  Omnium, brought a  premium of  s3  lOs., or 
sold  at a  loss of  &5 10s. on the  government  receipts,  for 
%100, transferred on that day on the stock exchange. 